You might try reading Yvain’s summary of Reaction. I can’t guarantee it’s the single most accurate description of the philosophy in existence, but it’s probably the clearest.
The article seems to amount to “Conspiracy theories aren’t always wrong”. I don’t see the connection.
No.
Here I consider in some detail a failure mode that classical rationality often recognizes. Unfortunately nearly all heuristics normally used to detect it seem remarkably vulnerable to misfiring or being exploited by others. I advocate an approach where we try our best to account for the key bias, seeing agency where there is none, while trying to minimize the risk of being tricked into dismissing claims because of boo lights.
To summarize.
When do conspiracy theories seem more likely than they are?
The phenomena is unpredictable or can’t be modelled very well
Models used by others are hard to understand or are very counter-intuitive
Thinking about the subject significantly strains cognitive resources
The theory explains why bad things happen or why something went wrong
The theory requires coordination
When you see these features you probably find the theory more plausible than it is.
No. Also you may need to think a bit more about what exactly you mean when you say conspiracy theory.
You might need to expand on the “no”.
You might try reading Yvain’s summary of Reaction. I can’t guarantee it’s the single most accurate description of the philosophy in existence, but it’s probably the clearest.
Did you read my article on conspiracy theories I linked to?
Your “No” seems to amount to “You interpreted Moldbug wrongly”.
The article seems to amount to “Conspiracy theories aren’t always wrong”. I don’t see the connection.
No.
To summarize.