That a state of affairs can only be better if it is better for someone is a substantive and controversial position in moral philosophy. Statements of the form “World A is better than world B, both of which contain no people” are meaningful, at least to many of those who have considered this question in detail. In general, I don’t think it’s a good idea to dismiss a claim as “confused” when it is made by a group of smart people who are considered experts in the field (e.g. G. E. Moore or Larry Temkin).
You’ve used a phrase like “clearly absurd” to characterize a belief that World B is “better” than World A, but you say that the semantics of the word ‘better’ are controversial.
You’ve used personal suffering to judge the quality of World B vs the quality of World A, and yet it seems “better” doesn’t need concern itself with personal viewpoints at all.
From the inside, every inhabitant of World A would prefer to have the average existence of World B, and yet it’s “clearly absurd” to believe that this means World B is better.
Yes, these claims seem confused and contradictory to me.
You’ve used a phrase like “clearly absurd” to characterize a belief that World B is “better” than World A, but you say that the semantics of the word ‘better’ are controversial.
The absurdity that I was pointing out doesn’t turn on the semantic ambiguity that you are referring to. Regardless of what you think about the meaning of ‘better’, it is clearly absurd to say that a world that differs from another only in containing a surplus of (undeserved, instrumentally useless) suffering is better. This is why virtually every contemporary moral philosopher rejects average utilitarianism.
From the inside, every inhabitant of World A would prefer to have the average existence of World B, and yet it’s “clearly absurd” to believe that this means World B is better.
This is not an accurate characterization of the scenario I described. Please re-read my earlier comment.
It is clearly absurd to say that a world that differs from another only in containing a surplus of (undeserved, instrumentally useless) suffering is better.
Except when you add ”...for the average person in it” at the end of the sentence, in short when you specify who is it supposed to be better for, rather than use a vague, confused and unspecified notion of ‘better’.
From the outside you say that a world with 10 people suffering LOTS is better than a world where (10 people suffer LOTS and 90 people suffer slightly less).
But given a choice, you’ll choose to one of the people in the second world rather than one of the people in the first world. So what exactly is the first world “better” at? Better at not horrifying you when viewed from the outside, not better at not hurting you when experienced from the inside.
So, again, I dispute how “clearly absurd” preferring the second world is.
This is why virtually every contemporary moral philosopher rejects average utilitarianism.
I don’t care what every contemporary moral philosopher says. If someone can’t decide what something is supposed to be better at, then they have no business using the word ‘better’ in the first place.
From the outside you say that a world with 10 people suffering LOTS is better than a world where (10 people suffer LOTS and 90 people suffer slightly less).
But given a choice, you’ll choose to one of the people in the second world rather than one of the people in the first world. So what exactly is the first world “better” at? Better at not horrifying you when viewed from the outside, not better at not hurting you when experienced from the inside.
No, you are conflating two distinct questions here: the question of whether a world is better “from the inside” versus “from the outside”, and the question of which world you would pick, if you knew the welfare levels of every person in either world, but ignored the identities of these people. Concerning the first question, which is the question relevant to our original discussion, it is clear that the world with the surplus of agony cannot be better, regardless of whether or not you believe that things can be better only if they are better for someone (i.e. better “from the inside”).
I don’t care what every contemporary moral philosopher says. If someone can’t decide what something is supposed to be better at, then they have no business using the word ‘better’ in the first place.
I was trying to get you understand that it is probably unwise to assume that people much smarter than you, who have thought about the issue for much longer than you have, have somehow failed to notice a distinction (impersonally better versus better for someone) that strikes you as glaringly obvious. And, as a matter of fact, these people haven’t failed to notice that distinction, as anyone with a passing knowledge of the literature will readily attest.
Here’s a simple scenario that should persuade you that things are not nearly as simple as you seem to believe they are. (This case was first introduced by Derek Parfit, and has been discussed extensively by population ethicists.) Suppose a woman who desires to have children is told by a competent doctor that, if she conceives a child within the next month, the child will very likely be born with a major disability. However, if the mother waits and conceives the child after this critical period, the baby’s chances of being born with that disability are close to zero. Most reasonable people will agree that the mother should wait, or at least that she has a strong reason to wait. But why should she? If the mother doesn’t wait and has a disabled child, this child couldn’t say, “Mother, you wronged me. If you had waited, I wouldn’t have been born with this disability.” If the mother had waited, a different child would have been born. So if we want to insist that the mother does have a reason for waiting, we must drop, or at least revise, the principle that things can be better only if they are better for someone.
it is clear that the world with the surplus of agony cannot be better,
Okay, do you have any argument other than “it is clear”. Once again: it may be clear to you, it’s not clear to me. “Clear” being another two-place word.
I was trying to get you understand that it is probably unwise to assume that people much smarter than you,
What’s your reason to believe that they’re much smarter than me?
And of course, for you to use the argument of their smartness, and for me to accept it, I wouldn’t just have to accept they’re smarter than me, I would also have to accept that they’re smarter than me and that you are interpreting and expressing their views correctly.
I’d rather discuss the issue directly, rather than yield to the views of authorities which I haven’t read.
So if we want to insist that the mother does have a reason for waiting, we must drop, or at least revise, the principle that things can be better only if they are better for someone.
