I’m not trying to mislead anybody. But Eliezer has apparently taken the extreme position that mainstream religion in general is worthless, so I made a long list of useful things that have come from mainstream religion—and some of it is not even from the most productive strain of mainstream religion, what I’ve been calling “Christian naturalism.” Useful things sometimes come from unexpected sources.
In the above quote the following replacements have been made.
philosophy → religion
Quinean → Christian
There are many ideas from religion that are not useless. It is not often the most productive source to learn from either however. Why filter ideas from religion texts when better sources are available or when it is easier to recreate them in within in a better framework; a framework that actual justifies the idea. This is also important because in my experience people fail to filter constantly and end up accepting bad ideas.
I do not see EY arguing that main stream philosophy has not useful nuggets. I seem him arguing that filtering for those nugets in general makes the process too costly. I see you arguing that “Quinean naturalism” is a rich vien of philosophy and worth mining for nuggets. If you want to prove the worth of mine “Quinean naturalism” you have to display nuggets that EY has not found through better means already.
If you want to prove the worth of mine “Quinean naturalism” you have to display nuggets that EY has not found through better means already.
I did list such nuggets that EY has not found through other means already, including several instances of “dissolution-to-algorithm”, which EY seems to think of as the hallmark of LW-style philosophy.
I wouldn’t call mainstream philosophy a “rich vein” that is (for most people) worth mining for nuggets. I’ve specifically said that people will get far more value reading statistics and AI and cognitive science. I’ve specifically said that EY should not be mining mainstream philosophy. What I’m saying is that if useful stuff happens to come from mainstream philosophy, why ignore it? It’s people like myself who are already familiar with mainstream philosophy, and for whom it doesn’t take much effort to list 20+ useful contributions of mainstream philosophy, who should bring those useful nuggets to the attention of Less Wrong.
What seems strange to me is to draw an arbitrary boundary around mainstream philosophy and say, “If it happens to come from here, we don’t want it.” And I think Eliezer already agrees with this, since of course he is already making use of several things from mainstream philosophy. But on the other hand, he seems to be insisting that mainstream philosophy has nothing (or almost nothing) useful to offer.
I did list such nuggets that EY has not found through other means already, including several instances of “dissolution-to-algorithm”, which EY seems to think of as the hallmark of LW-style philosophy.
In that post you labeled that list as “useful contributions of mainstream philosophy:” Which does not fit the criteria of nuggets not found by other means. Nor “here are things you have not figured out yet” or “see how this particular method is simpler and more elegant then the one you are currently using.” This is similar to what I think EY is expressing in: Show me this field’s power!
At list of 20 topics that are similar to LW is suggestive but not compelling. Compelling would be more predictive power or correct predictions where LW methods have been known to fail. Compelling would be just one case covered in depth fitting the above criteria. Frankly, and not ment to reflect on you, listing 20 topics that are suggestive reminds me of fast talk manipulation and/or an infomercial. I want to see a conversation digging deep on one topic. I want depth of proof not breadth, because breadth by itself is not compelling only suggestive.
What I’m saying is that if useful stuff happens to come from mainstream philosophy, why ignore it?
I see you repeating this in many places, but I have yet to see EY suggest the useful parts of philosophy should be ignored.
What seems strange to me is to draw an arbitrary boundary around mainstream philosophy and say, “If it happens to come from here, we don’t want it.”
I see EY arguing philosophy is a field “whose poison a novice should avoid”. Note the that novices should avoid, not that well grounded rationalists should ignore. I have followed the conversations of EY’s and I do not see him saying what you assert. I see you repeatedly asserting he or LW in general is though. In theory it should not be hard to dissolve the problem if you can provide links to where you believe this assertions have been made.
Explanation of cognitive biases and how to battle against them on Less Wrong? “Useful.”
Explanation of cognitive biases and how to battle against them in a mainstream philosophy book? “Not useful.”
Dissolution of common (but easy) philosophical problem like free will to cognitive algorithm on Less Wrong? “Useful, impressive.”
Dissolution of common (but easy) philosophical problems in mainstream philosophy journals? “Not useful.”
