I’m wondering if this isn’t simplifying the issue.
You are absolutely right when arguing that a government that yields to extorsion is giving an incentive to other terrorists. The rational choice does appear to be to resist. But then why would France accept to pay the ransoms while Israel send its commando units ? I believe the difference lies in the perceived role of the state; France gives priority to an individual life because it’s part of their philosophical history and, more importantly, because these last decades have seen France put more and more emphasis on the rights of individuals. Israel, on the other hand, is much more pragmatic and thus takes the rational choice as a matter of course. In other words, keeping up a tough front is not the only parameter that has to be taken into account when dealing with extorsion; a country’s history and subsequently one’s particular image also plays a part in that process. But then, I am not sure how much of this could be extrapolated to another situation.
As for brinksmanship, perhaps we could take into account the size of each actor. I’ll go with the hypothesis that you’re a juicy enough economic power, even if you’re on your own:
If you have 20 potential partners, among which three are particularly major and the others minor, then I believe it is justified to use brinksmanship on one of the major actors. It’s a gamble: if the deal falls through, your standing will fall and future deals will be harder to conclude. But if you strike the deal, then the two other superpowers may be encouraged to join the feast. The minor actors will be wary of future brinksmanship tactics but why would you use such a risky strategy again? They are desserts, and you’ve already gotten your main dish.
I hope you can see my point here: brinksmanship can be justified as a gamble depending on the size of the actors.
I’m wondering if this isn’t simplifying the issue.
You are absolutely right when arguing that a government that yields to extorsion is giving an incentive to other terrorists. The rational choice does appear to be to resist. But then why would France accept to pay the ransoms while Israel send its commando units ? I believe the difference lies in the perceived role of the state; France gives priority to an individual life because it’s part of their philosophical history and, more importantly, because these last decades have seen France put more and more emphasis on the rights of individuals. Israel, on the other hand, is much more pragmatic and thus takes the rational choice as a matter of course. In other words, keeping up a tough front is not the only parameter that has to be taken into account when dealing with extorsion; a country’s history and subsequently one’s particular image also plays a part in that process. But then, I am not sure how much of this could be extrapolated to another situation.
As for brinksmanship, perhaps we could take into account the size of each actor. I’ll go with the hypothesis that you’re a juicy enough economic power, even if you’re on your own:
If you have 20 potential partners, among which three are particularly major and the others minor, then I believe it is justified to use brinksmanship on one of the major actors. It’s a gamble: if the deal falls through, your standing will fall and future deals will be harder to conclude. But if you strike the deal, then the two other superpowers may be encouraged to join the feast. The minor actors will be wary of future brinksmanship tactics but why would you use such a risky strategy again? They are desserts, and you’ve already gotten your main dish.
I hope you can see my point here: brinksmanship can be justified as a gamble depending on the size of the actors.