I’ve eliminated it as a possibility from any situation that is remotely likely to happen in real life
Hmm, I can imagine situations where you can’t extract the resources without adding people. For example, should humans settle a place if it can support life, but only at a low level of comfort, and exporting resources from there isn’t economically viable?
It seems to me that if the settlement is done voluntarily that it must fulfill some preference that the settlers value more than comfort. Freedom, adventure, or the feeling that you’re part of something bigger, to name three possibilities. For that reason their lives couldn’t really be said to have lowered in quality. If it’s done involuntarily my first instinct is to say that no, we shouldn’t do it, although you could probably get me to say yes by introducing some extenuating circumstance, like it being the only way to prevent extinction.
Of course, this then brings up the issue of whether or not the settlers should have children who might not feel the same way they do. I’m much less sure about the morality of doing that.
I would say yes, to the extent that it reduces species ex-risk to have those extra people. (For instance, having a Mars colony as per RichardKennaway’s example would reduce Ex-Risk) However, it is possible that adding extra people in some cases might instead increase Ex-Risk (say, a slum outside of a city which might breed disease that spreads to the city) and in that case I might say No.
That’s a separate problem with the repugnant conclusion that bothers me sometimes. It appears to be the case that at some point the average function starts greatly increasing ex-risk at a later point even though it doesn’t do that at the beginning. If you are down to Muzak and Potatoes, a potato famine wipes you out.
So if you have “Potatoes, Carrots and Muzak” in Pop Y, and “Potatoes” in Pop Z, averaging it out to “Potatoes and Muzak” for everyone might increase average happiness, and Pop Z wouldn’t mind, but it wouldn’t be safe for Pop Y and Z together as a species, because they lose the safety of being able to come back from a potato famine.
That also seems to come with a built in idea of what kind of averaging is acceptable and where there are limits on averaging. Taking from a richer populations status to improve a poorer populations health would be fine. Taking from a richer populations health or safety to improve a lower populations safety would be unreasonable.
And a life where your health and safety are well guaranteed certainly sounds a hell of a lot better than “barely worth living.” so it doesn’t descend down into repugnance.
Basically, if instead of just looking at Population and Utility, you look at Population, Utility, and Ex-risk, the problem seems to vanish. It seems to say “Yes, add” and “Yes average” when I want it to add and average and say “no, don’t add” and “No don’t average” when I want it to now add and not average.
You could also just say “Well, Ex-Risk is part of my utility function” but that seems to lead to tricky calculation questions such as:
Approximately what is the Ex-Risk at a life barely worth living, utility wise?
Presumably, less Ex-Risk would make the life more worth living, and More Ex-Risk would make the life less worth living? Is that still the case here?
Can it flip the sign? Can an increase to Ex-Risk and nothing else make a life which is currently worth living not worth living?
Maybe I need to answer those questions, although I’m not sure where to start. Or maybe I just need to separate out multiplicative utility and additive utility?
That’s a separate problem with the repugnant conclusion that bothers me sometimes. It appears to be the case that at some point the average function starts greatly increasing ex-risk at a later point even though it doesn’t do that at the beginning. If you are down to Muzak and Potatoes, a potato famine wipes you out.
This criticism has been made before. I think the standard reply was that it may indeed be the case that we would need to have a life somewhat above the level of “barely worth living” in order to guard against the possibility that some sort of disaster would lower the quality of the people’s lives to such an extent that they were no longer worth living. However, such a standard of living would likely still be low enough for the Repugnant Conclusion to remain repugnant.
Hmm, I can imagine situations where you can’t extract the resources without adding people. For example, should humans settle a place if it can support life, but only at a low level of comfort, and exporting resources from there isn’t economically viable?
It seems to me that if the settlement is done voluntarily that it must fulfill some preference that the settlers value more than comfort. Freedom, adventure, or the feeling that you’re part of something bigger, to name three possibilities. For that reason their lives couldn’t really be said to have lowered in quality. If it’s done involuntarily my first instinct is to say that no, we shouldn’t do it, although you could probably get me to say yes by introducing some extenuating circumstance, like it being the only way to prevent extinction.
Of course, this then brings up the issue of whether or not the settlers should have children who might not feel the same way they do. I’m much less sure about the morality of doing that.
Yes, the scenario involves adding people, not just moving them around. That’s what makes population ethics tricky.
Such as, for example, the Moon or Mars?
I would say yes, to the extent that it reduces species ex-risk to have those extra people. (For instance, having a Mars colony as per RichardKennaway’s example would reduce Ex-Risk) However, it is possible that adding extra people in some cases might instead increase Ex-Risk (say, a slum outside of a city which might breed disease that spreads to the city) and in that case I might say No.
That’s a separate problem with the repugnant conclusion that bothers me sometimes. It appears to be the case that at some point the average function starts greatly increasing ex-risk at a later point even though it doesn’t do that at the beginning. If you are down to Muzak and Potatoes, a potato famine wipes you out.
So if you have “Potatoes, Carrots and Muzak” in Pop Y, and “Potatoes” in Pop Z, averaging it out to “Potatoes and Muzak” for everyone might increase average happiness, and Pop Z wouldn’t mind, but it wouldn’t be safe for Pop Y and Z together as a species, because they lose the safety of being able to come back from a potato famine.
That also seems to come with a built in idea of what kind of averaging is acceptable and where there are limits on averaging. Taking from a richer populations status to improve a poorer populations health would be fine. Taking from a richer populations health or safety to improve a lower populations safety would be unreasonable.
And a life where your health and safety are well guaranteed certainly sounds a hell of a lot better than “barely worth living.” so it doesn’t descend down into repugnance.
Basically, if instead of just looking at Population and Utility, you look at Population, Utility, and Ex-risk, the problem seems to vanish. It seems to say “Yes, add” and “Yes average” when I want it to add and average and say “no, don’t add” and “No don’t average” when I want it to now add and not average.
You could also just say “Well, Ex-Risk is part of my utility function” but that seems to lead to tricky calculation questions such as:
Approximately what is the Ex-Risk at a life barely worth living, utility wise? Presumably, less Ex-Risk would make the life more worth living, and More Ex-Risk would make the life less worth living? Is that still the case here? Can it flip the sign? Can an increase to Ex-Risk and nothing else make a life which is currently worth living not worth living?
Maybe I need to answer those questions, although I’m not sure where to start. Or maybe I just need to separate out multiplicative utility and additive utility?
This criticism has been made before. I think the standard reply was that it may indeed be the case that we would need to have a life somewhat above the level of “barely worth living” in order to guard against the possibility that some sort of disaster would lower the quality of the people’s lives to such an extent that they were no longer worth living. However, such a standard of living would likely still be low enough for the Repugnant Conclusion to remain repugnant.