- India, Turkey, and Hungary are widely referred to as “hybrid regimes” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_regime), in which opposition still exists and there are still elections, but the state interferes with elections so as to virtually guarantee victory. In Turkey’s case, there have been many elections, but Erdogan always wins through a combination of mass arrests, media censorship, and sending his most popular opponent to prison for “insulting public officials” (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63977555). In India’s case, Modi is no doubt very popular, but elections are likewise hardly fair when the main opponent is disqualified and sent to prison for “defamation” (insulting Modi). Rather than being voted out, hybrid regimes usually transition to full dictatorships, as has happened in (eg.) Russia, Belarus, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Iran, etc.
In Turkey’s case, there have been many elections, but Erdogan always wins through a combination of mass arrests, media censorship, and sending his most popular opponent to prison for “insulting public officials”
You do know that Ekrem Imamoglu was not actually sent to jail, right? He was one of the vice-presidential candidates in the May 2023 election.
Your claims here also ignore the fact that before the May 2023 elections, betting markets expected Erdogan to lose. On Betfair, for example, Erdogan winning the presidential elections was trading at 30c to 35c. Saying that “of course Erdogan would win, he censors his critics and puts them in jail” is a good example of 20⁄20 hindsight. Can you imagine betting markets giving Putin a 30% chance to win a presidential election in Russia?
It’s also not true that Erdogan always wins elections in Turkey. Erdogan’s party used to have a majority of seats in the parliament, and over time their share of the vote diminished to the extent that now they don’t anymore. To remain in power, Erdogan was compelled to ally with a Turkish nationalist party that had previously been one of his political enemies, and it’s only this alliance that has a majority of seats in the parliament now. This also led to noticeable policy shifts in Erdogan’s government, most notably when it comes to their attitude towards the Kurds.
It seems to me that you’re getting your information from biased sources and your knowledge of the political situation in Turkey is only superficial.
I wondered if there was a selection effect in your hybrid → dictatorship statement (we don’t talk much about people who lost power). But if I look at the hybrid regimes in 2012 here (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Economist_Democracy_Index), I do see a fair percentage that are listed as authoritarian in 2022. By contrast, only three countries (Singapore, Sri Lanka and Albania) have moved to Flawed Democracy. (2012 is, of course, a major outlier for Egypt, Libya and some other Arab Spring countries, but that doesn’t affect the general trend much.)
It’s worth looking at what happened in Ekrem İmamoğlu’s case, which you’ve linked to. As of today, Ekrem İmamoğlu is the sitting mayor of Istanbul, awaiting pending multiple courts upholding the verdict in his trial. İmamoğlu endorsed the head of his party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, as a presidential candidate, with İmamoğlu to serve as vice-president (though ultimately there were 7 (!) people set to serve as VP, so I don’t know how meaningful this is). Kılıçdaroğlu won 48% of the vote in the presidential election. I haven’t seen a detailed postmortem on how Erdoğan beat the polls, but there was no “virtually guaranteeing victory” in this election.
Also importantly: Erdoğan took power in 2003! He was 49. It took him 20 years to bring Turkey to the state it’s in, and I don’t think he has another 20 in him. If you want to turn your country into a dictatorship, you have to be young: Putin was 47, Chavez 45. This isn’t a quick process, and if your candidate for doing it is 75, they’re not likely to succeed. This is part of why I don’t see your “over the next decade” holding up.
Nitpick: Erdogan’s party won the 2002 elections, and Erdogan became Prime Minister in 2003. I’m not sure where you got the year 2004 from, but it’s not correct.
Thanks for the response! Here are some comments:
- India, Turkey, and Hungary are widely referred to as “hybrid regimes” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hybrid_regime), in which opposition still exists and there are still elections, but the state interferes with elections so as to virtually guarantee victory. In Turkey’s case, there have been many elections, but Erdogan always wins through a combination of mass arrests, media censorship, and sending his most popular opponent to prison for “insulting public officials” (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63977555). In India’s case, Modi is no doubt very popular, but elections are likewise hardly fair when the main opponent is disqualified and sent to prison for “defamation” (insulting Modi). Rather than being voted out, hybrid regimes usually transition to full dictatorships, as has happened in (eg.) Russia, Belarus, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Iran, etc.
- Of course nothing is certain, but France’s president is very powerful, and this article discusses in detail how Le Pen could manipulate the system to get a legislative supermajority and virtually unlimited power if elected: https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/20/france-election-le-pen-macron-constitution-separtism-law-state-of-emergency-referendum/
- I made a map here of roughly how much electoral support the far right has in each country worldwide (https://twitter.com/alyssamvance/status/1656882958903418880). However, it is tricky to forecast based on this, because far-right parties can appear from nothing and gain a wide support base very quickly (as happened with eg. Chile’s Republican Party).
You do know that Ekrem Imamoglu was not actually sent to jail, right? He was one of the vice-presidential candidates in the May 2023 election.
Your claims here also ignore the fact that before the May 2023 elections, betting markets expected Erdogan to lose. On Betfair, for example, Erdogan winning the presidential elections was trading at 30c to 35c. Saying that “of course Erdogan would win, he censors his critics and puts them in jail” is a good example of 20⁄20 hindsight. Can you imagine betting markets giving Putin a 30% chance to win a presidential election in Russia?
It’s also not true that Erdogan always wins elections in Turkey. Erdogan’s party used to have a majority of seats in the parliament, and over time their share of the vote diminished to the extent that now they don’t anymore. To remain in power, Erdogan was compelled to ally with a Turkish nationalist party that had previously been one of his political enemies, and it’s only this alliance that has a majority of seats in the parliament now. This also led to noticeable policy shifts in Erdogan’s government, most notably when it comes to their attitude towards the Kurds.
It seems to me that you’re getting your information from biased sources and your knowledge of the political situation in Turkey is only superficial.
I wondered if there was a selection effect in your hybrid → dictatorship statement (we don’t talk much about people who lost power). But if I look at the hybrid regimes in 2012 here (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Economist_Democracy_Index), I do see a fair percentage that are listed as authoritarian in 2022. By contrast, only three countries (Singapore, Sri Lanka and Albania) have moved to Flawed Democracy. (2012 is, of course, a major outlier for Egypt, Libya and some other Arab Spring countries, but that doesn’t affect the general trend much.)
It’s worth looking at what happened in Ekrem İmamoğlu’s case, which you’ve linked to. As of today, Ekrem İmamoğlu is the sitting mayor of Istanbul, awaiting pending multiple courts upholding the verdict in his trial. İmamoğlu endorsed the head of his party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, as a presidential candidate, with İmamoğlu to serve as vice-president (though ultimately there were 7 (!) people set to serve as VP, so I don’t know how meaningful this is). Kılıçdaroğlu won 48% of the vote in the presidential election. I haven’t seen a detailed postmortem on how Erdoğan beat the polls, but there was no “virtually guaranteeing victory” in this election.
Also importantly: Erdoğan took power in 2003! He was 49. It took him 20 years to bring Turkey to the state it’s in, and I don’t think he has another 20 in him. If you want to turn your country into a dictatorship, you have to be young: Putin was 47, Chavez 45. This isn’t a quick process, and if your candidate for doing it is 75, they’re not likely to succeed. This is part of why I don’t see your “over the next decade” holding up.
Nitpick: Erdogan’s party won the 2002 elections, and Erdogan became Prime Minister in 2003. I’m not sure where you got the year 2004 from, but it’s not correct.
Typo, fixed. I believe I got his age right.