Fortunately, Dunning-Kruger does not seem to be universal (not that anyone who would understand or care about calibration would also be in the stupid-enough quartiles in the first place).
Certainly you’d learn to calibrate, in general. You just wouldn’t automatically be calibrated in all domains.
Again, I don’t see why I couldn’t. All I need is a good understanding of what I know, and then anytime I run into predictions on things I don’t know about, I should be able to estimate my ignorance and adjust my predictions closer to 50% as appropriate. If I am mistaken, well, in some areas I will be underconfident and in some overconfident, and they balance out.
If there’s a single thing mainly responsible for making people poor estimators of their numerical certainty (judged against reality), then you’re probably right. For example, it makes sense for me to be overconfident in my pronouncements if I want people to listen to me, and there’s little chance of me being caught in my overconfidence. This motivation is strong and universal. But I can learn to realize that I’m effectively lying (everyone does it, so maybe I should persist in most arenas), and report more honestly and accurately, if only to myself, after just a little practice in the skill of soliciting the right numbers for my level of information about the proposition I’m judging.
I have no data, so I’ll disengage until I have some.
Fortunately, Dunning-Kruger does not seem to be universal (not that anyone who would understand or care about calibration would also be in the stupid-enough quartiles in the first place).
Again, I don’t see why I couldn’t. All I need is a good understanding of what I know, and then anytime I run into predictions on things I don’t know about, I should be able to estimate my ignorance and adjust my predictions closer to 50% as appropriate. If I am mistaken, well, in some areas I will be underconfident and in some overconfident, and they balance out.
If there’s a single thing mainly responsible for making people poor estimators of their numerical certainty (judged against reality), then you’re probably right. For example, it makes sense for me to be overconfident in my pronouncements if I want people to listen to me, and there’s little chance of me being caught in my overconfidence. This motivation is strong and universal. But I can learn to realize that I’m effectively lying (everyone does it, so maybe I should persist in most arenas), and report more honestly and accurately, if only to myself, after just a little practice in the skill of soliciting the right numbers for my level of information about the proposition I’m judging.
I have no data, so I’ll disengage until I have some.