It’s me who was arguing on the side of average utilitarianism, in short the idea that we can consider the life of the average person, not a real specific person. Average utilitarianism clearly sides with the idea that the woman ought wait.
As for the particular example you gave, any decision in our presents makes future people in our light-cones “different” than they would otherwise have been.
If we’re making a distinction between “John-A, born on Oct-1, and suffers from a crippling ailment” and “John-B, born on Nov-1, perfectly health”, then we should also be making a distinction between “John-A, born on Oct-1, and suffers from a crippling ailment” and “John-C, born on Oct-1, used to suffer from a crippling ailment and was cured via a medical procedure shortly afterwards”.
That a state of affairs can only be better if it is better for someone is a substantive and controversial position in moral philosophy. Statements of the form “World A is better than world B, both of which contain no people” are meaningful, at least to many of those who have considered this question in detail. In general, I don’t think it’s a good idea to dismiss a claim as “confused” when it is made by a group of smart people who are considered experts in the field (e.g. G. E. Moore or Larry Temkin).
You’ve used a phrase like “clearly absurd” to characterize a belief that World B is “better” than World A, but you say that the semantics of the word ‘better’ are controversial.
You’ve used personal suffering to judge the quality of World B vs the quality of World A, and yet it seems “better” doesn’t need concern itself with personal viewpoints at all.
From the inside, every inhabitant of World A would prefer to have the average existence of World B, and yet it’s “clearly absurd” to believe that this means World B is better.
Yes, these claims seem confused and contradictory to me.
The absurdity that I was pointing out doesn’t turn on the semantic ambiguity that you are referring to. Regardless of what you think about the meaning of ‘better’, it is clearly absurd to say that a world that differs from another only in containing a surplus of (undeserved, instrumentally useless) suffering is better. This is why virtually every contemporary moral philosopher rejects average utilitarianism.
This is not an accurate characterization of the scenario I described. Please re-read my earlier comment.
Except when you add ”...for the average person in it” at the end of the sentence, in short when you specify who is it supposed to be better for, rather than use a vague, confused and unspecified notion of ‘better’.
From the outside you say that a world with 10 people suffering LOTS is better than a world where (10 people suffer LOTS and 90 people suffer slightly less).
But given a choice, you’ll choose to one of the people in the second world rather than one of the people in the first world. So what exactly is the first world “better” at? Better at not horrifying you when viewed from the outside, not better at not hurting you when experienced from the inside.
So, again, I dispute how “clearly absurd” preferring the second world is.
I don’t care what every contemporary moral philosopher says. If someone can’t decide what something is supposed to be better at, then they have no business using the word ‘better’ in the first place.
No, you are conflating two distinct questions here: the question of whether a world is better “from the inside” versus “from the outside”, and the question of which world you would pick, if you knew the welfare levels of every person in either world, but ignored the identities of these people. Concerning the first question, which is the question relevant to our original discussion, it is clear that the world with the surplus of agony cannot be better, regardless of whether or not you believe that things can be better only if they are better for someone (i.e. better “from the inside”).
I was trying to get you understand that it is probably unwise to assume that people much smarter than you, who have thought about the issue for much longer than you have, have somehow failed to notice a distinction (impersonally better versus better for someone) that strikes you as glaringly obvious. And, as a matter of fact, these people haven’t failed to notice that distinction, as anyone with a passing knowledge of the literature will readily attest.
Here’s a simple scenario that should persuade you that things are not nearly as simple as you seem to believe they are. (This case was first introduced by Derek Parfit, and has been discussed extensively by population ethicists.) Suppose a woman who desires to have children is told by a competent doctor that, if she conceives a child within the next month, the child will very likely be born with a major disability. However, if the mother waits and conceives the child after this critical period, the baby’s chances of being born with that disability are close to zero. Most reasonable people will agree that the mother should wait, or at least that she has a strong reason to wait. But why should she? If the mother doesn’t wait and has a disabled child, this child couldn’t say, “Mother, you wronged me. If you had waited, I wouldn’t have been born with this disability.” If the mother had waited, a different child would have been born. So if we want to insist that the mother does have a reason for waiting, we must drop, or at least revise, the principle that things can be better only if they are better for someone.
Okay, do you have any argument other than “it is clear”. Once again: it may be clear to you, it’s not clear to me. “Clear” being another two-place word.
What’s your reason to believe that they’re much smarter than me?
And of course, for you to use the argument of their smartness, and for me to accept it, I wouldn’t just have to accept they’re smarter than me, I would also have to accept that they’re smarter than me and that you are interpreting and expressing their views correctly.
I’d rather discuss the issue directly, rather than yield to the views of authorities which I haven’t read.
It’s me who was arguing on the side of average utilitarianism, in short the idea that we can consider the life of the average person, not a real specific person. Average utilitarianism clearly sides with the idea that the woman ought wait.
As for the particular example you gave, any decision in our presents makes future people in our light-cones “different” than they would otherwise have been.
If we’re making a distinction between “John-A, born on Oct-1, and suffers from a crippling ailment” and “John-B, born on Nov-1, perfectly health”, then we should also be making a distinction between “John-A, born on Oct-1, and suffers from a crippling ailment” and “John-C, born on Oct-1, used to suffer from a crippling ailment and was cured via a medical procedure shortly afterwards”.