Have I been voted down on these comments because a concept of God is a privileged hypothesis?
I would like to verify that this was the reason for the downvotes, rather than something else, and see if I couldn’t persuade, or find my error.
First, all that I am packing into this concept of God is “creator”. We don’t know how (or if) the universe was ‘caused’—if the universe was caused by anything, wouldn’t that thing be our creator? For example, theists would be disappointed if it turned out that the universe and everything created was the result of ‘possibility’, but wouldn’t they agree, semantically, that ‘possibility’ was God? An impersonal, mindless God, but the source of our existence.
I didn’t downvote, but I think it’s because you’re calling something “God” which has no resemblance to a god, and thus trying to sneak in with all the connotations of that word.
I think that’s exactly it. Even after people have given up all belief in agents resembling what a majority of people in the world call gods, they often remain attached to the word “God” and the associated connotations. What good does it do to refer to a postulated first cause (particularly an impersonal, non-intentional, amoral, non-agent-like one) as “God” rather than “the first cause”? As far as I can tell, none; it just confuses things. (A general rule is that if you replace the word “God” with some made-up word and you can no longer say what you’d normally say about “God” and have it make as much sense, then something is amiss. If Yahweh really existed, and strong evidence of his existence and properties were available, then it wouldn’t matter what word people used — they could call him “God” or “Yahweh” or “Spruckel” but still describe him just fine. But attempts at secular spirituality always seem to depend on redefining the word God to refer to something other than an actual god, like “love” or “the universe” or “the first cause”, but then saying things about “God” that wouldn’t make any sense if you just said it about the thing you claim to be defining “God” as. It’s even sillier than worshipping an actual alleged god — it’s worshipping a word.)
I don’t much care for discussions about points, but I think using the “God” label to refer to whatever it was that caused (assuming, as you say, that there actually was any causal factor) there to be something rather than nothing unavoidably introduces, via implicit associations, certain assumptions and constraints to the ensuing discussion.
If this is unintended, it’s a sloppy use of language; if it’s intended, it’s a sneaky one. This might account for people thinking poorly of your comment.
==
Many theists of my acquaintance, if somehow convinced of the existence of an impersonal mindless process that caused everything to come into being, would not conclude “Ah! God is this particular impersonal mindless process. Now we know,” and continue more or less as before, but would instead either stop identifying as theists, or continue to believe that “God” refers to some mindful entity that is in some as-yet-not-understood way really responsible.
Similarly, of the many theists who identified “God” as the entity responsible for the origin of life before an impersonal mindless process was shown to be responsible for that, some rejected the evidence, some gave up theism, and some concluded that “God” properly refers to some other entity. (And, yes, some generalized their understanding of God to include that process, and some had an understanding of God that was already sufficiently general to include that process. My point is merely that they are the minority.)
I don’t think I was being sloppy or sneaky, since the specific assumptions going into the word God were mainly what my comment was about.
On the one hand, you can package a lot of very specific/extreme things into “God” and have a straw man that is easy to knock down. What should be packed into belief in “God’?? I think it should be some combination of what is generally meant and what is most charitable for the argument (that is, if something is asserted about God in general, it should be true for the narrowest meaning, or qualifiers should be added).
Consider the statement in question of whether the concept of God is a privileged hypothesis. In evaluating that, you wouldn’t consider a specific God—someone doesn’t sit down and hypothesize all the details of the trinity. Rather, they begin with something basic (like there seems to be a first cause, or agency in events) and then they proceed from there (these latter things would be deductions, faulty or not).
My image is that of a primitive man wondering why it rains when it does and then deciding that the rain-maker must like bugs because they swarm after the rains. There’s definitely a distinction to be made between God-in-the-abstract and a specific God with all details sketched in. The answer to his question is naturalistic (clouds, weather patterns) but with a little philosophy the man can decide that what he still doesn’t know why there is rain at all, and that this deeper question was some component of his original question.
When people consider whether God is a privileged hypothesis, I think they really ask this for a very minimalist concept of God. Because if a specific God is meant, with all the particulars that different religions argue over, then it would not be a very interesting statement.
Any definition of God that’s remotely connected to what people throughout history have meant by the concept must include (I believe) some characteristics that we would recognize as personhood, intelligence, purpose. Also atleast one of the following : superior power, superior wisdom, superior level of existence (to be superior to humans in atleast some way*).
“first cause” however is far, far, from being a universal characteristic of imagined Gods—many ancient pantheons had their various Gods (even their supreme Gods) being born, growing up, occasionally overthrowing previous gods, etc.
So a minimalist concept of God wouldn’t be limited to “first cause”, and I don’t think it should even include it as one of its elements.
If you want to describe a non-necessarily intelligent, non-necessarily purposeful “first cause”, I would very strongly advise you not to use the word “God”.
OK … there’s been sufficient unanimity in responses, I will update my understanding of the question ‘is the concept of God a privileged hypothesis?’ to mean a God that is again personal and mindful. A God that is like a human being (but superior) is clearly a privileged hypothesis, reflecting the limitations of human psychology and imagination, and I have no reason to challenge that.
There really appears to be nothing to argue about regarding atheism/theism. I’ll keep on the lookout though.
