Yes, but we’re talking about abstract ethical theories, so we’re already playing as the AI. An AI designed to minimize frustrated preferences will find it easier (that is, a better ratio of value to effort) to wirehead than to kill, unless the frustration-reduction of killing an individual is greater than the frustration-creation happening to all the individuals who are now mourning, scared, screaming in pain from shrapnel, etc.
How exactly could the option 2A be easier than 2B? No one is mourning, because eveyone alive is wireheaded. And surely killing someone is less work than keeping them alive.
Yes, but the point is not to speculate about AI, it’s to speculate about the particular ethical system in question, that being negative utilitarianism. You can assume that we’re modelling an agent who faithfully implements negative utilitarianism, not some random paper-clipper.
Yes, and my claim is that, given the amount of suffering in the world, negative utilitarianism says that building a paperclipper is a good thing to do (provided it’s sufficiently easy).
Ok, again, let’s assume we’re already “playing as the AI”. We are already possessed of superintelligence. Whatever we decide is negutilitarian good, we can feasibly do.
Given that, we can either wirehead everyone and eliminate their suffering forever, or rewrite ourselves as a paper-clipper and kill them.
Which one of these options do you think is negutilitarian!better?
Which one of these options do you think is negutilitarian!better?
If the first is easier (i.e. costs less utility to implement), or if they’re equally easy to implement, the first.
If the second is easier, it would depend on how much easier it was, and the answer could well be the second.
A superintelligence is still subject to tradeoffs.
But even if it turns out that wireheading is better on net than paperclipping, (a) that’s not an outcome I’m happy with, and (b) paperclipping is still better (according to negative utilitarianism) than the status quo. This is more than enough to reject negative utilitarianism.
Yes, but we’re talking about abstract ethical theories, so we’re already playing as the AI. An AI designed to minimize frustrated preferences will find it easier (that is, a better ratio of value to effort) to wirehead than to kill, unless the frustration-reduction of killing an individual is greater than the frustration-creation happening to all the individuals who are now mourning, scared, screaming in pain from shrapnel, etc.
Step 1: Wirehead all the people.
Step 2A: Continue caring about them.
Step 2B: Kill them.
How exactly could the option 2A be easier than 2B? No one is mourning, because eveyone alive is wireheaded. And surely killing someone is less work than keeping them alive.
Doesn’t matter. If humans can build an AI, an AI can build an AI as well.
Yes, but the point is not to speculate about AI, it’s to speculate about the particular ethical system in question, that being negative utilitarianism. You can assume that we’re modelling an agent who faithfully implements negative utilitarianism, not some random paper-clipper.
Yes, and my claim is that, given the amount of suffering in the world, negative utilitarianism says that building a paperclipper is a good thing to do (provided it’s sufficiently easy).
Ok, again, let’s assume we’re already “playing as the AI”. We are already possessed of superintelligence. Whatever we decide is negutilitarian good, we can feasibly do.
Given that, we can either wirehead everyone and eliminate their suffering forever, or rewrite ourselves as a paper-clipper and kill them.
Which one of these options do you think is negutilitarian!better?
If the first is easier (i.e. costs less utility to implement), or if they’re equally easy to implement, the first.
If the second is easier, it would depend on how much easier it was, and the answer could well be the second.
A superintelligence is still subject to tradeoffs.
But even if it turns out that wireheading is better on net than paperclipping, (a) that’s not an outcome I’m happy with, and (b) paperclipping is still better (according to negative utilitarianism) than the status quo. This is more than enough to reject negative utilitarianism.
Neither of us is happy with wireheading. Still, it’s better to be accurate about why we’re rejecting negutilitarianism.
The fact that it prefers paperclipping to the status quo is enough for me (and consistent with what I originally wrote).