In the same sense we talked about it in the {grand}parent post. You said:
You’re wrong that you shouldn’t drink. The only should on the table is my correct one. Your ‘no’ has no strength at all.
...to continue
the degree of complexity is so great, that we cannot be subject to a common ‘should’.
We may. But there is no guarantee that we would.
if we are subject to the same reasons, we are subject to the same ‘should’. Setting aside the question of how complex our values and preferences are, do you agree with this claim?
We have to be careful here. I understand “reasons” as, more or less, networks of causes and consequences. “Reasons” tell you what you should do to achieve something. But they don’t tell you what to achieve—that’s the job of values and preferences—and how to weight the different sides in a conflicting situation.
Given this, no, same reasons don’t give rise to the same “should”s because you need the same values and preferences as well.
So we have to figure out what a reason is. I took ‘reasons’ to be everything necessary and sufficient to conclude in a hypothetical or categorical imperative. So, the reasoning behind an action might look something like this:
1) I want an apple.
2) The store sells apples, for a price I’m willing to pay.
3) It’s not too much trouble to get there.
4) I have no other reason not to go get some apples.
C) I should get some apples from the store.
My claim is just that (C) follows and is true of everyone for whom (1)-(4) is true. If (1)-(4) is true of you, but you reject (C), then you’re wrong to do so. Just as anyone would be wrong to accept ‘If P then Q’ and ‘P’ but reject the conclusion ‘Q’.
I took ‘reasons’ to be everything necessary and sufficient to conclude in a hypothetical or categorical imperative.
That’s circular reasoning: if you define reasons as “everything necessary and sufficient”, well, of course, if they don’t conclude in an imperative they are not sufficient and so are not proper reasons :-/
In your example (4) is the weak spot. You’re making a remarkable wide and strong claim—one common in logical exercise but impossible to make in reality. There are always reasons pro and con and it all depends on how do you weight them.
Consider any objection to your conclusion (C) (e.g. “Eh, I’m feel lazy now”) -- any objection falls under (4) and so you can say that it doesn’t apply. And we’re back to the circle...
Not if I have independent reason to think that ‘everything necessary and sufficient to conclude an imperative’ is a reason, which I think I do.
In your example (4) is the weak spot. You’re making a remarkable wide and strong claim—one common in logical exercise but impossible to make in reality.
To be absolutely clear: the above is an empirical claim. Something for which we need evidence on the table. I’m indifferent to this claim, and it has no bearing on my point.
My point is just this conditional: IF (1)-(4) are true of any individual, that individual cannot rationally reject (C).
You might object to the antecedent (on the grounds that (4) is not a claim we can make in practice), but that’s different from objecting to the conditional. If you don’t object to the conditional, then I don’t think we have any disagreement, except the empirical one. And on that score, I find you view very implausible, and neither of us is prepared to argue about it. So we can drop the empirical point.
In the same sense we talked about it in the {grand}parent post. You said:
...to continue
We may. But there is no guarantee that we would.
We have to be careful here. I understand “reasons” as, more or less, networks of causes and consequences. “Reasons” tell you what you should do to achieve something. But they don’t tell you what to achieve—that’s the job of values and preferences—and how to weight the different sides in a conflicting situation.
Given this, no, same reasons don’t give rise to the same “should”s because you need the same values and preferences as well.
So we have to figure out what a reason is. I took ‘reasons’ to be everything necessary and sufficient to conclude in a hypothetical or categorical imperative. So, the reasoning behind an action might look something like this:
1) I want an apple. 2) The store sells apples, for a price I’m willing to pay. 3) It’s not too much trouble to get there. 4) I have no other reason not to go get some apples. C) I should get some apples from the store.
My claim is just that (C) follows and is true of everyone for whom (1)-(4) is true. If (1)-(4) is true of you, but you reject (C), then you’re wrong to do so. Just as anyone would be wrong to accept ‘If P then Q’ and ‘P’ but reject the conclusion ‘Q’.
That’s circular reasoning: if you define reasons as “everything necessary and sufficient”, well, of course, if they don’t conclude in an imperative they are not sufficient and so are not proper reasons :-/
In your example (4) is the weak spot. You’re making a remarkable wide and strong claim—one common in logical exercise but impossible to make in reality. There are always reasons pro and con and it all depends on how do you weight them.
Consider any objection to your conclusion (C) (e.g. “Eh, I’m feel lazy now”) -- any objection falls under (4) and so you can say that it doesn’t apply. And we’re back to the circle...
Not if I have independent reason to think that ‘everything necessary and sufficient to conclude an imperative’ is a reason, which I think I do.
To be absolutely clear: the above is an empirical claim. Something for which we need evidence on the table. I’m indifferent to this claim, and it has no bearing on my point.
My point is just this conditional: IF (1)-(4) are true of any individual, that individual cannot rationally reject (C).
You might object to the antecedent (on the grounds that (4) is not a claim we can make in practice), but that’s different from objecting to the conditional. If you don’t object to the conditional, then I don’t think we have any disagreement, except the empirical one. And on that score, I find you view very implausible, and neither of us is prepared to argue about it. So we can drop the empirical point.