“I have been to several yoga classes. The last one I attended consisted of about thirty women, plus me (this was in Ireland; I don’t know if American yoga has a different gender balance).
We propose two different explanations for this obviously significant result.
First, these yoga classes are somehow driving men away. Maybe they say mean things about men (maybe without intending it! we’re not saying they’re intentionally misandrist!) or they talk about issues in a way exclusionary to male viewpoints. The yoga class should invite some men’s rights activists in to lecture the participants on what they can do to make men feel comfortable, and maybe spend some of every class discussing issues that matter deeply to men, like Truckasaurus.
Second, men just don’t like yoga as much as women. One could propose a probably hilarious evolutionary genetic explanation for this (how about women being gatherers in the ancestral environment, so they needed lots of flexibility so they could bend down and pick small plants?) but much more likely is just that men and women are socialized differently in a bunch of subtle ways and the interests and values they end up with are more pro-yoga in women and more anti-yoga in men. In this case a yoga class might still benefit by making it super-clear that men are welcome and removing a couple of things that might make men uncomfortable, but short of completely re-ordering society there’s not much they can do to get equal gender balance and it shouldn’t be held against them that they don’t.
The second explanation seems much more plausible for my yoga class, and honestly it seems much more plausible for the rationalist community as well.”
Could you say how this is relevant? If the problem is that women are socialized poorly, that doesn’t make it a good idea for us to stop caring about solving (or circumventing) the problem. Empirically, women both get socialized to avoid STEM and academia and get driven out by bad practices when they arrive. This is called the ‘leaky pipeline’ problem, and I haven’t seen evidence that we’re immune. You can find good discussion of this here.
Could you say how this is relevant? If the problem is that women are socialized poorly …
Here:
[maybe] men just don’t like yoga as much as women … [and] short of completely re-ordering society there’s not much they can do to get equal gender balance and it shouldn’t be held against them that they don’t.
[This] explanation seems much more plausible for my yoga class, and honestly it seems much more plausible for the rationalist community as well.
Thanks for clarifying. Using Scott’s analogy, I’d respond by pointing to
In this case a yoga class might still benefit by making it super-clear that men are welcome and removing a couple of things that might make men uncomfortable
At present, going by the survey results, 9.8% of LessWrongers identify as female. (And 9.9% as women.) Quoting Wikipedia:
Women’s representation in the computing and information technology workforce has been falling from a peak of 38% in the mid-1980s. From 1993 through 1999, NSF’s SESTAT reported that the percentage of women working as computer/information scientists (including those who hold a bachelor’s degree or higher in an S&E field or have a bachelor’s degree or higher and are working in an S&E field) declined slightly from 33.1% to 29.6% percent while the absolute numbers increased from 170,500 to 185,000. Numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Catalyst in 2006 indicated that women comprise 27-29% of the computing workforce. A National Public Radio report in 2013 stated that about 20% of all US computer programmers are female.
I don’t think either hypothesis (‘women are socialized to be less interested in computer science’ and ‘women interested in computers get driven out by differential treatment by computer science authorities and communities’) predicts that we’d be doing worse at gender representativeness over time. We’d expect both causes for inequality to be lessening over time, as society becomes more progressive / feminist / egalitarian. It is clear, however, that something we’re doing is responsible for the rarity of women in such communities, and that this something can shift fairly rapidly from decade to decade. So, whatever the mechanism is, it looks plausibly susceptible to interventions.
If we grant that LessWrong has the power to improve its gender ratio without degrading the quality of discussion, then the only question is whether we prefer to retain a less diverse community. And it would be surprising to me if we have no power to move things in that direction. If we became merely as welcoming as computer science in general is today, we’d double the proportion of women at LessWrong. from 10% to 20%; if we became as attractive as computing and IT were in the ’80s, or as economics is today, we’d rise to 30% or 40%; and if we had proportionally as many women as there are in psychology today, we’d be up to 70% women and have the opposite problem!
When we’re doing worse than the worst of the large fields that can be claimed to have seeded LW, it’s probably time to think seriously about solutions. (And, no, ‘hey what if MIRI started a Pinterest account’ does not qualify as ‘thinking seriously about gender inclusivity’.)
Overall, I agree with Ben Kuhn’s points on this issue.
Looks like this kind of stuff also varies geographically: physics is not 89% male where I am, more like 65% I’d guess (and yoga more like 25% than 3%).
Note to anyone reading this who was disturbed by that comment: V_V is a known troll on LW.
