Don’t think that would help—instead of knowing the actual votes Vi for post i, I would have some distribution P(Vi) over the votes cast for i, and my intuition is that as long as I have sufficient probability mass above the threshold, it would skew my incentives.
But doesn’t the knowledge that everyone else is also doing this converge to just stating my true preferences… Or something? I don’t really have a feel for the game theory behind this, but it feels like knowing that everyone is trying to vote strategically makes it hard for me to count on other people voting for things that I don’t vote on.
I don’t expect everyone to vote strategically. In fact, I expect most users to act in good-faith and do their best. I still think these things can be a problem.
That’s interesting, because I expect most people to vote strategically when using QV. The structure of QV heavily encourages thinking about the value of each marginal vote.
Trying to allocate your budget truthfully in accordance with your preferences about posts != trying to game the rules as an unbounded EV-maximiser would.
Strategic voting for me = trying to think how much value your vote has relative to the outcome you’re trying to achieve. I don’t see for instance looking at how many people have already voted on something as “gaming the rules”, it just changes the value of a marginal vote of my own. I expect most people to think like that because QV is already making you think about the marginal value of another vote.
One interesting way to get around this problem would be to have votes be private.
This would probably create other weird dynamics.
Don’t think that would help—instead of knowing the actual votes Vi for post i, I would have some distribution P(Vi) over the votes cast for i, and my intuition is that as long as I have sufficient probability mass above the threshold, it would skew my incentives.
But doesn’t the knowledge that everyone else is also doing this converge to just stating my true preferences… Or something? I don’t really have a feel for the game theory behind this, but it feels like knowing that everyone is trying to vote strategically makes it hard for me to count on other people voting for things that I don’t vote on.
I don’t expect everyone to vote strategically. In fact, I expect most users to act in good-faith and do their best. I still think these things can be a problem.
That’s interesting, because I expect most people to vote strategically when using QV. The structure of QV heavily encourages thinking about the value of each marginal vote.
Trying to allocate your budget truthfully in accordance with your preferences about posts != trying to game the rules as an unbounded EV-maximiser would.
Strategic voting for me = trying to think how much value your vote has relative to the outcome you’re trying to achieve. I don’t see for instance looking at how many people have already voted on something as “gaming the rules”, it just changes the value of a marginal vote of my own. I expect most people to think like that because QV is already making you think about the marginal value of another vote.