The main problem with paraconsistent logic is that it doesn’t exist. That is, there is no formalisation of it that anyone uses. Whatever non-standard logics people study, their metalanguage is always plain old mathematical logic, as foreshadowed by Aristotle, hoped for by Leibnitz, brought to fruition by Boole, Russell, and Whitehead, and embodied into computers by Turing, von Neumann, and whoever else should be mentioned in the same breath as them. There is no other game in town, except perhaps subsystems for constructive reasoning (where e.g. any proof of ∀x.∃y… can be read as a program for computing a suitable y from a given x).
The idea of Buddhist logic has always puzzled me, because I don’t recognise anything that could be called logic in those writings, i.e. methods of reasoning,. There are only recitations of various formulas like “true, not-true, neither true not not-true, both true and not-true.”
“What do I have in my pocket?” said Gollum, and Frodo knew, and said, without philosophizing on the nature of truth.
The idea of Buddhist logic has always puzzled me, because I don’t recognise anything that could be called logic in those writings, i.e. methods of reasoning,. There are only recitations of various formulas like “true, not-true, neither true not not-true, both true and not-true.”
The motivation is probably metaphysical. Indeed, some aspects of classical logic also have metaphysical motivations. It doesn’t cause paradoxes to drop bivalence, so the motivation for including it is probably an intuition that things either exist or don’t.
The main problem with paraconsistent logic is that it doesn’t exist. That is, there is no formalisation of it that anyone uses. Whatever non-standard logics people study, their metalanguage is always plain old mathematical logic, as foreshadowed by Aristotle, hoped for by Leibnitz, brought to fruition by Boole, Russell, and Whitehead, and embodied into computers by Turing, von Neumann, and whoever else should be mentioned in the same breath as them. There is no other game in town, except perhaps subsystems for constructive reasoning (where e.g. any proof of ∀x.∃y… can be read as a program for computing a suitable y from a given x).
The idea of Buddhist logic has always puzzled me, because I don’t recognise anything that could be called logic in those writings, i.e. methods of reasoning,. There are only recitations of various formulas like “true, not-true, neither true not not-true, both true and not-true.”
“What do I have in my pocket?” said Gollum, and Frodo knew, and said, without philosophizing on the nature of truth.
The motivation is probably metaphysical. Indeed, some aspects of classical logic also have metaphysical motivations. It doesn’t cause paradoxes to drop bivalence, so the motivation for including it is probably an intuition that things either exist or don’t.