RobbBB, please take that into account when deciding whether LW needs an explicit post on whether it’s good qua good to improve gender ratio if it’s otherwise cost-free to do so.
Well, to the defense of those of us who think V_V a troll, if I remember correctly he marked his early existence in LessWrong by accusing Anna Salamon of being a spammer (when she made a post announcing some activity of CFAR). Since then he’s done the occasional “you’re all cultists” thing, and smirked about it in Rationalwiki.
In my mind, I’ve grouped him with Dmytry/private_messaging and Alexander Kruel/Xixidu. It’s not about people who disagree, it’s about people who have acted like assholes, who seem to enjoy to make fun of people with different opinions, who don’t actually care whether what they say has truth-content in it, etc, etc—and who after spending so much time in LessWrong, they then go somewhere else and insult the people who spend time in LessWrong.
Let us assume that there is some activity A (either posting on LessWrong, or participating in a yoga class, or whatever).
Activity A is either beneficial, or detrimental, to take part in. (It may be beneficial to some people but detrimental to others; let as assume for the moment that the amount of benefit recieved, as with most activities, is not directly tied to gender).
Note that the gender ratio of humanity is pretty close to 50⁄50.
If activity A is detrimental, then it is to the benefit of people in general for no-one to attempt activity A.
If activity A is beneficial, then it is to the benefit of people in general for as many people as possible to attempt activity A.
If activity A is beneficial to x% of people and detrimental to (100-x)% of people, then we should expect, in a perfect world, to see x% of males and x% of females attempting activity A.
In all cases, this is a 50⁄50 male:female ratio. When we do not see this, it is usually evidence of a detrimental gender-based bias; possibly cultural, possibly due to some unintended error that is driving away one gender more than the other. It seems especially sensible to ask about the cause of such a strong bias in a community which puts such effort into understanding its own biases, but it’s still a good idea whenever sufficiently strong evidence of this sort of bias becomes apparent...
(It may be beneficial to some people but detrimental to others; let as assume for the moment that the amount of benefit recieved, as with most activities, is not directly tied to gender).
How do you support that assumption?
If activity A is beneficial to x% of people and detrimental to (100-x)% of people, then we should expect, in a perfect world, to see x% of males and x% of females attempting activity A. In all cases, this is a 50⁄50 male:female ratio.
Again, assuming that whatever makes activity A beneficial to some people and not other people isn’t correlated with gender. But lots of psychological traits are correlated with gender, hence this seems a highly questionable assumption.
Moreover, even if the particular activity A gives equal benefits to both genders, comparative advantage may make one of them more interested in performing A than the other is.
(It may be beneficial to some people but detrimental to others; let as assume for the moment that the amount of benefit recieved, as with most activities, is not directly tied to gender).
How do you support that assumption?
That depends on the nature of activity A.
If, for example, activity A consists of posting on (and reading posts and sequences on) LessWrong, then I would support it on the basis that I cannot see any evidence that the benefits of rationality are at all correlated to gender. If activity A consists of posting on, and reading posts on, a website dedicated to (say) breastfeeding, then there is clearly a greater benefit for female readers and my assumption becomes invalid.
For most activities, however, I tend to default to this assumption unless there is a clear causal chain showing how a difference in gender changes the benefit received.
Again, assuming that whatever makes activity A beneficial to some people and not other people isn’t correlated with gender. But lots of psychological traits are correlated with gender, hence this seems a highly questionable assumption.
My immediate question is how many of those psychological traits correlated with gender are due, not to gender, but to the cultural perception of gender?
If, for example, activity A consists of posting on (and reading posts and sequences on) LessWrong, then I would support it on the basis that I cannot see any evidence that the benefits of rationality are at all correlated to gender.
And health benefits of yoga are probably not strongly correlated to gender.
Yet people engage in leisure activities generally not because of possible long-term benefits, but because they find these activivities intrinsicaly rewarding. And since different people have different preferences, the activities they find rewarding differ. Add the fact that leisure time is a limited resource, hence a tradeoff between available activities must be done, and these competing activities, and their enjoyablility differs from one person to the other.
Personal preferences correlate with gender.
My immediate question is how many of those psychological traits correlated with gender are due, not to gender, but to the cultural perception of gender?
Gender correlates to many, if not most, objectively measurable physiological traits. As for psychological traits, we know for sure that sexual hormones affect brain development during fetal stage, and brain activity during adult life. Whether each particular psychological trait correlates to gender due to a biological cause, or a cultural one, or a combination of both, is a matter of research.
