Nothing to do with objective frequency? Surely that’s wrong: e.g., as you gain information, your subjective probabilities ought to converge on the objective frequencies.
But I agree: the relevant sense of expectation here has to be the subjective one (since all an agent can use in deciding what to prefer is its own subjective probabilities, not whatever objective ones there may be), and this does seem like it’s a problem with what Phil’s saying.
the relevant sense of expectation here has to be the subjective one (since all an agent can use in deciding what to prefer is its own subjective probabilities, not whatever objective ones there may be), and this does seem like it’s a problem with what Phil’s saying.
It’s just as much a problem with all of decision theory, and all expectation maximization, as with anything I’m saying. This may be a difficulty, but it’s completely orthogonal to the issue at hand, since all of the alternatives have that same weakness.
I think the point is that, if probability is only in the mind, the analogy between averaging over future yous and averaging over other people is weaker than it might initially appear.
It sort of seems like there might be an analogy if you’re talking about averaging over versions of you that end up in different Everett branches. But if we’re talking about subjective probabilities, then there’s no sense in which these “future yous” exist, except in your mind, and it’s more difficult to see the analogy between averaging over them, and averaging over actual people.
Nothing to do with objective frequency? Surely that’s wrong: e.g., as you gain information, your subjective probabilities ought to converge on the objective frequencies.
But I agree: the relevant sense of expectation here has to be the subjective one (since all an agent can use in deciding what to prefer is its own subjective probabilities, not whatever objective ones there may be), and this does seem like it’s a problem with what Phil’s saying.
It’s just as much a problem with all of decision theory, and all expectation maximization, as with anything I’m saying. This may be a difficulty, but it’s completely orthogonal to the issue at hand, since all of the alternatives have that same weakness.
I think the point is that, if probability is only in the mind, the analogy between averaging over future yous and averaging over other people is weaker than it might initially appear.
It sort of seems like there might be an analogy if you’re talking about averaging over versions of you that end up in different Everett branches. But if we’re talking about subjective probabilities, then there’s no sense in which these “future yous” exist, except in your mind, and it’s more difficult to see the analogy between averaging over them, and averaging over actual people.