Is this seriously what is being claimed? If it’s not what’s being claimed, then good—we may not disagree on anything.
Also: as I stated, several of the things I listed are already in use at Less Wrong, and have been employed in depth. Is this not compelling for now?
I’m planning in-depth explanations, but those take time. So far I’ve only done one of them: on SPRs.
As for my interpretation of Eliezer’s views on mainstream philosophy, here are some quotes:
One: “It seems to me that people can get along just fine knowing only what philosophy they pick up from reading AI books.” But maybe this doesn’t mean to avoid mainstream philosophy entirely. Maybe it just means that most people should avoid mainstream philosophy, which I agree with.
Two: “I expect [reading philosophy] to teach very bad habits of thought that will lead people to be unable to do real work.”
Three: “only things of that level [dissolution to algorithm] are useful philosophy. Other things are not philosophy or more like background intros.” Reflective equilibrium isn’t “of that level” of dissolution to cognitive algorithm, in any way that I can tell, and yet it plays a useful role in Eliezer’s CEV plan to save humanity. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment doesn’t say much about dissolution to cognitive algorithm, and yet its content reads like a series of Less Wrong blog posts on overcoming cognitive biases with “ameliorative psychology.” If somebody claims that those Less Wrong posts are useful but the Epistemology book isn’t, I think that’s a blatant double standard. And it seems that Eliezer in this quote is claiming just that, though again, I’m not clear what it means for something to be “of that level” of dissolution to algorithm.
And then, in his first comment on this post, Eliezer opened with: “I’m highly skeptical.” I took that to be a response to my claim that “rationalists need not ignore mainstream philosophy,” but maybe he was responding to some other claim in my original post.
But if I’ve been misinterpreting Eliezer this whole time, he hasn’t told me so. I’d sure appreciate that. That would be the simplest way to clear this up.
The standard sequences explanation of cognitive biases and how to battle against them on Less Wrong? “Useful.”
Yet another explanation of cognitive biases and how to battle against them in a mainstream philosophy book? “Not useful.”
Dissolution of difficult philosophical problem like free will to cognitive algorithm on Less Wrong? “Useful, impressive.”
Dissolution of common (but easy) philosophical problem arising from language misuse in mainstream philosophy journals? “Not useful.”
Yeah, if that’s what’s being claimed, that’s the double standard stuff I was talking about.
Good stuff of various kinds, surrounded by error, confusion, and nonsense in mainstream philosophy journals? “Not useful.”
Of course there’s error, confusion, and nonsense in just about any large chunk of literature. Mainstream philosophy is particularly bad, but of course what I plan to do is pluck the good bits out and share just those things on Less Wrong.
Explanation of cognitive biases and how to battle against them on Less Wrong? “Useful.”
Explanation of cognitive biases and how to battle against them in a mainstream philosophy book? “Not useful.”
Dissolution of common (but easy) philosophical problem like free will to cognitive algorithm on Less Wrong? “Useful, impressive.”
Dissolution of common (but easy) philosophical problems in mainstream philosophy journals? “Not useful.”
Is this seriously what is being claimed? If it’s not what’s being claimed, then good—we may not disagree on anything.
I no longer remember your original post did you get that format from Perplexed? Or did he get it from you?
You state Perplexed example i a double standard here. Perplexed discribes what is happen LW as different from what happens in mainstream philosophy, which does not fit the standard definition of double standard. Double standard: a rule applied differently to essentially the same thing/idea/group. Perplexed statements imply that LW and mainstream philosophy are considerably different which does not fit the description of a double standard.
As of yet I have not interpreted anything on LW as meaning the content of the quote above.
Also: as I stated, several of the things I listed are already in use at Less Wrong, and have been employed in depth. Is this not compelling for now?
No it is not compelling. In science a theory which merely reproduces previous results is not compelling only suggestive. A new theory must have predictive power in areas the old one did not or be simpler(aka:more elegant) to be considered compelling. That is how you show the power of a new theory.
Your assertion was:
What seems strange to me is to draw an arbitrary boundary around mainstream philosophy and say, “If it happens to come from here, we don’t want it.”