But I don’t think the nature vs nurture question really matters here: different people have different preferences, whatever the cause, and I don’t see why we should try to engineer them to achieve some arbitrary ideal.
And health benefits of yoga are probably not strongly correlated to gender.
This is why it surprises me that there is a gender imbalance in people going to yoga classes.
Yet people engage in leisure activities generally not because of possible long-term benefits, but because they find these activivities intrinsicaly rewarding. And since different people have different preferences, the activities they find rewarding differ.
Add the fact that leisure time is a limited resource, hence a tradeoff between available activities must be done, and these competing activities, and their enjoyablility differs from one person to the other.
Personal preferences correlate with gender.
Here, again, I think that a large part of the difference between personal preferences with gender is more cultural than biological. Consider, for example; culturally, over a large part of the world, it is considered acceptable for a woman to wear a skirt, but frowned on for a man. As a result, few men wear skirts; if you were to pick a random man and ask for his opinion on wearing a skirt, it is likely that he would not wish to do so. However, if one considers a slightly different culture for a little (for example, the Scottish kilt), one finds a similar garment being worn by many men. So a person’s preferences are affected by culture.
But I don’t think the nature vs nurture question really matters here: different people have different preferences, whatever the cause, and I don’t see why we should try to engineer them to achieve some arbitrary ideal.
I don’t see it so much as reaching an arbitrary ideal; I see it more as avoiding a known failure mode.
I have noticed that, throughout history, there have been cases where people were divided into separate groups; whether by race, gender, religion, or other means. In most of those cases, one group managed to achieve some measure of power over all the other groups; and then used that measure of power to oppress all the other groups, whether overtly or not.
This leads to all sorts of problems.
One means of maintaining such a division, is by creating a further, artificial divide, and using that to widen the gap between the groups. For example, if significantly more men than women own land in a given society, then restricting the ability to vote to landowners will tend to exacerbate any official pro-male bias. (This works the other way around, as well).
Therefore, when I see a major statistical imbalance for no adequately explained reason (such as the noted gender bias on LessWrong, or the imbalance in yoga classes) I find it a cause for slight concern; enough to at least justify trying to find and explain the reason for the imbalance.
Consider, for example; culturally, over a large part of the world, it is considered acceptable for a woman to wear a skirt, but frowned on for a man. As a result, few men wear skirts; if you were to pick a random man and ask for his opinion on wearing a skirt, it is likely that he would not wish to do so. However, if one considers a slightly different culture for a little (for example, the Scottish kilt), one finds a similar garment being worn by many men. So a person’s preferences are affected by culture.
So, should we campaign to increase the number of men who wear skirts and the number of women who wear traditional Scottish kilts? Or the number of non-Scottish people who wear kilts? Or the number of Scottish people who wear pants? I don’t know, what is the proper PC ideal here?
One means of maintaining such a division, is by creating a further, artificial divide, and using that to widen the gap between the groups. For example, if significantly more men than women own land in a given society, then restricting the ability to vote to landowners will tend to exacerbate any official pro-male bias. (This works the other way around, as well).
I don’t think anybody proposed a restriction of voting rights based on the partecipation to LessWrong or yoga classes, thus this seems to be a slippery slope argument.
Please don’t take this personally, but trying to “re-educate” people to change their preferences in order to socially engineer an utopian society, is the hallmark of totalitarianism. I think that, as long as people get along peacefully, it’s better to recognize, acknowledge and respect diversity.
If activity A is beneficial to x% of people and detrimental to (100-x)% of people, then we should expect, in a perfect world, to see x% of males and x% of females attempting activity A.
Suppose A is beneficial to 80% of males and 40% of females, and detrimental to 20% of males and 60% of females; why would you expect, in a perfect world, to see 60% of males and 60% of females attempting activity A?
This is a very appropriate quote, and I upvoted. However, I would suggest formatting the quote in markdown as a quote, using “>”.
Something like this
In my opinion, this quote format is better: it makes it easier to distinguish it as a quote.
In any case, I’m sorry for nitpicking about formatting, and no offence is intended. Perhaps there is some reason I missed that explains why you put it the way you did?
A RESPONSE TO APOPHEMI ON TRIGGERS. Part IV.
Could you say how this is relevant? If the problem is that women are socialized poorly, that doesn’t make it a good idea for us to stop caring about solving (or circumventing) the problem. Empirically, women both get socialized to avoid STEM and academia and get driven out by bad practices when they arrive. This is called the ‘leaky pipeline’ problem, and I haven’t seen evidence that we’re immune. You can find good discussion of this here.
