Evolutionary Biology might be good at telling us what we value. However, as GE Moore pointed out, ethics is about what we SHOULD value. What evolutionary ethics will teach us is that our mind/brains are maleable. Our values are not fixed.
And the question of what we SHOULD value makes sense because our brains are malleable. Our desires—just like our beliefs—are not fixed. They are learned. So, the question arises, “Given that we can mold desires into different forms, what SHOULD we mold them into?”
Besides, evolutionary ethics is incoherent. “I have evolved a disposition to harm people like you; therefore, you deserve to be harmed.” How does a person deserve punishment just because somebody else evolved a disposition to punish him.
Do we solve the question of gay marriage by determining whether the accusers actually have a genetic disposition to kill homosexuals? And if we discover they do, we leap to the conclusion that homosexuals DESERVE to be killed?
Why evolve a disposition to punish? That makes no sense.
What is this practice of praise and condemnation that is central to morality? Of deserved praise and condemnation? Does it make sense to punish somebody for having the wrong genes?
What, according to evolutionary ethics, is the role of moral argument?
Does genetics actually explain such things as the end of slavery, and a woman’s right to vote? Those are very fast genetic changes.
The reason that the Euthyphro argument works against evolutionary ethics because—regardless of what evolution can teach us about what we do value, it teaches us that our values are not fixed. Because values are not genetically determined, there is a realm in which it is sensible to ask about what we should value, which is a question that evolutionary ethics cannot answer. Praise and condemnation are central to our moral life precisely because these are the tools for shaping learned desires—resulting in an institution where the question of the difference between right and wrong is the question of the difference between what we should and should not praise or condemn.
Its lunchtime so for fun I will answer some of your rhetorical questions.
Evolutionary Biology might be good at telling us what we value. However, as GE Moore pointed out, ethics is about what we SHOULD value.
Unless GE Moore is either an alien or an artificial intelligence, he is telling us what we should value from a human brain that values things based on its evolution. How will he be able to make any value statement and tell you with a straight face that his valuing that thing has NOTHING to do with his evolution?
Besides, evolutionary ethics is incoherent. “I have evolved a disposition to harm people like you; therefore, you deserve to be harmed.” How does a person deserve punishment just because somebody else evolved a disposition to punish him.
My disposition to harm people is triggered approximately proportionally to my judgement that this person has or will harm me or someone I care about. My disposition doesn’t speak, but neither does my disposition to presume based on experience that the sun will rise tomorrow. What does speak says about the second that being able to predict the future based on the past is an incredibly effective way to understand the universe, so much so that it seems the niverse’s continuity from the past to the future is a feature of the universe, not just a feature of the tools my mind has developed to understand the universe. About my incoherent disposition to harm someone who is threatening my wife or my sister, I would invite you to consider life in a society where this disposition did not exist. Violent thieves would run roughshod over the non-violent, who would stand around naked, starving, and puzzled: “what can we do about this after all?”
Do we solve the question of gay marriage by determining whether the accusers actually have a genetic disposition to kill homosexuals? And if we discover they do, we leap to the conclusion that homosexuals DESERVE to be killed?
This sentence seems somewhat incoherent but I’ll address what I think are some of the interesting issues it evokes, if not quite brings up.
First, public open acceptance of homosexuality is a gigantic and modern phenomenon. If nothing else, it proves that an incredibly large number of humans DO NOT have any such genetic urge to kill homosexuals, or even to give them dirty looks when walking by them on the street for that matter. So if there is a lesson about concluding moral “oughts” from moral “is-es” here, it is that anybody who previously conclude that homicidal hatred of homosexuals was part of human genetic moral makeup was using insanely flawed methods for understanding genetic morality.
I would say that all attempts to derive ought from is, to design sensible rules for humans living and working together, should be approached with a great deal of caution and humility, especially given the clear tendency towards erroneous conclusions that may also be in our genes. But I would also say that any attempt at determining useful and valuable rules for living and working together which completely ignores what we might learn from evolutionary morality is “wrong” to do so, that any additional human suffering that occurs because these people willfully ignore useful scientific facts is blood on their hands.
What is this practice of praise and condemnation that is central to morality? Of deserved praise and condemnation? Does it make sense to punish somebody for having the wrong genes?
Well, it makes sense to restrict the freedom of anybody who does more social harm than social good if left unrestrained. It doesn’t matter whether the reason is bad genes or some other reason. We shoot a lion who is loose and killing suburbanites. You don’t have to call it punishment, but what if you do? It is still a gigantically sensible and useful thing to do.
