Exactly. The problem is that on the one hand, it is perfectly obvious that we say that something is true when it gives us correct expectations, and false when it gives us incorrect expectations. But on the other hand, we cannot explain what we mean by “correct” or “incorrect” expectations except by talking about correspondence or some equivalent. But then the idea of correspondence itself leads to incoherence (e.g. the Liar paradox.) There is no escape from this. This is why I recently commented that it is quite correct to see the Liar paradox as “deep and mysterious.”
Is this supposed be little cute side notion or powerful counterargument?
Its possible to have better and worse ontologies even if philosophers cant solve what is the right theory of truth. One could answer to the liars paradox based on Russells, Tarskis, Kripkes or Priests ideas but this is irrelevant IF one is interested about actually having accurate beliefs. It is not necessary to have completely water tight necessary and sufficient theory of the truth to be able to rank beliefsystems based on evidence at hand and evidence about human cognitive tendencies to create predictable folk theories.
It is not a little cute side notion. Nor is it a very substantial argument as presented, but it is a crack in the OP’s position that points in the direction of powerful counterarguments, ones strong enough to establish that their position is plain wrong. This why I said the OP’s supposed ability to distinguish between “fundamentally real” and “fundamentally unreal” is itself a folk ontology.
Let me point in the direction of a truer theory of reality. Consider the special theory of relativity. Here you can have two objects moving apart, without one of them being “really moving” and the other not. They are simply moving relative to one another. Now it is possible for someone to object: “Look. They were close together before. Now they are not. So something is different. Which one really changed? One of them must have changed for -real-, in order to end up in a different situation.” But the response is that the notion of “real change” here is fundamentally misguided. “Moving relative to another” is itself the fundamental thing, and does not have to be based on a non-relative “real” motion.
The OP’s notion of “fundamentally real” is misguided in a similar way, like the idea of “real motion.” I would propose an existential theory of relativity. To say that something exists, is to say that it exists relative to a reference frame, one which is often constituted by an observer, although not necessarily only in this way. In one way this is obvious: it is even typical to say that things in the past and the future do not exist, and the only way this is true is in relation to the one who is talking about them. But to see this more clearly, consider how skeptical scenarios would work. Suppose someone is a brain in a vat. If the person in the vat says, “I am a brain in a vat,” it is evident that their statement is false. For their word “brain” refers to something in their simulation, and likewise their word “vat” refers to something in their simulation. And in terms of those things, they are not a brain in a vat. So they speak the truth only by saying “I am not a brain in a vat.” On the other hand, because we have a different reference frame, we can truly say, “They are a brain in a vat.”
Likewise, I pointed out not that long ago that the words “I am not a Boltzmann brain” are necessarily true in my reference frame. But their might be some other reference frame where someone could truly call me a Boltzmann brain. And like in relativity, each of us might be a Boltzmann brain in the other’s reference frame, but not in their own.
I started to write a lot more here to establish the truth of this position and to manifest other flaws in the OP’s position, but then erased the rest because this comment is not the place to establish the true nature of reality.
But one obvious point. I am not saying that some ontologies are not truer than others. In fact, I am saying that the OP’s ontology is very wrong, and not only in terms of what he places on various sides of “real” and “unreal” but in the very division itself.
First of all thats wrong level of analysis. There is nothing relativistic about the theory of relativity itself. Proper analogy would be between theories/ontologies/belief systems not in terms of the content of those theories.
No reference frame makes Newtons, Thomas Youngs, Augustine-Jean Fresnels or Ernest Machs ideas about motion less or more right compared to Einsteins. You need evidence to value the ontologies, even if the content is relativistic.
The article was rather optimistic about our ability to establish correspondence, rather than just attain stuff that works.
Exactly. The problem is that on the one hand, it is perfectly obvious that we say that something is true when it gives us correct expectations, and false when it gives us incorrect expectations. But on the other hand, we cannot explain what we mean by “correct” or “incorrect” expectations except by talking about correspondence or some equivalent. But then the idea of correspondence itself leads to incoherence (e.g. the Liar paradox.) There is no escape from this. This is why I recently commented that it is quite correct to see the Liar paradox as “deep and mysterious.”
Is this supposed be little cute side notion or powerful counterargument?
Its possible to have better and worse ontologies even if philosophers cant solve what is the right theory of truth. One could answer to the liars paradox based on Russells, Tarskis, Kripkes or Priests ideas but this is irrelevant IF one is interested about actually having accurate beliefs. It is not necessary to have completely water tight necessary and sufficient theory of the truth to be able to rank beliefsystems based on evidence at hand and evidence about human cognitive tendencies to create predictable folk theories.
It is not a little cute side notion. Nor is it a very substantial argument as presented, but it is a crack in the OP’s position that points in the direction of powerful counterarguments, ones strong enough to establish that their position is plain wrong. This why I said the OP’s supposed ability to distinguish between “fundamentally real” and “fundamentally unreal” is itself a folk ontology.
Let me point in the direction of a truer theory of reality. Consider the special theory of relativity. Here you can have two objects moving apart, without one of them being “really moving” and the other not. They are simply moving relative to one another. Now it is possible for someone to object: “Look. They were close together before. Now they are not. So something is different. Which one really changed? One of them must have changed for -real-, in order to end up in a different situation.” But the response is that the notion of “real change” here is fundamentally misguided. “Moving relative to another” is itself the fundamental thing, and does not have to be based on a non-relative “real” motion.
The OP’s notion of “fundamentally real” is misguided in a similar way, like the idea of “real motion.” I would propose an existential theory of relativity. To say that something exists, is to say that it exists relative to a reference frame, one which is often constituted by an observer, although not necessarily only in this way. In one way this is obvious: it is even typical to say that things in the past and the future do not exist, and the only way this is true is in relation to the one who is talking about them. But to see this more clearly, consider how skeptical scenarios would work. Suppose someone is a brain in a vat. If the person in the vat says, “I am a brain in a vat,” it is evident that their statement is false. For their word “brain” refers to something in their simulation, and likewise their word “vat” refers to something in their simulation. And in terms of those things, they are not a brain in a vat. So they speak the truth only by saying “I am not a brain in a vat.” On the other hand, because we have a different reference frame, we can truly say, “They are a brain in a vat.”
Likewise, I pointed out not that long ago that the words “I am not a Boltzmann brain” are necessarily true in my reference frame. But their might be some other reference frame where someone could truly call me a Boltzmann brain. And like in relativity, each of us might be a Boltzmann brain in the other’s reference frame, but not in their own.
I started to write a lot more here to establish the truth of this position and to manifest other flaws in the OP’s position, but then erased the rest because this comment is not the place to establish the true nature of reality.
But one obvious point. I am not saying that some ontologies are not truer than others. In fact, I am saying that the OP’s ontology is very wrong, and not only in terms of what he places on various sides of “real” and “unreal” but in the very division itself.
First of all thats wrong level of analysis. There is nothing relativistic about the theory of relativity itself. Proper analogy would be between theories/ontologies/belief systems not in terms of the content of those theories.
No reference frame makes Newtons, Thomas Youngs, Augustine-Jean Fresnels or Ernest Machs ideas about motion less or more right compared to Einsteins. You need evidence to value the ontologies, even if the content is relativistic.
Exactly. Newton’s idea is that either a thing is in motion or it is not, absolutely speaking, without considering a reference frame. This is false.
I’m glad I’m not the only one to have noticed.