I’m not sure what your model here happens to be. I would expect that at a minimum you would need to lobby people with power to turn patents into products for that to happen.
From the progress study perspective the key question is whether if you make it easier to get patents and sue people with those patents, you will get less or more or new products.
Both are plausible outcomes and the effects are hard to know. Just pointing to the fact that life would be easier for some people in the ecosystem if it would be easier to get patents for them and sue people, does not automatically mean that this would be good for progress.
It’s not about making it “harder” or “easier to get patents”. That’s not what increasing the time that reviewers have to look at patents does.
There’s also a distinction between reducing the procedural difficulty of applying for patents and reducing the “real” difficulty of making a legitimate novel invention. You don’t seem to be making that distinction, but surely you agree it’s relevant?
If you reduce the backlog of patents, it’s “easier to get patents” and people are likely going to fill more patents.
I do agree that having a single reviewer spend more time to review a patent doesn’t make it harder or easier to get a patent.
If you worry about effects such as different reviewers making different decisions about when to accept or reject a patent, it would however be better to let every patent be independently reviewed by two patent clerks. If both vote approve, the patent gets approved. If both vote reject it gets rejected. If they differ a new patent clerk gets to be tie brackets.
Then you give bonuses to the patent clerks that least often need a third patent clerk as a tiebreaker and fire those patent clerks that need the most tie brackets.
Going from the current system to one where every application gets two reviewers isn’t easy but wouldn’t be impossible either.
One way would be to allow a process, where an inventor that request a patent can pay $10,000 to get two reviewers and jump ahead of the one-reviewer patent queue. At the end of each calendar month when the two-reviewer process takes longer than a month to reply to a patent application the price goes up by 10%. If the queue is empty the price goes down by 10%.
The money then goes to the patent office to hire more patent clerks. Maybe +200% fee would be better than a blanket sum given that different patent claims have different complexities.
There’s also a distinction between reducing the procedural difficulty of applying for patents and reducing the “real” difficulty of making a legitimate novel invention. You don’t seem to be making that distinction, but surely you agree it’s relevant?
If you are making a “legitimate novel invention” and do nothing to produce a product but sue all the people who make the same legitimate novel invention after you, I think that’s still a drag to progress overall.
If you reduce the backlog of patents, it’s “easier to get patents” and people are likely going to fill more patents.
Well, if you reduce the backlog by rejecting far more patents (especially those that aren’t demonstrated as feasible), then maybe people won’t file more.
I’m not sure what your model here happens to be. I would expect that at a minimum you would need to lobby people with power to turn patents into products for that to happen.
From the progress study perspective the key question is whether if you make it easier to get patents and sue people with those patents, you will get less or more or new products.
Both are plausible outcomes and the effects are hard to know. Just pointing to the fact that life would be easier for some people in the ecosystem if it would be easier to get patents for them and sue people, does not automatically mean that this would be good for progress.
It’s not about making it “harder” or “easier to get patents”. That’s not what increasing the time that reviewers have to look at patents does.
There’s also a distinction between reducing the procedural difficulty of applying for patents and reducing the “real” difficulty of making a legitimate novel invention. You don’t seem to be making that distinction, but surely you agree it’s relevant?
If you reduce the backlog of patents, it’s “easier to get patents” and people are likely going to fill more patents.
I do agree that having a single reviewer spend more time to review a patent doesn’t make it harder or easier to get a patent.
If you worry about effects such as different reviewers making different decisions about when to accept or reject a patent, it would however be better to let every patent be independently reviewed by two patent clerks. If both vote approve, the patent gets approved. If both vote reject it gets rejected. If they differ a new patent clerk gets to be tie brackets.
Then you give bonuses to the patent clerks that least often need a third patent clerk as a tiebreaker and fire those patent clerks that need the most tie brackets.
Going from the current system to one where every application gets two reviewers isn’t easy but wouldn’t be impossible either.
One way would be to allow a process, where an inventor that request a patent can pay $10,000 to get two reviewers and jump ahead of the one-reviewer patent queue. At the end of each calendar month when the two-reviewer process takes longer than a month to reply to a patent application the price goes up by 10%. If the queue is empty the price goes down by 10%.
The money then goes to the patent office to hire more patent clerks. Maybe +200% fee would be better than a blanket sum given that different patent claims have different complexities.
If you are making a “legitimate novel invention” and do nothing to produce a product but sue all the people who make the same legitimate novel invention after you, I think that’s still a drag to progress overall.
Well, if you reduce the backlog by rejecting far more patents (especially those that aren’t demonstrated as feasible), then maybe people won’t file more.
Yes, it’s possible to reduce the backlog that way but it wasn’t the strategy proposed in the OP.