The most important thing I learned from LessWrong is that my brain isn’t always right.
This was a huge thing for me.
I already had the reductionist viewpoint, that I was just a brain. But I only had a part of it. I basically presumed that my thought processes were right: they couldn’t be wrong, since if they were wrong, correcting it was merely a matter of changing some of the biological structures and firing patterns. But since I was that structure and those patterns, the ‘corrected’ version wouldn’t be me; it would be someone else. The way I was, was the only way I could be, if I wanted to be me. So I had what you might call biological relativism.
The sequences’ focus on biases let me realise that wasn’t the case.
Social effects were actually positive: although I disagreed with people and could sometimes spot why they were wrong, I didn’t voice my opinion. I made exceptions in the case of genuine mistakes, things like doing your math wrong, but if someone wanted to believe something, I didn’t feel like I should take that away from them if it meant taking away part of their biological identity. So, during that time, I was noticeably easy-going and agreeable.
In terms of adverse effects, there were really only mental ones, in that I wasn’t correcting my mistakes. It wasn’t as literal a belief as I make it sound—it was more like belief in belief and such. Most of the time I think I rounded it off the cached wisdom of respecting others’ opinions.
The most important thing I learned from LessWrong is that my brain isn’t always right.
This was a huge thing for me.
I already had the reductionist viewpoint, that I was just a brain. But I only had a part of it. I basically presumed that my thought processes were right: they couldn’t be wrong, since if they were wrong, correcting it was merely a matter of changing some of the biological structures and firing patterns. But since I was that structure and those patterns, the ‘corrected’ version wouldn’t be me; it would be someone else. The way I was, was the only way I could be, if I wanted to be me. So I had what you might call biological relativism.
The sequences’ focus on biases let me realise that wasn’t the case.
That sounds pretty strange! Were there adverse social effects, I wonder?
Social effects were actually positive: although I disagreed with people and could sometimes spot why they were wrong, I didn’t voice my opinion. I made exceptions in the case of genuine mistakes, things like doing your math wrong, but if someone wanted to believe something, I didn’t feel like I should take that away from them if it meant taking away part of their biological identity. So, during that time, I was noticeably easy-going and agreeable.
In terms of adverse effects, there were really only mental ones, in that I wasn’t correcting my mistakes. It wasn’t as literal a belief as I make it sound—it was more like belief in belief and such. Most of the time I think I rounded it off the cached wisdom of respecting others’ opinions.