Consequentialism and deontologism can be encoded in terms of one another (please allow me to temporarily mischaracterize the discussion as if there were only two options consequentialism and deontologism). Both theories have “free parameters”; consequentialism has preferences over states, and deontologism has precepts (should-rules). By carefully setting the free parameters, you can turn one into the other. The deontologist can say “You should make decisions by considering their consequences according to this utility function”, and the consequentialist may say “I prefer world-lines where I obey these precepts”.
Given this background, advocacy of consequentialism over deontolgism is essentially saying that the correct entire theory (that is, including the free parameters as well) is best expressed using the language of preferences and states-of-the-world.
However, there are things that I value, including autonomy, freedom, self-determination, that are difficult to express as states-of-the-world. These can be expressed as preferences over world-lines or paths through configuration space, of course. However, this is an awkward encoding.
My argument against foundational consequentialism (as opposed to practical, day-to-day consequentialism) is that most of the things that I ultimately value are actually paths and properties of paths, and not states or properties of states at all. If the only reason to pick one over the other is the apt capture of the entire theory, then I prefer to discuss ethics in terms of “shoulds” and relegate consequentialism to a practical, day-to-day role.
Possibly we can set foundations aside (or agree as a group to be foundationally-pluralistic), and focus on very-slightly-more-practical questions?
By carefully setting the free parameters, you can turn one into the other.
How would this be different than inserting epicycles to express geocentrism as heliocentrism? From consequentialist and deontological perspectives, I don’t think this is an insight that dissolves the question.
There are various distinguishing points between geocentrism and heliocentrism—one is that heliocentrism had fewer free parameters. More elaborately: Certain parameters of the epicycles had to be delicately balanced, and heliocentrism “predicted” that those parameters would be turn out to be balanced. This sense of prediction has nothing to do with previous-in-time, and everything to do with opportunities for falsification; if ever those parameters drifted from perfect balance, heliocentrism would be falsified. Heliocentrism was preferable (even though it was slightly less accurate at first) because it exposed itself to a more stringent test.
Overall, what I’m saying is that those two theories are asymmetric.
Consequentialism and deontologism can be encoded in terms of one another (please allow me to temporarily mischaracterize the discussion as if there were only two options consequentialism and deontologism). Both theories have “free parameters”; consequentialism has preferences over states, and deontologism has precepts (should-rules). By carefully setting the free parameters, you can turn one into the other. The deontologist can say “You should make decisions by considering their consequences according to this utility function”, and the consequentialist may say “I prefer world-lines where I obey these precepts”.
Given this background, advocacy of consequentialism over deontolgism is essentially saying that the correct entire theory (that is, including the free parameters as well) is best expressed using the language of preferences and states-of-the-world.
However, there are things that I value, including autonomy, freedom, self-determination, that are difficult to express as states-of-the-world. These can be expressed as preferences over world-lines or paths through configuration space, of course. However, this is an awkward encoding.
My argument against foundational consequentialism (as opposed to practical, day-to-day consequentialism) is that most of the things that I ultimately value are actually paths and properties of paths, and not states or properties of states at all. If the only reason to pick one over the other is the apt capture of the entire theory, then I prefer to discuss ethics in terms of “shoulds” and relegate consequentialism to a practical, day-to-day role.
Possibly we can set foundations aside (or agree as a group to be foundationally-pluralistic), and focus on very-slightly-more-practical questions?
How would this be different than inserting epicycles to express geocentrism as heliocentrism? From consequentialist and deontological perspectives, I don’t think this is an insight that dissolves the question.
The difference is that this is an ‘ought’ problem rather than an ‘is’ problem and we have no reason to believe our values should be simple.
There are various distinguishing points between geocentrism and heliocentrism—one is that heliocentrism had fewer free parameters. More elaborately: Certain parameters of the epicycles had to be delicately balanced, and heliocentrism “predicted” that those parameters would be turn out to be balanced. This sense of prediction has nothing to do with previous-in-time, and everything to do with opportunities for falsification; if ever those parameters drifted from perfect balance, heliocentrism would be falsified. Heliocentrism was preferable (even though it was slightly less accurate at first) because it exposed itself to a more stringent test.
Overall, what I’m saying is that those two theories are asymmetric.