Have I been voted down on these comments because a concept of God is a privileged hypothesis?
I would like to verify that this was the reason for the downvotes, rather than something else, and see if I couldn’t persuade, or find my error.
First, all that I am packing into this concept of God is “creator”. We don’t know how (or if) the universe was ‘caused’—if the universe was caused by anything, wouldn’t that thing be our creator? For example, theists would be disappointed if it turned out that the universe and everything created was the result of ‘possibility’, but wouldn’t they agree, semantically, that ‘possibility’ was God? An impersonal, mindless God, but the source of our existence.
I didn’t downvote, but I think it’s because you’re calling something “God” which has no resemblance to a god, and thus trying to sneak in with all the connotations of that word.
I think that’s exactly it. Even after people have given up all belief in agents resembling what a majority of people in the world call gods, they often remain attached to the word “God” and the associated connotations. What good does it do to refer to a postulated first cause (particularly an impersonal, non-intentional, amoral, non-agent-like one) as “God” rather than “the first cause”? As far as I can tell, none; it just confuses things. (A general rule is that if you replace the word “God” with some made-up word and you can no longer say what you’d normally say about “God” and have it make as much sense, then something is amiss. If Yahweh really existed, and strong evidence of his existence and properties were available, then it wouldn’t matter what word people used — they could call him “God” or “Yahweh” or “Spruckel” but still describe him just fine. But attempts at secular spirituality always seem to depend on redefining the word God to refer to something other than an actual god, like “love” or “the universe” or “the first cause”, but then saying things about “God” that wouldn’t make any sense if you just said it about the thing you claim to be defining “God” as. It’s even sillier than worshipping an actual alleged god — it’s worshipping a word.)
Two things.
==
I don’t much care for discussions about points, but I think using the “God” label to refer to whatever it was that caused (assuming, as you say, that there actually was any causal factor) there to be something rather than nothing unavoidably introduces, via implicit associations, certain assumptions and constraints to the ensuing discussion.
If this is unintended, it’s a sloppy use of language; if it’s intended, it’s a sneaky one. This might account for people thinking poorly of your comment.
==
Many theists of my acquaintance, if somehow convinced of the existence of an impersonal mindless process that caused everything to come into being, would not conclude “Ah! God is this particular impersonal mindless process. Now we know,” and continue more or less as before, but would instead either stop identifying as theists, or continue to believe that “God” refers to some mindful entity that is in some as-yet-not-understood way really responsible.
Similarly, of the many theists who identified “God” as the entity responsible for the origin of life before an impersonal mindless process was shown to be responsible for that, some rejected the evidence, some gave up theism, and some concluded that “God” properly refers to some other entity. (And, yes, some generalized their understanding of God to include that process, and some had an understanding of God that was already sufficiently general to include that process. My point is merely that they are the minority.)
Thanks for the reply.
I don’t think I was being sloppy or sneaky, since the specific assumptions going into the word God were mainly what my comment was about.
On the one hand, you can package a lot of very specific/extreme things into “God” and have a straw man that is easy to knock down. What should be packed into belief in “God’?? I think it should be some combination of what is generally meant and what is most charitable for the argument (that is, if something is asserted about God in general, it should be true for the narrowest meaning, or qualifiers should be added).
Consider the statement in question of whether the concept of God is a privileged hypothesis. In evaluating that, you wouldn’t consider a specific God—someone doesn’t sit down and hypothesize all the details of the trinity. Rather, they begin with something basic (like there seems to be a first cause, or agency in events) and then they proceed from there (these latter things would be deductions, faulty or not).
My image is that of a primitive man wondering why it rains when it does and then deciding that the rain-maker must like bugs because they swarm after the rains. There’s definitely a distinction to be made between God-in-the-abstract and a specific God with all details sketched in. The answer to his question is naturalistic (clouds, weather patterns) but with a little philosophy the man can decide that what he still doesn’t know why there is rain at all, and that this deeper question was some component of his original question.
When people consider whether God is a privileged hypothesis, I think they really ask this for a very minimalist concept of God. Because if a specific God is meant, with all the particulars that different religions argue over, then it would not be a very interesting statement.
Any definition of God that’s remotely connected to what people throughout history have meant by the concept must include (I believe) some characteristics that we would recognize as personhood, intelligence, purpose. Also atleast one of the following : superior power, superior wisdom, superior level of existence (to be superior to humans in atleast some way*).
“first cause” however is far, far, from being a universal characteristic of imagined Gods—many ancient pantheons had their various Gods (even their supreme Gods) being born, growing up, occasionally overthrowing previous gods, etc.
So a minimalist concept of God wouldn’t be limited to “first cause”, and I don’t think it should even include it as one of its elements.
If you want to describe a non-necessarily intelligent, non-necessarily purposeful “first cause”, I would very strongly advise you not to use the word “God”.
OK … there’s been sufficient unanimity in responses, I will update my understanding of the question ‘is the concept of God a privileged hypothesis?’ to mean a God that is again personal and mindful. A God that is like a human being (but superior) is clearly a privileged hypothesis, reflecting the limitations of human psychology and imagination, and I have no reason to challenge that.
There really appears to be nothing to argue about regarding atheism/theism. I’ll keep on the lookout though.