It doesn’t uniquely determine it: but again, in any common usage sense it’s important. Phrases like ‘fair weather friend’ and similar stories etc. denote the basic human understanding that we see friendship motivated directly for favours isn’t friendship. If someone seemed to be my friend and it turned out they just like the fact I buy drinks, I would feel betrayed as they’d exploited what friendship is understood to be.
Are you saying that this view should be overturned, or that it isn’t actually the common understanding of friendship?
Would it not matter to you if a close friend turned out to be your ‘friend’ purely for the assoicated favours?
I think friendships can be instrumentally good, obviously. But there’s a distinction between ways in which friendships are instrumentally good. If I discovered a friend of mine revealing that they were only my friend for the fantastic conversation, the excellent company, the superb sense of humour etc. I wouldn’t feel cheated. If I found out they were only my friend because I drove a car and it was convenient for them to get around, I would feel cheated.
Suppose there were two people with equally good conversation, company, humor, &tc, one of whom had a car, and only enough time/resources for a hypothetical third party to develop a friendship with one of them? Would you feel cheated if your mundane instrumental utility was a factor at all?
You clearly implied “only”. The external favours were the basis of the motivation.
“It isn’t immoral to notice that someone values friendship, and then to be their friend [b]in order to get the favors[/b] from them that they willingly provide to their friends”
In answer to your question: I’d still find it a little weird, tbh.
Why does the motivation for the relationship determine the nature of the relationship?
It doesn’t uniquely determine it: but again, in any common usage sense it’s important. Phrases like ‘fair weather friend’ and similar stories etc. denote the basic human understanding that we see friendship motivated directly for favours isn’t friendship. If someone seemed to be my friend and it turned out they just like the fact I buy drinks, I would feel betrayed as they’d exploited what friendship is understood to be.
Are you saying that this view should be overturned, or that it isn’t actually the common understanding of friendship?
Would it not matter to you if a close friend turned out to be your ‘friend’ purely for the assoicated favours?
So what’s wrong with fostering an “actual friendship” because it is instrumentally better to have them then to not have them?
I think friendships can be instrumentally good, obviously. But there’s a distinction between ways in which friendships are instrumentally good. If I discovered a friend of mine revealing that they were only my friend for the fantastic conversation, the excellent company, the superb sense of humour etc. I wouldn’t feel cheated. If I found out they were only my friend because I drove a car and it was convenient for them to get around, I would feel cheated.
I never specified ‘only’.
Suppose there were two people with equally good conversation, company, humor, &tc, one of whom had a car, and only enough time/resources for a hypothetical third party to develop a friendship with one of them? Would you feel cheated if your mundane instrumental utility was a factor at all?
You clearly implied “only”. The external favours were the basis of the motivation.
“It isn’t immoral to notice that someone values friendship, and then to be their friend [b]in order to get the favors[/b] from them that they willingly provide to their friends”
In answer to your question: I’d still find it a little weird, tbh.