Your quote one does not seem to support your assertion by your own admission. My interpretation was most people should avoid mainstream philosophy, perhaps the vast majority and certainly novices. If possibly learn from a better source, since there is a vast amount from better sources and there is a vast amount of work to be done with those sources why focus on lesser sources?
Two: “I expect [reading philosophy] to teach very bad habits of thought that will lead people to be unable to do real work.”
This does not support your assertion either. It only claims the methods of mainstream philosophy are bad habits for people who want to get things done.
Three: …
This one does not seem to a “daw arbitrary boundary” either so it does not support your assertion. Maybe a boundary but then EY then does on to describe the boundary so you have not supported your discriptor of arbitrary.
I think the difference more and less useful is defiantly being claimed. Having everything in one self consistant system has many advantages. Only one set of terminology to learn. It is easier to build groups when everyone is using or familiar with the same terminology.
Out of your three quotes I do not see any “arbitrary boundry” being drawn by EY. He is drawing a boundary, but in no way do I see it as arbitrary. This boundary and why it is draw is a point that you do not seem to understand EY’s reasoning on, otherwise you would do your best to describe the algorithm that EY used to draw the boundary and then show how it is wrong rather then just calling it arbitrary.
And then, in his first comment on this post, Eliezer opened with: “I’m highly skeptical.” I took that to be a response to my claim that “rationalists need not ignore mainstream philosophy,” but maybe he was responding to some other claim in my original post.
Really I would have thought you main assertion was:
Yudkowsky once wrote, “If there’s any centralized repository of reductionist-grade naturalistic cognitive philosophy, I’ve never heard mention of it.”
When I read that I thought: What? That’s Quinean naturalism! That’s Kornblith and Stich and Bickle and the Churchlands and Thagard and Metzinger and Northoff! There are hundreds of philosophers who do that!
You have not shown Quinean naturalism and the rest are a “centralized repository of reductionist-grade naturalistic cognitive philosophy” and you will have to do a proof with depth, which you have not provided but are working on, to show this. So his skepticism is warranted, justified, prudent and seems like a reasonable barrier to unproven ideas.
But if I’ve been misinterpreting Eliezer this whole time, he hasn’t told me so. I’d sure appreciate that. That would be the simplest way to clear this up.
I think he has pointed it out. The three quotes above do not support your assertion or “arbitrary”. The difference is at a basic definition and methodological level.
And I just read your resolution as I was writing this post. Frankly It really seem like you jumped to conclusions on EY’s position and level of arbitrariness to a degree which caused inefficiency. My main curiosity is now why you think you jumped to conclusions and what you are going to do to prevent it from happening again.
Yeah, I just disagree with your comment from beginning to end.
Perplexed discribes what is happen LW as different from what happens in mainstream philosophy, which does not fit the standard definition of double standard.
Yeah, and my claim is that LW content and some useful content from mainstream philosophy is not relevantly different, hence to praise one and ignore the other is to apply a double standard. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, which reads like a sequence of LW posts, is a good example. So is much of the work I listed that dissolves traditional philosophical debates into the cognitive algorithms that produce the conflicting intuitions that philosophers use to go in circles for thousands of years.
No it is not compelling. In science a theory which merely reproduces previous results is not compelling only suggestive. A new theory must have predictive power in areas the old one did not or be simpler(aka:more elegant) to be considered compelling.
This is a change of subject. I was talking about the usefulness of certain work in mainstream philosophy already used by Less Wrong, not proposing a new scientific theory. If your point applied, it would apply to the re-use of the ideas on Less Wrong, not to their origination in mainstream philosophy.
The strongest support for my interpretation of EY comes from quote #3, for reasons I explained in detail and you ignored. I suspect much of our confusion came from Eliezer’s assumption that I was saying everybody should go out and read Quinean philosophy, which of course I never claimed and in fact have specifically denied.
In any case, EY and I have come to common ground, so this is kinda irrelevant.
You have not shown Quinean naturalism and the rest are a “centralized repository of reductionist-grade naturalistic cognitive philosophy” and you will have to do a proof with depth...
