In general, it seems strongly that some aspects of gender are social constructs and others or not. The most helpful way of distinguishing them is to look at differences across different societies. If some difference in gender behavior exists in all or almost all societies then the degree of social construction in it is likely to be small. If some gender aspect only exists in some specific times and places then it is a gender construct. Let’s look at examples which are relevant to modern society. In the United States, and much of the Western world, it is taken for granted that pink is a feminine color and blue is a masculine color. Indeed, we start this with a very young age, giving clothes of the appropriate colors to infants. Many people in the US consider this to be an obvious universal. But in fact, this color distinction is very modern. However, now consider for example aggressiveness. In pretty much all societies, males are considered to be more violent and aggressive than females.
Aside from looking at other cultures, there are other methods. For example, one can look at children who were genetically male but had surgery at a very young age that made them anatomically female. Even when they are raised as “female” they frequently develop habits, attitudes, and play interests that are considered to be masculine.
So, the upshot is that some aspects of gender are clearly culturally constructed, and that most people probably underestimate how much falls into that category. But the claim that gender as a whole is a pure social construct is empirically wrong.
In general, it seems strongly that some aspects of gender are social constructs and others or not. The most helpful way of distinguishing them is to look at differences across different societies.
There are however two huge pitfalls when engaging in this sort of reasoning.
The first is the tendency to conclude that since aspect X of gender apparently doesn’t exist in society Y, it is therefore a social construct, and it can be eliminated by changing some particular aspect of the existing society in isolation—ignoring the possibility that any such change necessarily entails making the society look more similar to Y in other ways, which would be seen as unfavorable even by most people who are negatively disposed towards X per se. This of course sounds like a clear fallacy when spelled out like this, but the fallacy can often be found at the core of many gender-related arguments, and countering it is often impossible without making arguments of the sort “lack of X leads to Y” that sound insensitive and offensive when stated explicitly.
The second is the failure to realize that aspect X of gender can be a stable equilibrium for collective behavior, like driving on the right side. There is nothing (more or less) that objectively favors either the left- or the right-side driving to be the universal rule, and different conventions exist in different places, but this doesn’t mean it’s a good idea to start telling people that since the direction of traffic is a social convention, they should now choose freely which side to drive on. (This also relates to the first problem, since unlike the direction of traffic, different stable equilibriums in gender-related norms may in fact have far-reaching broader social implications.)
(And all this is even ignoring the common tendency to report information about other societies in distorted and biased manner in service of ideological goals, which introduces further dangers and greatly multiplies the amount of nonsense on this topic that is circulating around, even in prestigious venues.)
However, now consider for example aggressiveness. In pretty much all societies, males are considered to be more violent and aggressive than females. … But the claim that gender as a whole is a pure social construct is empirically wrong.
Not all attributes of gender are transient; not all of the things commonly attributed to one gender or another would be totally gone in a genderless (non-transhumanist) society. But that doesn’t mean that the category of gender cleaves thingspace at the natural edges.
Aside from looking at other cultures, there are other methods. For example, one can look at children who were genetically male but had surgery at a very young age that made them anatomically female. Even when they are raised as “female” they [frequently develop habits, attitudes, and play interests] that are considered to be masculine.
This isn’t a good experiment unless the people involved have no knowledge of the child’s birth sex. Also, as far as I’m aware, there’s about one prominent case study describing this, and as such I think it’s misleading that you use the word “frequently”. The one time I know of this happening, you’re right—the person eventually transitioned back to masculinity. But that’s not much to update on.
This isn’t a good experiment unless the people involved have no knowledge of the child’s birth sex.
Sure. This is far from perfect.
Also, as far as I’m aware, there’s about one prominent case study describing this, and as such I think it’s misleading that you use the word “frequently”.
I presume that you are thinking of the David Reimer case. While that is the most prominent example it is not the only one. In fact, that case is actually is one of the less useful examples since there were many complicating factors. But there are a variety of other case studies. See, e.g. here.
In general, it seems strongly that some aspects of gender are social constructs and others or not. The most helpful way of distinguishing them is to look at differences across different societies. If some difference in gender behavior exists in all or almost all societies then the degree of social construction in it is likely to be small. If some gender aspect only exists in some specific times and places then it is a gender construct. Let’s look at examples which are relevant to modern society. In the United States, and much of the Western world, it is taken for granted that pink is a feminine color and blue is a masculine color. Indeed, we start this with a very young age, giving clothes of the appropriate colors to infants. Many people in the US consider this to be an obvious universal. But in fact, this color distinction is very modern. However, now consider for example aggressiveness. In pretty much all societies, males are considered to be more violent and aggressive than females.
Aside from looking at other cultures, there are other methods. For example, one can look at children who were genetically male but had surgery at a very young age that made them anatomically female. Even when they are raised as “female” they frequently develop habits, attitudes, and play interests that are considered to be masculine.
So, the upshot is that some aspects of gender are clearly culturally constructed, and that most people probably underestimate how much falls into that category. But the claim that gender as a whole is a pure social construct is empirically wrong.
There are however two huge pitfalls when engaging in this sort of reasoning.
The first is the tendency to conclude that since aspect X of gender apparently doesn’t exist in society Y, it is therefore a social construct, and it can be eliminated by changing some particular aspect of the existing society in isolation—ignoring the possibility that any such change necessarily entails making the society look more similar to Y in other ways, which would be seen as unfavorable even by most people who are negatively disposed towards X per se. This of course sounds like a clear fallacy when spelled out like this, but the fallacy can often be found at the core of many gender-related arguments, and countering it is often impossible without making arguments of the sort “lack of X leads to Y” that sound insensitive and offensive when stated explicitly.
The second is the failure to realize that aspect X of gender can be a stable equilibrium for collective behavior, like driving on the right side. There is nothing (more or less) that objectively favors either the left- or the right-side driving to be the universal rule, and different conventions exist in different places, but this doesn’t mean it’s a good idea to start telling people that since the direction of traffic is a social convention, they should now choose freely which side to drive on. (This also relates to the first problem, since unlike the direction of traffic, different stable equilibriums in gender-related norms may in fact have far-reaching broader social implications.)
(And all this is even ignoring the common tendency to report information about other societies in distorted and biased manner in service of ideological goals, which introduces further dangers and greatly multiplies the amount of nonsense on this topic that is circulating around, even in prestigious venues.)
Characteristically Burkian.
Not all attributes of gender are transient; not all of the things commonly attributed to one gender or another would be totally gone in a genderless (non-transhumanist) society. But that doesn’t mean that the category of gender cleaves thingspace at the natural edges.
This isn’t a good experiment unless the people involved have no knowledge of the child’s birth sex. Also, as far as I’m aware, there’s about one prominent case study describing this, and as such I think it’s misleading that you use the word “frequently”. The one time I know of this happening, you’re right—the person eventually transitioned back to masculinity. But that’s not much to update on.
Sure. This is far from perfect.
I presume that you are thinking of the David Reimer case. While that is the most prominent example it is not the only one. In fact, that case is actually is one of the less useful examples since there were many complicating factors. But there are a variety of other case studies. See, e.g. here.