Heh. I take it you’ve been reading RationalWiki again.
(Edited to add: I regret having to explain the joke, but anyway: the obvious difference between the rationalist and SJ cmmunities is that the rationalist community is equipped with the proper cognitive tools and social norms for dealing with phyg-like tendencies, whereas social justice groups—broadly understood—are not. This marks a big difference between the two—which incidentally explains why I do find it at least marginally worthwhile to participate in LW. Equating these two situations really is not that different from what RationalWiki states in its LessWrong page: the denotation is broadly correct—the article may well be a useful sanity check for LW users—but the connotation is arguably very misleading.)
EDIT: Y’know what, actually, forget snippy replying back to the snip. What I find damn fascinating about this reply is that the suggestion that any of those labels might apply here immediately prompted a guess at which Other Tribe I must be secretly infiltrating from.
the obvious difference between the rationalist and SJ cmmunities is that the rationalist community is equipped with the proper cognitive tools and social norms for dealing with phyg-like tendencies, whereas social justice groups—broadly understood—are not.
To me this reads more as rationalist cheering than as a good argument in favor of LW social norms. Yes, we’ve generally got a good opinion of LW culture around here—that’s why we’re posting here rather than on, say, Tiger Beatdown. But that’s hardly surprising.
What are the specific norms and cognitive tools that make the LW community so well equipped, and where’s the evidence that we’re actually implementing them successfully? If we don’t have a good answer to that, we shouldn’t be making the claim.
To me this reads more as rationalist cheering than as a good argument in favor of rationalist social norms.
You may want to refer to EY’s article about Guardians of Ayn Rand. Objectivists may have been “rationalists” in some sense, but did they ever claim to have good cognitive and social tools against phyg-ishness? Of course they didn’t, because they expended no effort on developing such tools, and coming up with tools or successfully applying them conferred no status benefits within their social group. Do you spot the difference now? Good, it’s nice that we’re clearing this up.
If we don’t have a good answer to that, we shouldn’t be making the claim.
I agree that we should not be focusing too much (or at all) on this particular claim about ourselves, as a matter of basic epistemic hygiene: as LW insiders, we should fear and alieve that we really are being too phyg-ish, as opposed to not phyg-ish at all. Nonetheless, there are exceptions—such as when a naïve comparison is drawn between LessWrong and garden-variety social and political movements. At some point, it really becomes important to set the record straight.
Objectivists may have “rationalists” in some sense, but did they ever claim to have good cognitive and social tools against phyg-ishness? Of course they didn’t, because they expended no effort on developing such tools...
Depends how wide your scope is. It’s fairly rare for groups to use the cult terminology (my impression is that LW developed its vocabulary in that area mainly thanks to early accusations of being a personality cult centered on EY; consider Two Cult Koans). But it’s quite common for groups to identify as “the non-clique clique”, to borrow a phrase from a recent conversation: that’s an identity shared by all of Objectivism, LW rationality, and most strains of social justice. Their methods for attempting that status vary, but all indications are that it’s a hard problem, which is exactly why we should wait on data before making any strong claims about our methodology.
As to Objectivism specifically, my knowledge of the group is limited to Rand’s writings, but she seems to have been under the impression that what she saw as rigorous axiomatization would be enough to prevent the pitfalls of ideology. She put a huge amount of effort into streamlining her philosophy along those lines, far more than we’ve put into combating happy death spirals and the affect heuristic directly. In retrospect that was clearly a bad approach, but in her own context it wasn’t obviously so; it seemed to have worked for mathematics, after all, which was making huge strides around when she was writing.
But it’s quite common for groups to identify as “the non-clique clique”, to borrow a phrase from a recent conversation:
Unfortunately, “the non-clique clique” is vulnerable to outgroup-homogeneity and related biases. It’s all too easy to think that they are a clique with simplistic views, wereas we (our own tribe) are a diverse group with a variety of opinions and well-argued viewpoints. It’s not clear that this adds anything in terms of basic hygiene.
… what she saw as rigorous axiomatization would be enough to prevent the pitfalls of ideology. She put a huge amount of effort into streamlining her philosophy along those lines …
I assume that Objectivism was not in fact the first known attempt at “rigorous axiomatized” philosophy—so the outside view should’ve been fairly clear, even at the time. Besides, it’s not clear what you (or perhaps Rand herself) mean by “ideology”: informally, rigorous axiomatization seems to be a recipe for absolute-sounding, black-and-white statements. Is it really plausible that this would not be understood at the time?
“the non-clique clique” is vulnerable to outgroup-homogeneity and related biases. It’s all too easy to think that they are a clique with simplistic views, wereas we (our own tribe) are a diverse group with a variety of opinions and well-argued viewpoints.
Which is exactly my point. Everyone thinks this, and most of them are wrong. What I’m hoping for is some data point that suggests, from the outside view, that our approach of focusing on the underlying heuristics and biases is more effective at preventing actual affective death spirals than Rand’s axiomatization or SJ’s focus on symptoms. Once again, knowledge of bias isn’t well correlated with reduction of bias, and there’s very little consistency here in actual epistemic hygiene practice. The minicamps might have data, but I’m not involved in those.