Here:
Thanks for clarifying. Using Scott’s analogy, I’d respond by pointing to
At present, going by the survey results, 9.8% of LessWrongers identify as female. (And 9.9% as women.) Quoting Wikipedia:
I don’t think either hypothesis (‘women are socialized to be less interested in computer science’ and ‘women interested in computers get driven out by differential treatment by computer science authorities and communities’) predicts that we’d be doing worse at gender representativeness over time. We’d expect both causes for inequality to be lessening over time, as society becomes more progressive / feminist / egalitarian. It is clear, however, that something we’re doing is responsible for the rarity of women in such communities, and that this something can shift fairly rapidly from decade to decade. So, whatever the mechanism is, it looks plausibly susceptible to interventions.
If we grant that LessWrong has the power to improve its gender ratio without degrading the quality of discussion, then the only question is whether we prefer to retain a less diverse community. And it would be surprising to me if we have no power to move things in that direction. If we became merely as welcoming as computer science in general is today, we’d double the proportion of women at LessWrong. from 10% to 20%; if we became as attractive as computing and IT were in the ’80s, or as economics is today, we’d rise to 30% or 40%; and if we had proportionally as many women as there are in psychology today, we’d be up to 70% women and have the opposite problem!
When we’re doing worse than the worst of the large fields that can be claimed to have seeded LW, it’s probably time to think seriously about solutions. (And, no, ‘hey what if MIRI started a Pinterest account’ does not qualify as ‘thinking seriously about gender inclusivity’.)
Overall, I agree with Ben Kuhn’s points on this issue.
Looks like this kind of stuff also varies geographically: physics is not 89% male where I am, more like 65% I’d guess (and yoga more like 25% than 3%).
I don’t think it has a lot of power, because (1) males have higher IQ variability (so, apparently, males are two times more likely to have an IQ of 130, and average IQ on LW is 138, which should create even bigger gender imbalance), and (2.1) according to 2012 survey, LW is ~80% Myers-Briggs NT, (2.2) NT is much more prevalent in males (somewhere around 2:1), (2.3) apparently, NT’s have very high average intelligence.
My guess is that we can move it a little without lowering content quality, but I doubt if anything significant is possible.
Basically, we just need to find out gender ratio of individuals with average IQ of 135-140 who are also NT’s.
Btw, Yvain posted a huge comment to Ben Kuhn’s post.
I can’t see why gender imbalance is supposed to be a problem.
Note to anyone reading this who was disturbed by that comment: V_V is a known troll on LW.
RobbBB, please take that into account when deciding whether LW needs an explicit post on whether it’s good qua good to improve gender ratio if it’s otherwise cost-free to do so.
You know, it’s starting to seem that your definition of “troll” is “someone who dares disagree with Eliezer’s firmly held beliefs”.
Don’t feed the troll. :D
Well, to the defense of those of us who think V_V a troll, if I remember correctly he marked his early existence in LessWrong by accusing Anna Salamon of being a spammer (when she made a post announcing some activity of CFAR). Since then he’s done the occasional “you’re all cultists” thing, and smirked about it in Rationalwiki.
In my mind, I’ve grouped him with Dmytry/private_messaging and Alexander Kruel/Xixidu. It’s not about people who disagree, it’s about people who have acted like assholes, who seem to enjoy to make fun of people with different opinions, who don’t actually care whether what they say has truth-content in it, etc, etc—and who after spending so much time in LessWrong, they then go somewhere else and insult the people who spend time in LessWrong.
Let us assume that there is some activity A (either posting on LessWrong, or participating in a yoga class, or whatever).
Activity A is either beneficial, or detrimental, to take part in. (It may be beneficial to some people but detrimental to others; let as assume for the moment that the amount of benefit recieved, as with most activities, is not directly tied to gender).
Note that the gender ratio of humanity is pretty close to 50⁄50.
If activity A is detrimental, then it is to the benefit of people in general for no-one to attempt activity A.
If activity A is beneficial, then it is to the benefit of people in general for as many people as possible to attempt activity A.
If activity A is beneficial to x% of people and detrimental to (100-x)% of people, then we should expect, in a perfect world, to see x% of males and x% of females attempting activity A.
In all cases, this is a 50⁄50 male:female ratio. When we do not see this, it is usually evidence of a detrimental gender-based bias; possibly cultural, possibly due to some unintended error that is driving away one gender more than the other. It seems especially sensible to ask about the cause of such a strong bias in a community which puts such effort into understanding its own biases, but it’s still a good idea whenever sufficiently strong evidence of this sort of bias becomes apparent...
