I don’t consider equitable distributions of utility better than inequitable distributions. I consider fair distributions better then unfair ones, which is not quite the same thing.
Put it that way, the answer to the original question is simple: if my future selves are me, then I am entitled to be unfair to some of myself whenever in my sole judgment I have sufficient reason.
That’s a different question. That’s the sort of thing that a utility function incorporates; e.g., whether the system of distribution of rewards will encourage productivity.
If you say you don’t consider equitable distributions of utility better than inequitable distributions, you don’t get to specify which inequitable distributions can occur. You mean all inequitable distributions, including the ones in which the productive people get nothing and the parasites get everything.
I don’t consider equitable distributions of utility better than inequitable distributions. I consider fair distributions better then unfair ones, which is not quite the same thing.
Put it that way, the answer to the original question is simple: if my future selves are me, then I am entitled to be unfair to some of myself whenever in my sole judgment I have sufficient reason.
That’s a different question. That’s the sort of thing that a utility function incorporates; e.g., whether the system of distribution of rewards will encourage productivity.
If you say you don’t consider equitable distributions of utility better than inequitable distributions, you don’t get to specify which inequitable distributions can occur. You mean all inequitable distributions, including the ones in which the productive people get nothing and the parasites get everything.
What definition of “fair” are you using such that that isn’t a tautology?
Example: my belief that my neighbor’s money would yield more utility in my hands than his, doesn’t entitle me to steal it.