I’m not super-Kantian, but “ought implies can” seems pretty strong to me. If there is a correct prediction, the agent CANNOT invalidate it, and therefore talk of whether it should do so is meaningless (to me, at least. I am open to the idea that I really don’t understand how decisions interact with causality in the first place).
still announced in advance by an oracle as the normative action for that situation.
I don’t think I’ve seen that in the setup of these thought experiments. So far as I’ve seen, Omega or the mugger conditionally acts on a prediction of action, not on a normative declaration of counterfactual.
I’m not super-Kantian, but “ought implies can” seems pretty strong to me. If there is a correct prediction, the agent CANNOT invalidate it, and therefore talk of whether it should do so is meaningless (to me, at least. I am open to the idea that I really don’t understand how decisions interact with causality in the first place).
I don’t think I’ve seen that in the setup of these thought experiments. So far as I’ve seen, Omega or the mugger conditionally acts on a prediction of action, not on a normative declaration of counterfactual.