Many genes produce tendencies in people that are moderated by feedback from the world. I have a tendency to be really good at linear algebra and math and building electronic things that work. Without education this might have gone unnoticed. Without positive accolades, I might have preferred to play the electric guitar. Perhaps someone who has a tendency to pick up things he likes and keep them, or to strike out at people who piss him off, will have behavior which is also moderated by his genes AND his environment. Perhaps training him to get along with other people will be the difference between an incarcerated petty thief and a talented corporate raider or linebacker.
The thing that is central to morality is inducing moral behavior. Praise and condemnation are not central, they are two techniques which may or may not help meet that end, and given the fact that they have been enhanced by evolution, I’m guessing they actually do work in a lot of circumstances.
What, according to evolutionary ethics, is the role of moral argument?
Moral argment writ small is a band of humans hashing out how they will get along running on the savannah. This has probably been going on long enough to be evolutionarily meaningful. How do we share the meat and the furs from the animal we cooperatively killed? Who gets to have sex with whom, and how do we change that result to something we like better? What do we do about that guy who keeps pooping in the water supply? The evidence that “talking about it” is useful is the incredibly high level of cooperative organization that humans demonstrate as compared to any other animal. Social insects are the only creatures I know of that even come close, and their high levels of organizations took 10s or 100s of thousands of years to refine, while the productivity of the human corporation or anything we have using a steam engine or a transistor has all been accomplished in 100 years or so.
Does genetics actually explain such things as the end of slavery, and a woman’s right to vote? Those are very fast genetic changes.
Does genetics explain an artificial heart? The 4 minute mile? Walking on the moon without dying? The heart is evolved, as is our ability to run, and our need to breathe and for gravity. Without knowing what the answer exactly is, these non-moral and very recent examples bear a similar relationship to our genetics as do the recent moral examples in the question. Sorry to not answer this one, except by tangent.
Because values are not genetically determined, there is a realm in which it is sensible to ask about what we should value, which is a question that evolutionary ethics cannot answer.
What can answer it if evolutionary ethics cannot? A science fiction story like Jesus, Moses, or Scientology that everybody decides to pretend is a morally relevant truth?
ALL your moral questioning and intuitions about right and wrong, about the ability or lack of it for evolutionary investigations to provide answers, it seems to me it is all coming from your evolved brain interacting with the world. Which is what the brain evolved to do. By what reasoning are you able to separate your moral intuitions, which you seem to think are useful for evolving your moral values, from the moral intuitions your evolved brain makes?
Are you under the impression that it is the moral CONCLUSIONS that are evolved? It is not. The brain is a mechanism, some sort of information processor. Evolution occurs when a processor of one type outcompetes a processor of another type. The detailed moral conclusions reached by the mechanism that evolved are just that: new results coming from an old machine from some mixture of inputs, some of which are novel and some of which are same-old-same-old.
Praise and condemnation are central to our moral life precisely because these are the tools for shaping learned desires—resulting in an institution where the question of the difference between right and wrong is the question of the difference between what we should and should not praise or condemn.
And you think this is somehow an alternative to an evolutionary explanation? Go watch the neurobiologists sussing out all the different ways that learning takes place in brains and see if you can tell me where the evolutionary part stopped, because to me it looked like learning algorithms are just beautifully evolved with a compactness which is exceptional, and still unduplicated in silicon, which is millions of times faster than brains.
That was fun. Lunch is over. Back to writing android apps.
Does it make sense to punish somebody for having the wrong genes?
This depends on what you mean by “punish”. If by “punish” you mean socially ostracize and disallow mating privileges, I can think of situations in which it could make evolutionary sense, although as we no longer live in our ancestral environment and have since developed a complex array of cultural norms, it no longer makes moral sense.
In any event, what you’ve written is pretty much orthogonal to what I’ve said; I’m not defending what you’re calling evolutionary ethics (nor am I aware of indicating that I hold that view, if anything I took it to be a bit of a strawman). Descriptive evolutionary ethics is potentially useful, but normative evolutionary ethics commits the naturalistic fallacy (as you’ve pointed out), and I think the Euthyphro argument is fairly weak in comparison to that point.
The view you’re attacking doesn’t seem to take into account the interplay between genetic, epigenetic and cultural/mememtic factors in how moral intuitions are shaped and can be shaped. It sounds like a pretty flimsy position, and I’m a bit surprised that any ethicist actually holds it. I would be interested if you’re willing to cite some people who currently hold the viewpoint you’re addressing.
The reason that the Euthyphro argument works against evolutionary ethics because—regardless of what evolution can teach us about what we do value, it teaches us that our values are not fixed.
