Petrov Day thought: there’s this narrative around Petrov where one guy basically had the choice to nuke or not, and decided not to despite all the flashing red lights. But I wonder… was this one of those situations where everyone knew what had to be done (i.e. “don’t nuke”), but whoever caused the nukes to not fly was going to get demoted, so there was a game of hot potato and the loser was the one forced to “decide” to not nuke? Some facts possibly relevant here:
Petrov’s choice wasn’t actually over whether or not to fire the nukes; it was over whether or not to pass the alert up the chain of command.
Petrov himself was responsible for the design of those warning systems.
… so it sounds like Petrov was ~ the lowest-ranking person with a de-facto veto on the nuke/don’t nuke decision.
Petrov was in fact demoted afterwards.
There was another near-miss during the Cuban missile crisis, when three people on a Soviet sub had to agree to launch. There again, it was only the lowest-ranked who vetoed the launch. (It was the second-in-command; the captain and political officer both favored a launch—at least officially.)
This was the Soviet Union; supposedly (?) this sort of hot potato happened all the time.
Those are some good points. I wonder whether similar happened (or could at all happen) in other nuclear countries, where we don’t know about similar incidents—because the system haven’t collapsed there, the archives were not made public etc.
Also, it makes actually celebrating Petrov’s day as widely as possible important, because then the option for the lowest-ranked person would be: “Get demoted, but also get famous all around the world.”
Petrov Day thought: there’s this narrative around Petrov where one guy basically had the choice to nuke or not, and decided not to despite all the flashing red lights. But I wonder… was this one of those situations where everyone knew what had to be done (i.e. “don’t nuke”), but whoever caused the nukes to not fly was going to get demoted, so there was a game of hot potato and the loser was the one forced to “decide” to not nuke? Some facts possibly relevant here:
Petrov’s choice wasn’t actually over whether or not to fire the nukes; it was over whether or not to pass the alert up the chain of command.
Petrov himself was responsible for the design of those warning systems.
… so it sounds like Petrov was ~ the lowest-ranking person with a de-facto veto on the nuke/don’t nuke decision.
Petrov was in fact demoted afterwards.
There was another near-miss during the Cuban missile crisis, when three people on a Soviet sub had to agree to launch. There again, it was only the lowest-ranked who vetoed the launch. (It was the second-in-command; the captain and political officer both favored a launch—at least officially.)
This was the Soviet Union; supposedly (?) this sort of hot potato happened all the time.
Those are some good points. I wonder whether similar happened (or could at all happen) in other nuclear countries, where we don’t know about similar incidents—because the system haven’t collapsed there, the archives were not made public etc.
Also, it makes actually celebrating Petrov’s day as widely as possible important, because then the option for the lowest-ranked person would be: “Get demoted, but also get famous all around the world.”