I think I figured out the main idea of Bayesian epistemology. It is: Bayes’ theorem is the source of justification (this is intended as the solution to the problem of justification, which is a bad problem).
No. See here, where Eliezer specifically says that this is not the case. (“But first, let it be clearly admitted that the rules of Bayesian updating, do not of themselves solve the problem of induction.”)
No. See here, where Eliezer specifically says that this is not the case. (“But first, let it be clearly admitted that the rules of Bayesian updating, do not of themselves solve the problem of induction.”)
I had already seen that.
Note that I said justification not induction.
I don’t want to argue about this. If you like the idea, enjoy it. If you don’t, just forget about it and reply to something else I said.