hmmm.… not-lying is moral in the kantian sense. It’s often ‘moral’ in the utilitarian sense, though definitely not always—as in your examples, or when the proverbial murderer is at the door, asking if his chosen victim is at home.
On top of that, I don’t think rationality is necessarily moral. Many rationalists may also be very moral people, but that s not a requirement—thus, I think there is plenty of room for lying in rationality, whether its moral (by some definition) or not. Often it may be very rational to be moral—but that is not necessarily always the case.
hmmm.… not-lying is moral in the kantian sense. It’s often ‘moral’ in the utilitarian sense, though definitely not always—as in your examples, or when the proverbial murderer is at the door, asking if his chosen victim is at home.
On top of that, I don’t think rationality is necessarily moral. Many rationalists may also be very moral people, but that s not a requirement—thus, I think there is plenty of room for lying in rationality, whether its moral (by some definition) or not. Often it may be very rational to be moral—but that is not necessarily always the case.