Well, really it’s more neuroscience that tells us that our values aren’t fixed (along with how the valuation works). It also has the potential to tell us to what degree our values are fixed at any given stage of development, and how to take advantage of the present degree of malleability.
Because values are not genetically determined, there is a realm in which it is sensible to ask about what we should value, which is a question that evolutionary ethics cannot answer.
Of course; under your usage of evolutionary ethics this is clearly the case. I’m not sure how this relates to my comment, however.
Praise and condemnation are central to our moral life precisely because these are the tools for shaping learned desires
I agree that it’s pretty obvious that social reinforcement is important because it shapes moral behavior, but I’m not sure if you’re trying to make a central point to me, or just airing your own position regardless of the content of my post.
Evolutionary Biology might be good at telling us what we value. However, as GE Moore pointed out, ethics is about what we SHOULD value. What evolutionary ethics will teach us is that our mind/brains are maleable. Our values are not fixed.
And the question of what we SHOULD value makes sense because our brains are malleable. Our desires—just like our beliefs—are not fixed. They are learned. So, the question arises, “Given that we can mold desires into different forms, what SHOULD we mold them into?”
Besides, evolutionary ethics is incoherent. “I have evolved a disposition to harm people like you; therefore, you deserve to be harmed.” How does a person deserve punishment just because somebody else evolved a disposition to punish him.
Do we solve the question of gay marriage by determining whether the accusers actually have a genetic disposition to kill homosexuals? And if we discover they do, we leap to the conclusion that homosexuals DESERVE to be killed?
Why evolve a disposition to punish? That makes no sense.
What is this practice of praise and condemnation that is central to morality? Of deserved praise and condemnation? Does it make sense to punish somebody for having the wrong genes?
What, according to evolutionary ethics, is the role of moral argument?
Does genetics actually explain such things as the end of slavery, and a woman’s right to vote? Those are very fast genetic changes.
The reason that the Euthyphro argument works against evolutionary ethics because—regardless of what evolution can teach us about what we do value, it teaches us that our values are not fixed. Because values are not genetically determined, there is a realm in which it is sensible to ask about what we should value, which is a question that evolutionary ethics cannot answer. Praise and condemnation are central to our moral life precisely because these are the tools for shaping learned desires—resulting in an institution where the question of the difference between right and wrong is the question of the difference between what we should and should not praise or condemn.
Its lunchtime so for fun I will answer some of your rhetorical questions.
Unless GE Moore is either an alien or an artificial intelligence, he is telling us what we should value from a human brain that values things based on its evolution. How will he be able to make any value statement and tell you with a straight face that his valuing that thing has NOTHING to do with his evolution?
My disposition to harm people is triggered approximately proportionally to my judgement that this person has or will harm me or someone I care about. My disposition doesn’t speak, but neither does my disposition to presume based on experience that the sun will rise tomorrow. What does speak says about the second that being able to predict the future based on the past is an incredibly effective way to understand the universe, so much so that it seems the niverse’s continuity from the past to the future is a feature of the universe, not just a feature of the tools my mind has developed to understand the universe. About my incoherent disposition to harm someone who is threatening my wife or my sister, I would invite you to consider life in a society where this disposition did not exist. Violent thieves would run roughshod over the non-violent, who would stand around naked, starving, and puzzled: “what can we do about this after all?”
This sentence seems somewhat incoherent but I’ll address what I think are some of the interesting issues it evokes, if not quite brings up.
First, public open acceptance of homosexuality is a gigantic and modern phenomenon. If nothing else, it proves that an incredibly large number of humans DO NOT have any such genetic urge to kill homosexuals, or even to give them dirty looks when walking by them on the street for that matter. So if there is a lesson about concluding moral “oughts” from moral “is-es” here, it is that anybody who previously conclude that homicidal hatred of homosexuals was part of human genetic moral makeup was using insanely flawed methods for understanding genetic morality.
I would say that all attempts to derive ought from is, to design sensible rules for humans living and working together, should be approached with a great deal of caution and humility, especially given the clear tendency towards erroneous conclusions that may also be in our genes. But I would also say that any attempt at determining useful and valuable rules for living and working together which completely ignores what we might learn from evolutionary morality is “wrong” to do so, that any additional human suffering that occurs because these people willfully ignore useful scientific facts is blood on their hands.
Well, it makes sense to restrict the freedom of anybody who does more social harm than social good if left unrestrained. It doesn’t matter whether the reason is bad genes or some other reason. We shoot a lion who is loose and killing suburbanites. You don’t have to call it punishment, but what if you do? It is still a gigantically sensible and useful thing to do.