Objectivism was not in fact the first known attempt at “rigorous axiomatized” philosophy—so the outside view should’ve been fairly clear [...] Besides, it’s not clear what you (or perhaps Rand herself) mean by “ideology”: informally, rigorous axiomatization seems to be a recipe for absolute-sounding, black-and-white statements.
Rand was looking for absolute-sounding statements; indeed, she was looking for absolute statements, things you could treat as theorems and therefore wouldn’t need to worry about bias in. It’s not too far wrong to describe Objectivism as an attempt to axiomatize political philosophy (and to a lesser extent other branches of philosophy, though her attempts at these were much weaker) along mathematical lines. This had been tried before (I believe Leibniz took a whack at it), but not successfully, and not famously.
Heh. I take it you’ve been reading RationalWiki again.
(Edited to add: I regret having to explain the joke, but anyway: the obvious difference between the rationalist and SJ cmmunities is that the rationalist community is equipped with the proper cognitive tools and social norms for dealing with phyg-like tendencies, whereas social justice groups—broadly understood—are not. This marks a big difference between the two—which incidentally explains why I do find it at least marginally worthwhile to participate in LW. Equating these two situations really is not that different from what RationalWiki states in its LessWrong page: the denotation is broadly correct—the article may well be a useful sanity check for LW users—but the connotation is arguably very misleading.)
EDIT: Y’know what, actually, forget snippy replying back to the snip. What I find damn fascinating about this reply is that the suggestion that any of those labels might apply here immediately prompted a guess at which Other Tribe I must be secretly infiltrating from.
I think that says a lot.
To me this reads more as rationalist cheering than as a good argument in favor of LW social norms. Yes, we’ve generally got a good opinion of LW culture around here—that’s why we’re posting here rather than on, say, Tiger Beatdown. But that’s hardly surprising.
What are the specific norms and cognitive tools that make the LW community so well equipped, and where’s the evidence that we’re actually implementing them successfully? If we don’t have a good answer to that, we shouldn’t be making the claim.
You may want to refer to EY’s article about Guardians of Ayn Rand. Objectivists may have been “rationalists” in some sense, but did they ever claim to have good cognitive and social tools against phyg-ishness? Of course they didn’t, because they expended no effort on developing such tools, and coming up with tools or successfully applying them conferred no status benefits within their social group. Do you spot the difference now? Good, it’s nice that we’re clearing this up.
I agree that we should not be focusing too much (or at all) on this particular claim about ourselves, as a matter of basic epistemic hygiene: as LW insiders, we should fear and alieve that we really are being too phyg-ish, as opposed to not phyg-ish at all. Nonetheless, there are exceptions—such as when a naïve comparison is drawn between LessWrong and garden-variety social and political movements. At some point, it really becomes important to set the record straight.
Depends how wide your scope is. It’s fairly rare for groups to use the cult terminology (my impression is that LW developed its vocabulary in that area mainly thanks to early accusations of being a personality cult centered on EY; consider Two Cult Koans). But it’s quite common for groups to identify as “the non-clique clique”, to borrow a phrase from a recent conversation: that’s an identity shared by all of Objectivism, LW rationality, and most strains of social justice. Their methods for attempting that status vary, but all indications are that it’s a hard problem, which is exactly why we should wait on data before making any strong claims about our methodology.
As to Objectivism specifically, my knowledge of the group is limited to Rand’s writings, but she seems to have been under the impression that what she saw as rigorous axiomatization would be enough to prevent the pitfalls of ideology. She put a huge amount of effort into streamlining her philosophy along those lines, far more than we’ve put into combating happy death spirals and the affect heuristic directly. In retrospect that was clearly a bad approach, but in her own context it wasn’t obviously so; it seemed to have worked for mathematics, after all, which was making huge strides around when she was writing.
Unfortunately, “the non-clique clique” is vulnerable to outgroup-homogeneity and related biases. It’s all too easy to think that they are a clique with simplistic views, wereas we (our own tribe) are a diverse group with a variety of opinions and well-argued viewpoints. It’s not clear that this adds anything in terms of basic hygiene.
I assume that Objectivism was not in fact the first known attempt at “rigorous axiomatized” philosophy—so the outside view should’ve been fairly clear, even at the time. Besides, it’s not clear what you (or perhaps Rand herself) mean by “ideology”: informally, rigorous axiomatization seems to be a recipe for absolute-sounding, black-and-white statements. Is it really plausible that this would not be understood at the time?
Which is exactly my point. Everyone thinks this, and most of them are wrong. What I’m hoping for is some data point that suggests, from the outside view, that our approach of focusing on the underlying heuristics and biases is more effective at preventing actual affective death spirals than Rand’s axiomatization or SJ’s focus on symptoms. Once again, knowledge of bias isn’t well correlated with reduction of bias, and there’s very little consistency here in actual epistemic hygiene practice. The minicamps might have data, but I’m not involved in those.
Rand was looking for absolute-sounding statements; indeed, she was looking for absolute statements, things you could treat as theorems and therefore wouldn’t need to worry about bias in. It’s not too far wrong to describe Objectivism as an attempt to axiomatize political philosophy (and to a lesser extent other branches of philosophy, though her attempts at these were much weaker) along mathematical lines. This had been tried before (I believe Leibniz took a whack at it), but not successfully, and not famously.