That’s a very reasonable interpretation, but it’s orthogonal to why I’m bothered.
If the argument is “my objection to cryonics was I wasn’t convinced a remade me would be me, but as soon as I realized the configuration was important and not the pieces inside the configuration, that toppled my last objection,” then I don’t have an issue with that.
What it looked like to me was “I am convinced of Eliezer’s viewpoint” instead of “I believe Eliezer’s arguments are correct in the domain that they are argued.” The linked argument that cryonics is reasonable is an argument that cryonics is possible, not an argument that signing up with Alcor or CI actually increases your likelihood of being awoken in the future. The linked argument is necessary but not sufficient for the action stated.
That came to the forefront of my mind because Eliezer’s declaration that MWI is “correct” could mean two things- either MWI is the single truest / best flavor of QM, which I do not think he is qualified to state, or MWI gives the right answers when you ask it relevant questions, just like Copenhagen. Eliezer can rightly say MWI is more satisfactory than Copenhagen, but when you go further and make plans based on multiverses that you would not make if you were just planning for a singular future, that is a giant red flag.
That’s a very reasonable interpretation, but it’s orthogonal to why I’m bothered.
If the argument is “my objection to cryonics was I wasn’t convinced a remade me would be me, but as soon as I realized the configuration was important and not the pieces inside the configuration, that toppled my last objection,” then I don’t have an issue with that.
What it looked like to me was “I am convinced of Eliezer’s viewpoint” instead of “I believe Eliezer’s arguments are correct in the domain that they are argued.” The linked argument that cryonics is reasonable is an argument that cryonics is possible, not an argument that signing up with Alcor or CI actually increases your likelihood of being awoken in the future. The linked argument is necessary but not sufficient for the action stated.
That came to the forefront of my mind because Eliezer’s declaration that MWI is “correct” could mean two things- either MWI is the single truest / best flavor of QM, which I do not think he is qualified to state, or MWI gives the right answers when you ask it relevant questions, just like Copenhagen. Eliezer can rightly say MWI is more satisfactory than Copenhagen, but when you go further and make plans based on multiverses that you would not make if you were just planning for a singular future, that is a giant red flag.