Many genes produce tendencies in people that are moderated by feedback from the world. I have a tendency to be really good at linear algebra and math and building electronic things that work. Without education this might have gone unnoticed. Without positive accolades, I might have preferred to play the electric guitar. Perhaps someone who has a tendency to pick up things he likes and keep them, or to strike out at people who piss him off, will have behavior which is also moderated by his genes AND his environment. Perhaps training him to get along with other people will be the difference between an incarcerated petty thief and a talented corporate raider or linebacker.
The thing that is central to morality is inducing moral behavior. Praise and condemnation are not central, they are two techniques which may or may not help meet that end, and given the fact that they have been enhanced by evolution, I’m guessing they actually do work in a lot of circumstances.
Moral argment writ small is a band of humans hashing out how they will get along running on the savannah. This has probably been going on long enough to be evolutionarily meaningful. How do we share the meat and the furs from the animal we cooperatively killed? Who gets to have sex with whom, and how do we change that result to something we like better? What do we do about that guy who keeps pooping in the water supply? The evidence that “talking about it” is useful is the incredibly high level of cooperative organization that humans demonstrate as compared to any other animal. Social insects are the only creatures I know of that even come close, and their high levels of organizations took 10s or 100s of thousands of years to refine, while the productivity of the human corporation or anything we have using a steam engine or a transistor has all been accomplished in 100 years or so.
Does genetics explain an artificial heart? The 4 minute mile? Walking on the moon without dying? The heart is evolved, as is our ability to run, and our need to breathe and for gravity. Without knowing what the answer exactly is, these non-moral and very recent examples bear a similar relationship to our genetics as do the recent moral examples in the question. Sorry to not answer this one, except by tangent.
What can answer it if evolutionary ethics cannot? A science fiction story like Jesus, Moses, or Scientology that everybody decides to pretend is a morally relevant truth?
ALL your moral questioning and intuitions about right and wrong, about the ability or lack of it for evolutionary investigations to provide answers, it seems to me it is all coming from your evolved brain interacting with the world. Which is what the brain evolved to do. By what reasoning are you able to separate your moral intuitions, which you seem to think are useful for evolving your moral values, from the moral intuitions your evolved brain makes?
Are you under the impression that it is the moral CONCLUSIONS that are evolved? It is not. The brain is a mechanism, some sort of information processor. Evolution occurs when a processor of one type outcompetes a processor of another type. The detailed moral conclusions reached by the mechanism that evolved are just that: new results coming from an old machine from some mixture of inputs, some of which are novel and some of which are same-old-same-old.
And you think this is somehow an alternative to an evolutionary explanation? Go watch the neurobiologists sussing out all the different ways that learning takes place in brains and see if you can tell me where the evolutionary part stopped, because to me it looked like learning algorithms are just beautifully evolved with a compactness which is exceptional, and still unduplicated in silicon, which is millions of times faster than brains.
That was fun. Lunch is over. Back to writing android apps.
First, I do have a couple of nitpicks:
That depends. See here for instance.
This depends on what you mean by “punish”. If by “punish” you mean socially ostracize and disallow mating privileges, I can think of situations in which it could make evolutionary sense, although as we no longer live in our ancestral environment and have since developed a complex array of cultural norms, it no longer makes moral sense.
In any event, what you’ve written is pretty much orthogonal to what I’ve said; I’m not defending what you’re calling evolutionary ethics (nor am I aware of indicating that I hold that view, if anything I took it to be a bit of a strawman). Descriptive evolutionary ethics is potentially useful, but normative evolutionary ethics commits the naturalistic fallacy (as you’ve pointed out), and I think the Euthyphro argument is fairly weak in comparison to that point.
The view you’re attacking doesn’t seem to take into account the interplay between genetic, epigenetic and cultural/mememtic factors in how moral intuitions are shaped and can be shaped. It sounds like a pretty flimsy position, and I’m a bit surprised that any ethicist actually holds it. I would be interested if you’re willing to cite some people who currently hold the viewpoint you’re addressing.
Well, really it’s more neuroscience that tells us that our values aren’t fixed (along with how the valuation works). It also has the potential to tell us to what degree our values are fixed at any given stage of development, and how to take advantage of the present degree of malleability.
Of course; under your usage of evolutionary ethics this is clearly the case. I’m not sure how this relates to my comment, however.
I agree that it’s pretty obvious that social reinforcement is important because it shapes moral behavior, but I’m not sure if you’re trying to make a central point to me, or just airing your own position regardless of the content of my post.
Yay for my favorite ethicist signing up for LessWrong!