The definitional dispute about sound is different in that air pressure and auditory experience are both useful concepts, and there is no competition between them.
There is a dispute, ever hear of the idealists and the realists? Luckily it is over now. But either way. It does not matter why you are using one word to stand for many things, you shouldn’t do it if you can use a terminology that is more widely accepted. I still think that bayesianism is a better interpretation, a much better interpretation than frequentism, but what is it an interpretation of? Is it an interpretation of math? Seems to me like it as interpretation of typographical string manipulations applied to certain basic strings.
As another commenter has pointed out, the semantic argument is just a proxy for the dispute over whether one or other interpretation is preferable either philosophically or in practical terms.
That wasn’t another commenter, that was in my article, I’m pretty sure.
If people switched to saying that probability models both subjective degrees of belief and imaginary long-run frequency, there would still be this argument; however, it would then be harder for the Bayesian revolution (with whom the momentum lies) to finally oust the cursed frequentists, because language would be used in such a way as to imply equal validity of the interpretations.
If bayesianism wins this argument, which it probably will, it should win because it is the ideal system of statistical inference, not because they managed to convince a bunch of people of a statement with absolutely no empirical consequences. If you argue about what probability is you argue about surface bubbles of your theory that are just irrelevant to the real dispute you are having, whether you are a realist and an idealist, or a frequentist and a bayesian.
There is a dispute, ever hear of the idealists and the realists? Luckily it is over now. But either way. It does not matter why you are using one word to stand for many things, you shouldn’t do it if you can use a terminology that is more widely accepted. I still think that bayesianism is a better interpretation, a much better interpretation than frequentism, but what is it an interpretation of? Is it an interpretation of math? Seems to me like it as interpretation of typographical string manipulations applied to certain basic strings.
That wasn’t another commenter, that was in my article, I’m pretty sure.
If bayesianism wins this argument, which it probably will, it should win because it is the ideal system of statistical inference, not because they managed to convince a bunch of people of a statement with absolutely no empirical consequences. If you argue about what probability is you argue about surface bubbles of your theory that are just irrelevant to the real dispute you are having, whether you are a realist and an idealist, or a frequentist and a bayesian.
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