This could mean you would also have to reject thirding in the famous Sleeping Beauty problem. Which contradicts a straightforward frequentist interpretation of the setup: If the SB experiment was repeated many times, one third of the awakenings would be Monday Heads, so if SB was guessing after awakening “the coin came up heads” she would be right with frequentist probability 1⁄3.
Of course there are possible responses to this. My point is just that: rejecting Katja’s doomsday argument by rejecting SIA style anthropic reasoning may come with implausible consequences in other areas.
This could mean you would also have to reject thirding in the famous Sleeping Beauty problem. Which contradicts a straightforward frequentist interpretation of the setup: If the SB experiment was repeated many times, one third of the awakenings would be Monday Heads, so if SB was guessing after awakening “the coin came up heads” she would be right with frequentist probability 1⁄3.
Of course there are possible responses to this. My point is just that: rejecting Katja’s doomsday argument by rejecting SIA style anthropic reasoning may come with implausible consequences in other areas.