How do you support that assumption?
Again, assuming that whatever makes activity A beneficial to some people and not other people isn’t correlated with gender. But lots of psychological traits are correlated with gender, hence this seems a highly questionable assumption.
Moreover, even if the particular activity A gives equal benefits to both genders, comparative advantage may make one of them more interested in performing A than the other is.
That depends on the nature of activity A.
If, for example, activity A consists of posting on (and reading posts and sequences on) LessWrong, then I would support it on the basis that I cannot see any evidence that the benefits of rationality are at all correlated to gender. If activity A consists of posting on, and reading posts on, a website dedicated to (say) breastfeeding, then there is clearly a greater benefit for female readers and my assumption becomes invalid.
For most activities, however, I tend to default to this assumption unless there is a clear causal chain showing how a difference in gender changes the benefit received.
My immediate question is how many of those psychological traits correlated with gender are due, not to gender, but to the cultural perception of gender?
And health benefits of yoga are probably not strongly correlated to gender.
Yet people engage in leisure activities generally not because of possible long-term benefits, but because they find these activivities intrinsicaly rewarding. And since different people have different preferences, the activities they find rewarding differ.
Add the fact that leisure time is a limited resource, hence a tradeoff between available activities must be done, and these competing activities, and their enjoyablility differs from one person to the other.
Personal preferences correlate with gender.
Gender correlates to many, if not most, objectively measurable physiological traits.
As for psychological traits, we know for sure that sexual hormones affect brain development during fetal stage, and brain activity during adult life.
Whether each particular psychological trait correlates to gender due to a biological cause, or a cultural one, or a combination of both, is a matter of research.
But I don’t think the nature vs nurture question really matters here: different people have different preferences, whatever the cause, and I don’t see why we should try to engineer them to achieve some arbitrary ideal.
This is why it surprises me that there is a gender imbalance in people going to yoga classes.
Here, again, I think that a large part of the difference between personal preferences with gender is more cultural than biological. Consider, for example; culturally, over a large part of the world, it is considered acceptable for a woman to wear a skirt, but frowned on for a man. As a result, few men wear skirts; if you were to pick a random man and ask for his opinion on wearing a skirt, it is likely that he would not wish to do so. However, if one considers a slightly different culture for a little (for example, the Scottish kilt), one finds a similar garment being worn by many men. So a person’s preferences are affected by culture.
I don’t see it so much as reaching an arbitrary ideal; I see it more as avoiding a known failure mode.
I have noticed that, throughout history, there have been cases where people were divided into separate groups; whether by race, gender, religion, or other means. In most of those cases, one group managed to achieve some measure of power over all the other groups; and then used that measure of power to oppress all the other groups, whether overtly or not.
This leads to all sorts of problems.
One means of maintaining such a division, is by creating a further, artificial divide, and using that to widen the gap between the groups. For example, if significantly more men than women own land in a given society, then restricting the ability to vote to landowners will tend to exacerbate any official pro-male bias. (This works the other way around, as well).
Therefore, when I see a major statistical imbalance for no adequately explained reason (such as the noted gender bias on LessWrong, or the imbalance in yoga classes) I find it a cause for slight concern; enough to at least justify trying to find and explain the reason for the imbalance.
So, should we campaign to increase the number of men who wear skirts and the number of women who wear traditional Scottish kilts? Or the number of non-Scottish people who wear kilts? Or the number of Scottish people who wear pants? I don’t know, what is the proper PC ideal here?
I don’t think anybody proposed a restriction of voting rights based on the partecipation to LessWrong or yoga classes, thus this seems to be a slippery slope argument.
Please don’t take this personally, but trying to “re-educate” people to change their preferences in order to socially engineer an utopian society, is the hallmark of totalitarianism.
I think that, as long as people get along peacefully, it’s better to recognize, acknowledge and respect diversity.
Suppose A is beneficial to 80% of males and 40% of females, and detrimental to 20% of males and 60% of females; why would you expect, in a perfect world, to see 60% of males and 60% of females attempting activity A?
This is a very appropriate quote, and I upvoted. However, I would suggest formatting the quote in markdown as a quote, using “>”.
In my opinion, this quote format is better: it makes it easier to distinguish it as a quote.
In any case, I’m sorry for nitpicking about formatting, and no offence is intended. Perhaps there is some reason I missed that explains why you put it the way you did?
No, you’re right. I’m just not used to lesswrong comments.
And sure there’s no offense, because Crocker’s Rules.