The “is-ought” dichotomy is overrated, as are the kindred splits between normative and descriptive, practice and theory, etc. I suggest that every “normative” statement contains some “descriptive” import and vice versa. For example, “grass is green” implies statements like “if you want to see green, then other things being equal you should see some grass”, and “murder is immoral” implies something like “if you want to be able to justify your actions to fellow humans in open rational dialogue, you shouldn’t murder.” Where the corresponding motivation (e.g. “wanting to see green”) is idiosyncratic and whimsical, the normative import seems trivial and we call the statement descriptive. Where it is nearly-universal and typically dear, the normative import looms large. But the evidence that there are two radically different kinds of statement—or one category of statement and a radically different category of non-statement—is lacking. When philosophers try to produce such evidence, they usually assume a strong form of moral internalism which is not itself justifiable.
Well said. I’d go further:
The “is-ought” dichotomy is overrated, as are the kindred splits between normative and descriptive, practice and theory, etc. I suggest that every “normative” statement contains some “descriptive” import and vice versa. For example, “grass is green” implies statements like “if you want to see green, then other things being equal you should see some grass”, and “murder is immoral” implies something like “if you want to be able to justify your actions to fellow humans in open rational dialogue, you shouldn’t murder.” Where the corresponding motivation (e.g. “wanting to see green”) is idiosyncratic and whimsical, the normative import seems trivial and we call the statement descriptive. Where it is nearly-universal and typically dear, the normative import looms large. But the evidence that there are two radically different kinds of statement—or one category of statement and a radically different category of non-statement—is lacking. When philosophers try to produce such evidence, they usually assume a strong form of moral internalism which is not itself justifiable.