but your reply obviously beat me to it! I agree, there is plausibly some ‘actual valence magnitude’ which we ‘should’ normatively account for in aggregations.
In behavioural practice, it comes down to what cooperative/normative infrastructure is giving rise to the cooperative gains which push toward the Pareto frontier. e.g.
explicit instructions/norms (fair or otherwise)
‘exchange rates’ between goods or directly on utilities
marginal production returns on given resources
starting state/allocation in dynamic economy-like scenarios (with trades)
differential bargaining power/leverage
In discussion I have sometimes used the ‘ice cream/stabbing game’ as an example
either you get ice cream and I get stabbed
or neither of those things
neither of us is concerned with the other’s preferences
It’s basically a really extreme version of your chocolate and vanilla case. But they’re preference-isomorphic!
I swiftly edited that to read
but your reply obviously beat me to it! I agree, there is plausibly some ‘actual valence magnitude’ which we ‘should’ normatively account for in aggregations.
In behavioural practice, it comes down to what cooperative/normative infrastructure is giving rise to the cooperative gains which push toward the Pareto frontier. e.g.
explicit instructions/norms (fair or otherwise)
‘exchange rates’ between goods or directly on utilities
marginal production returns on given resources
starting state/allocation in dynamic economy-like scenarios (with trades)
differential bargaining power/leverage
In discussion I have sometimes used the ‘ice cream/stabbing game’ as an example
either you get ice cream and I get stabbed
or neither of those things
neither of us is concerned with the other’s preferences
It’s basically a really extreme version of your chocolate and vanilla case. But they’re preference-isomorphic!