I read it as “You can consciously choose your actions, but your ultimate reasons will always be subconscious and unchangeable.”
I disagree with this. Many of our conscious choices are driven by subconscious desires, but not all. We do have veto power. What’s more, through conscious repetition we can reprogram the subconscious and change how we feel about things, even on a very deep level.
Do we ‘choose’ to exercise our veto power? If so, then is there a reason for this choice? Follow the thought chain and it will become apparent that even our choice to veto emanates from our unconscious. There is no escape. And no room for free-will.
Let’s be careful not to conflate choice with free will. It does seem quite inescapable that there is no room for free will, nevertheless, choice happens all the time. Perhaps the phenomenon of choosing cannot be feasibly examined at the same order of granularity that is required for the examination of free-will (just as it is unfeasible to examine the function of a house by examining each of its constituent atoms)? Perhaps choice is a phenomenon emergent, not reliant on any underlying freedom of will?
I read it as “You can consciously choose your actions, but your ultimate reasons will always be subconscious and unchangeable.”
I disagree with this. Many of our conscious choices are driven by subconscious desires, but not all. We do have veto power. What’s more, through conscious repetition we can reprogram the subconscious and change how we feel about things, even on a very deep level.
Do we ‘choose’ to exercise our veto power? If so, then is there a reason for this choice? Follow the thought chain and it will become apparent that even our choice to veto emanates from our unconscious. There is no escape. And no room for free-will.
Let’s be careful not to conflate choice with free will. It does seem quite inescapable that there is no room for free will, nevertheless, choice happens all the time. Perhaps the phenomenon of choosing cannot be feasibly examined at the same order of granularity that is required for the examination of free-will (just as it is unfeasible to examine the function of a house by examining each of its constituent atoms)? Perhaps choice is a phenomenon emergent, not reliant on any underlying freedom of will?