“God as first cause” is just the latest god of the gaps. If the concept of first cause / creator is general enough to be legitimately supported by not knowing enough about the beginnings of existence then it’s isomorphic to ignorance.
If it’s specific enough to include concepts of believers and non-believers and the punishments and rewards due to them—as the grandparent does—then it is privileging the hypothesis to consider it.
The God of the gaps idea is that since there could be no possible natural explanation, God must have done it. God-as-first-cause is a different argument, because God is the first cause whatever it is, even a natural one.
The fallacy is more one of anthropomorphism: when we think of creation of the universe, we think of a creator deciding to do so (mind), being invested in his creation (loving) and setting up the outcome. It seems clear we have projected our ideas of a parent (our notion of a creator) onto God. Different religions (especially early ones) are the hypotheses that came up in the absence of science, and reflect human biases. In this sense the hypotheses are certainly skewed (I agree the hypotheses are privileged) but not the God-concept itself.
If it’s specific enough to include concepts of believers and non-believers and the punishments and rewards due to them
This is why I had added the words (‘and fate’) up above. It is very, very easy to see design in random events over a lifetime. Over the weekend, a friend told me about how they decided to name their child after a saint whose ‘saint day’ was a couple weeks before her scheduled C-section. I shared the warm flush of surprise and happiness that her water broke and her son was born on that day after all. (Imagine, God had overseen the naming and birth of that child. What a blessing.) I understand that this fact is the one treasured from hundreds of mundane occurrences—statistically, this is going to happen sometimes.
The God of the gaps idea is that since there could be no possible natural explanation, God must have done it. God-as-first-cause is a different argument, because God is the first cause whatever it is, even a natural one.
I will reserve judgement, but I don’t expect many people accept whatever explanation scientists eventually produce for the beginning of existence. What I expect is that when scientists explain first cause, the “God-as-first-cause” argument will fade away, and, say, “God-as-abiogenesis” will become more popular. Supporters of that will attempt to distinguish it from a typical god-of-the-gaps argument by claiming that whatever process caused life to spring into existence is God.
The relative in question already only considers the issues of belief vs disbelief, existence vs non-existence, as motivated by reward and punishment.
If God doesn’t exist, the issue is moot (for the relative)
If belief doesn’t matter either way, obviously the issue is moot (for the relative).
If reward and punishment isn’t related to it, obviously the issue is moot (for the relative).
What I asked was therefore contingent to the following givens:
1) God exists
2) Belief in god matters
3) Reward and punishment is connected to belief.
And I mentioned the hypothesis that seemed to be missing from the whole above reasoning: “Why does the relative assume that belief will be rewarded and disbelief punished? Why can’t it be the other way around?”
I think you might find that the reason that hypothesis is missing is because “belief is rewarded, disbelief punished” is taken as given #4. This relative appears to simply take whatever they want as a given, if we are starting at “1) God exists 2) Belief in god matters 3) Reward and punishment is connected to belief.”
“God as first cause” is just the latest god of the gaps. If the concept of first cause / creator is general enough to be legitimately supported by not knowing enough about the beginnings of existence then it’s isomorphic to ignorance.
If it’s specific enough to include concepts of believers and non-believers and the punishments and rewards due to them—as the grandparent does—then it is privileging the hypothesis to consider it.
The God of the gaps idea is that since there could be no possible natural explanation, God must have done it. God-as-first-cause is a different argument, because God is the first cause whatever it is, even a natural one.
The fallacy is more one of anthropomorphism: when we think of creation of the universe, we think of a creator deciding to do so (mind), being invested in his creation (loving) and setting up the outcome. It seems clear we have projected our ideas of a parent (our notion of a creator) onto God. Different religions (especially early ones) are the hypotheses that came up in the absence of science, and reflect human biases. In this sense the hypotheses are certainly skewed (I agree the hypotheses are privileged) but not the God-concept itself.
This is why I had added the words (‘and fate’) up above. It is very, very easy to see design in random events over a lifetime. Over the weekend, a friend told me about how they decided to name their child after a saint whose ‘saint day’ was a couple weeks before her scheduled C-section. I shared the warm flush of surprise and happiness that her water broke and her son was born on that day after all. (Imagine, God had overseen the naming and birth of that child. What a blessing.) I understand that this fact is the one treasured from hundreds of mundane occurrences—statistically, this is going to happen sometimes.
I will reserve judgement, but I don’t expect many people accept whatever explanation scientists eventually produce for the beginning of existence. What I expect is that when scientists explain first cause, the “God-as-first-cause” argument will fade away, and, say, “God-as-abiogenesis” will become more popular. Supporters of that will attempt to distinguish it from a typical god-of-the-gaps argument by claiming that whatever process caused life to spring into existence is God.
The relative in question already only considers the issues of belief vs disbelief, existence vs non-existence, as motivated by reward and punishment.
If God doesn’t exist, the issue is moot (for the relative) If belief doesn’t matter either way, obviously the issue is moot (for the relative). If reward and punishment isn’t related to it, obviously the issue is moot (for the relative).
What I asked was therefore contingent to the following givens: 1) God exists 2) Belief in god matters 3) Reward and punishment is connected to belief.
And I mentioned the hypothesis that seemed to be missing from the whole above reasoning: “Why does the relative assume that belief will be rewarded and disbelief punished? Why can’t it be the other way around?”
I think you might find that the reason that hypothesis is missing is because “belief is rewarded, disbelief punished” is taken as given #4. This relative appears to simply take whatever they want as a given, if we are starting at “1) God exists 2) Belief in god matters 3) Reward and punishment is connected to belief.”