It may be imaginable, but if it’s false, who cares. Like, suppose I argue, that fundamental reality has to meet constraint X and view Y is the only plausible view that does so. Listing off a bunch of random ones that meet constraint X but are false doesn’t help you .
It’s a counterexample to a single step of reasoning(large multiverse of people --> God), it doesn’t have to be globally a valid theory of reality. And clearly the existence of an imaginable multiverse satisfying a certain property makes it more plausible that our actual multiverse might satisfy the same property. (As an analogy, consider math, where you might want an object satisfying properties A and B. Constructing an object with property A makes it more plausible that you might eventually construct one with both properties)
It may be imaginable, but if it’s false, who cares. Like, suppose I argue, that fundamental reality has to meet constraint X and view Y is the only plausible view that does so. Listing off a bunch of random ones that meet constraint X but are false doesn’t help you .
It’s a counterexample to a single step of reasoning(large multiverse of people --> God), it doesn’t have to be globally a valid theory of reality. And clearly the existence of an imaginable multiverse satisfying a certain property makes it more plausible that our actual multiverse might satisfy the same property. (As an analogy, consider math, where you might want an object satisfying properties A and B. Constructing an object with property A makes it more plausible that you might eventually construct one with both properties)