You can precommit to not smoking in the same way you can precommit to taking only one box. If you might later find smoking irresistable, you might later find taking both boxes irresistable.
Precommitting not to smoke also changes my disposition regarding smoking. I still might find it irresistable later. Likewise if I precommit to one box. That says nothing about how I will feel about it later, when the situation happens.
In fact, even in real life, I suspect many one-boxers would two box in the end when they are standing there and thinking, “Either the million is there or it isn’t, and there’s nothing I can do about it.” In other words, they might very well find two-boxing irresistable, even if they had precommitted.
If they give in, they have not successfully precommitted.
Now, you could argue that successfully precommitting is impossible. But in the Newcombian problem, it doesn’t seem to be.
In the Lesion problem, the problem involves what essentially amounts to brain-damage, which gives a clear reason why precommitment is impossible.
Precommitting not to smoke also changes my disposition regarding smoking. I still might find it irresistable later.
This misses the point.
If precommitting changes your disposition, and your disposition decides the outcome, precommitting is worthwhile.
If precommitting changes your disposition, and a lesion decides the outcome, precommitting is irrelevant.
Actually, talking about precommitting is any case a side issue, because it happens before the start of the game. We can just assume you’ve never thought it before Omega comes up to you, says that it has predicted your decision, and tells you the rules. Now what do you do?
In this case the situation is clearly the same as the lesion, and the lines of causality are the same: both your present disposition, and the million in the box, have a common cause, namely your previous disposition, but you can do nothing about it.
If you should one-box here, then you should not smoke in the lesion case.
In fact, even in real life, I suspect many one-boxers would two box in the end when they are standing there
My intuition says the opposite: I think many people who claimed they would two-box would one-box in the event. $1000 is so small compared to $1000000, after all; why take the chance that Omega will be wrong?
You can precommit to not smoking in the same way you can precommit to taking only one box. If you might later find smoking irresistable, you might later find taking both boxes irresistable.
Precommitting changes my disposition, making me not find two-boxing irresistable.
Precommitting CAN’T change whether I get the lesion or not.
In Newcombs scenario, precommitting changes the outcome. In the smoking lesion, it doesn’t.
Precommitting not to smoke also changes my disposition regarding smoking. I still might find it irresistable later. Likewise if I precommit to one box. That says nothing about how I will feel about it later, when the situation happens.
In fact, even in real life, I suspect many one-boxers would two box in the end when they are standing there and thinking, “Either the million is there or it isn’t, and there’s nothing I can do about it.” In other words, they might very well find two-boxing irresistable, even if they had precommitted.
If they give in, they have not successfully precommitted. Now, you could argue that successfully precommitting is impossible. But in the Newcombian problem, it doesn’t seem to be.
In the Lesion problem, the problem involves what essentially amounts to brain-damage, which gives a clear reason why precommitment is impossible.
This misses the point. If precommitting changes your disposition, and your disposition decides the outcome, precommitting is worthwhile.
If precommitting changes your disposition, and a lesion decides the outcome, precommitting is irrelevant.
Actually, talking about precommitting is any case a side issue, because it happens before the start of the game. We can just assume you’ve never thought it before Omega comes up to you, says that it has predicted your decision, and tells you the rules. Now what do you do?
In this case the situation is clearly the same as the lesion, and the lines of causality are the same: both your present disposition, and the million in the box, have a common cause, namely your previous disposition, but you can do nothing about it.
If you should one-box here, then you should not smoke in the lesion case.
My intuition says the opposite: I think many people who claimed they would two-box would one-box in the event. $1000 is so small compared to $1000000, after all; why take the chance that Omega will be wrong?