[ not that deep on the background assumptions, so maybe not the feedback you’re looking for. Feel free to ignore if this is on the wrong dimensions. ]
I’m not sure why either subagent would contract away whatever influence it had over the button-press. This is probably because I don’t understand wealth and capital in the model of your “Why not subagents” post. That seemed to be about agreement not to veto, in order to bypass some path-dependency of compromise improvements. In the subagent-world where all value is dependent on the button, this power would not be given up.
I’m also a bit skeptical of enforced ignorance of a future probability. I’m unsure it’s possible to have a rational superintelligent (sub)agent that is prevented from knowing it has influence over a future event that definitely affects it.
On the agents’ own models, neither has any influence at all over the button-press, because each is operating under a model in which the button-press has been counterfacted-upon.
[ not that deep on the background assumptions, so maybe not the feedback you’re looking for. Feel free to ignore if this is on the wrong dimensions. ]
I’m not sure why either subagent would contract away whatever influence it had over the button-press. This is probably because I don’t understand wealth and capital in the model of your “Why not subagents” post. That seemed to be about agreement not to veto, in order to bypass some path-dependency of compromise improvements. In the subagent-world where all value is dependent on the button, this power would not be given up.
I’m also a bit skeptical of enforced ignorance of a future probability. I’m unsure it’s possible to have a rational superintelligent (sub)agent that is prevented from knowing it has influence over a future event that definitely affects it.
On the agents’ own models, neither has any influence at all over the button-press, because each is operating under a model in which the button-press has been counterfacted-upon.