But such thought experiments are a way of testing the generality of your decision procedures—do they work in all possible worlds?
As in the old saw, part of your strength as a real decision-maker is that your decision procedures choose less well in impossible worlds than in possible worlds.
It doesn’t have to be true. It’s desirable because decision procedures that rely on other knowledge about reality are faster/better/cheaper than ones that don’t import knowledge about reality. Specialization for the situation you find yourself in is often useful, though it does limit flexibility.
As in the old saw, part of your strength as a real decision-maker is that your decision procedures choose less well in impossible worlds than in possible worlds.
A world that can support paperclip production of arbitrary magnitude is not an impossible world. The speed of light is a contingent fact.
Why does that have to be true?
It doesn’t have to be true. It’s desirable because decision procedures that rely on other knowledge about reality are faster/better/cheaper than ones that don’t import knowledge about reality. Specialization for the situation you find yourself in is often useful, though it does limit flexibility.