I agree that concern about the consequences of a belief is important to the cluster you’re describing. There’s also an element of “in the past, people who have asserted X have had motives of which I disapprove, and therefore the fact that you are asserting X is evidence that I will disapprove of your motives as well.”
I am confused by this comment. I was agreeing with Viliam that concern about consequences was important, and adding that concern about motives was also important… to which you seem to be responding that the idea is that concern about consequences is important. Have I missed something, or are we just going in circles now?
Strictly speaking, path dependency may not always be rational—but until we raise the sanity line high enough, it is a highly predictable part of human interaction.
I agree that concern about the consequences of a belief is important to the cluster you’re describing. There’s also an element of “in the past, people who have asserted X have had motives of which I disapprove, and therefore the fact that you are asserting X is evidence that I will disapprove of your motives as well.”
Not just motives—the idea is that those beliefs have reliably led to destructive actions.
I am confused by this comment. I was agreeing with Viliam that concern about consequences was important, and adding that concern about motives was also important… to which you seem to be responding that the idea is that concern about consequences is important. Have I missed something, or are we just going in circles now?
Sorry—I missed the “also” in “There’s also an element....”
I wish I had another upvote.
Strictly speaking, path dependency may not always be rational—but until we raise the sanity line high enough, it is a highly predictable part of human interaction.