So, getting back to your hypothetical… if replacing one set of things-that-I-can-do (S1) with a different set of things-that-I-can-do (S2) doesn’t constitute a utility loss, then I don’t care about the substitution. Why should I? I’m just as well-off along all measurable dimensions of value as I was before.
Similarly, if group 1 has S1 and group 2 has S2, and there’s no utility difference, I don’t care which group I’m assigned to. Again, why should I? I’m just as well-off along all measurable dimensions of value either way. On what grounds would I pick one over the other?
So if, as you posited, rich people had S1 and poor people had S2, then I wouldn’t care whether I was rich or poor. That’s clearly not the way the real world is set up, which is precisely why I’m comfortable saying rich and poor people in the real world aren’t equal. But that is the way things are set up in your hypothetical.
But each of them only gets half! What about … well, what about individual variance, for a start. S1 and S2 wouldn’t be exactly equal for everybody if you’re dealing with humans, which to be fair I did not make explicit.
But each of them only gets half! What about … well, what about individual variance, for a start. S1 and S2 wouldn’t be exactly equal for everybody if you’re dealing with humans, which to be fair I did not make explicit.
OK. Given some additional data about what arguing for Dave!equality might look like, I’m tapping out here.
Lengthy, amirite?
Fair enough.