“Outperform at talking about epistemics” doesn’t mean “perform better at being epistemically correct”, it means “perform better at getting what he wants when epistemics are involved”.
I might be misunderstanding, I understood the comment I was responding to as saying that Zack was helping Cade do a better job of disguising himself as someone who cared about good epistemics. Something like “if Zack keeps talking, Cade will learn to the surface level features of a good Convo about epistemology and thus, even if he still doesn’t know shit, he’ll be able to trick more people into thinking he’s someone worth talking to.”
In response to that claim, I shared an older interview of Cade to demonstrate that his been exposed to people who talk about epistemology for a while, and he did not do a convincing job of pretending to be in good faith then, and in this interview with Zack I don’t think he’s doing any better a job of seeming like he’s acting in good faith.
And while there can still be plenty of reasons to not talk to journalists, or Cade in particular, I really don’t think “you’ll enable them to mimick us better” is remotely plausible.
I agree, except for the last statement. I’ve found that talking to certain people with bad epistemology about epistemic concepts will, instead of teaching them concepts, teach them a rhetorical trick that (soon afterward) they will try to use against you as a “gotcha” (related)… as a result of them having a soldier mindset and knowing you have a different political opinion.
While I expect most of them won’t ever mimic rationalists well, (i) mimicryper se doesn’t seem important and (ii) I think there are a small fraction of people (tho not Metz) who do end up fostering a “rationalist skin” ― they talk like rationalists, but seem to be in it mostly for gotchas, snipes and sophistry.
I understood the comment I was responding to as saying that Zack was helping Cade do a better job of disguising himself as someone who cared about good epistemics.
Yes, but disguising himself as someone who cares about good epistemics doesn’t require using good epistemics. Rather it means saying the right things to get the rationalist to let his guard down. There are plenty of ways to convince people about X that don’t involve doing X.
I agree that disguising one’s self as “someone who cares about X” doesn’t require being good at X, at least when you only have short contained contact with them.
I’m trying to emphasize that I don’t think Cade has made any progress in learning to “say the right things”. I think he has probably learned more individual words that are more frequent in a rationalist context than not (like the word “priors”), but it seems really unlikely that he’s gotten any better at even the grammar of rationalist communication.
Like, I’d be mediumly surprised if he, when talking to a rat, said something like “so what’s your priors on XYZ?” I’d be incredibly surprised if he said something like “there’s clearly a large inferential distance between your world model and the public’s world model, so maybe you could help point me towards what you think the cruxes might be for my next article?”
That last sentence seems like a v clear example of something that both doesn’t actually require understanding or caring about epistemology to utter, yet if I heard it I’d assume a certain orientation to epistemology and someone could falsely get me to “let my guard down”. I don’t think Cade can do things like that. And based on Zack’s convo and Vassar’s convo with him, and the amount of time and exposure he’s had to learn between the two convos, I don’t think that’s the sort of thing he’s capable of.
it seems really unlikely that he’s gotten any better at even the grammar of rationalist communication.
You don’t need to use rationalist grammar to convince rationalists that you like them. You just need to know what biases of theirs to play upon, what assumptions they’re making, how to reassure them, etc.
The skills for pretending to be someone’s friend are very different from the skills for acting like them.
“Outperform at talking about epistemics” doesn’t mean “perform better at being epistemically correct”, it means “perform better at getting what he wants when epistemics are involved”.
I might be misunderstanding, I understood the comment I was responding to as saying that Zack was helping Cade do a better job of disguising himself as someone who cared about good epistemics. Something like “if Zack keeps talking, Cade will learn to the surface level features of a good Convo about epistemology and thus, even if he still doesn’t know shit, he’ll be able to trick more people into thinking he’s someone worth talking to.”
In response to that claim, I shared an older interview of Cade to demonstrate that his been exposed to people who talk about epistemology for a while, and he did not do a convincing job of pretending to be in good faith then, and in this interview with Zack I don’t think he’s doing any better a job of seeming like he’s acting in good faith.
And while there can still be plenty of reasons to not talk to journalists, or Cade in particular, I really don’t think “you’ll enable them to mimick us better” is remotely plausible.
I agree, except for the last statement. I’ve found that talking to certain people with bad epistemology about epistemic concepts will, instead of teaching them concepts, teach them a rhetorical trick that (soon afterward) they will try to use against you as a “gotcha” (related)… as a result of them having a soldier mindset and knowing you have a different political opinion.
While I expect most of them won’t ever mimic rationalists well, (i) mimicry per se doesn’t seem important and (ii) I think there are a small fraction of people (tho not Metz) who do end up fostering a “rationalist skin” ― they talk like rationalists, but seem to be in it mostly for gotchas, snipes and sophistry.
Yes, but disguising himself as someone who cares about good epistemics doesn’t require using good epistemics. Rather it means saying the right things to get the rationalist to let his guard down. There are plenty of ways to convince people about X that don’t involve doing X.
I agree that disguising one’s self as “someone who cares about X” doesn’t require being good at X, at least when you only have short contained contact with them.
I’m trying to emphasize that I don’t think Cade has made any progress in learning to “say the right things”. I think he has probably learned more individual words that are more frequent in a rationalist context than not (like the word “priors”), but it seems really unlikely that he’s gotten any better at even the grammar of rationalist communication.
Like, I’d be mediumly surprised if he, when talking to a rat, said something like “so what’s your priors on XYZ?” I’d be incredibly surprised if he said something like “there’s clearly a large inferential distance between your world model and the public’s world model, so maybe you could help point me towards what you think the cruxes might be for my next article?”
That last sentence seems like a v clear example of something that both doesn’t actually require understanding or caring about epistemology to utter, yet if I heard it I’d assume a certain orientation to epistemology and someone could falsely get me to “let my guard down”. I don’t think Cade can do things like that. And based on Zack’s convo and Vassar’s convo with him, and the amount of time and exposure he’s had to learn between the two convos, I don’t think that’s the sort of thing he’s capable of.
You don’t need to use rationalist grammar to convince rationalists that you like them. You just need to know what biases of theirs to play upon, what assumptions they’re making, how to reassure them, etc.
The skills for pretending to be someone’s friend are very different from the skills for acting like them.