I’m fine with that. What counts as a ‘centralized repository’ is pretty fuzzy. Quinean naturalism counts as a ‘centralized repository’ in my meaning, but if Eliezer means something different by ‘centralized repository’, then we have a disagreement in words but not in fact on that point.
Yeah, and my claim is that LW content and some useful content from mainstream philosophy is not relevantly different, hence to praise one and ignore the other is to apply a double standard.
In the mind of EY, i assume, and some others there is a difference. If the difference is not relevant there would be a double standard. If there is a relevant difference no double standard exists. I did not see you point out what that difference was and why it was not relevant before calling it a double standard.
This is a change of subject. I was talking about the usefulness of certain work in mainstream philosophy already used by Less Wrong, not proposing a new scientific theory.
Not a change of subject at all. Just let you know what standards I use for judging something suggestive vs compelling and that I think EY might be using a similar standard. Just answering your question “Is this not compelling for now?”, a no with exposition. I was giving you the method by which I often judge how useful a work is and suggesting that EY may use a similar method. If so it would explain some of why you were not communicating well.
If your point applied, it would apply to the re-use of the ideas on Less Wrong, not to their origination in mainstream philosophy.
It is to be applied within the development of an individuals evolving beliefs. So someone holding LW beliefs then introduce to mainstream philosophy would use this standard before adopting mainstream philosophy’s beliefs.
I explained in detail and you ignored.
I do not like the idea, I think it is unproductive, of having conversation with people who think they magically know what I pay attention to and what I do not. If you meant that I did not address your point please say so and how instead.
I did not ignore it. I did think it supported an argument that EY draws a boundary between mainstream philosophy and LW, but did not support the argument that he drew a arbitrary boundary.
I’m fine with that. What counts as a ‘centralized repository’ is pretty fuzzy. Quinean naturalism counts as a ‘centralized repository’ in my meaning, but if Eliezer means something different by ‘centralized repository’, then we have a disagreement in words but not in fact on that point
My interpretation was that he skeptical with the grade of repository not the centralness of it.
In the above quote the following replacements have been made. philosophy → religion Quinean → Christian
There are many ideas from religion that are not useless. It is not often the most productive source to learn from either however. Why filter ideas from religion texts when better sources are available or when it is easier to recreate them in within in a better framework; a framework that actual justifies the idea. This is also important because in my experience people fail to filter constantly and end up accepting bad ideas.
I do not see EY arguing that main stream philosophy has not useful nuggets. I seem him arguing that filtering for those nugets in general makes the process too costly. I see you arguing that “Quinean naturalism” is a rich vien of philosophy and worth mining for nuggets. If you want to prove the worth of mine “Quinean naturalism” you have to display nuggets that EY has not found through better means already.
I did list such nuggets that EY has not found through other means already, including several instances of “dissolution-to-algorithm”, which EY seems to think of as the hallmark of LW-style philosophy.
I wouldn’t call mainstream philosophy a “rich vein” that is (for most people) worth mining for nuggets. I’ve specifically said that people will get far more value reading statistics and AI and cognitive science. I’ve specifically said that EY should not be mining mainstream philosophy. What I’m saying is that if useful stuff happens to come from mainstream philosophy, why ignore it? It’s people like myself who are already familiar with mainstream philosophy, and for whom it doesn’t take much effort to list 20+ useful contributions of mainstream philosophy, who should bring those useful nuggets to the attention of Less Wrong.
What seems strange to me is to draw an arbitrary boundary around mainstream philosophy and say, “If it happens to come from here, we don’t want it.” And I think Eliezer already agrees with this, since of course he is already making use of several things from mainstream philosophy. But on the other hand, he seems to be insisting that mainstream philosophy has nothing (or almost nothing) useful to offer.
In that post you labeled that list as “useful contributions of mainstream philosophy:” Which does not fit the criteria of nuggets not found by other means. Nor “here are things you have not figured out yet” or “see how this particular method is simpler and more elegant then the one you are currently using.” This is similar to what I think EY is expressing in: Show me this field’s power!
At list of 20 topics that are similar to LW is suggestive but not compelling. Compelling would be more predictive power or correct predictions where LW methods have been known to fail. Compelling would be just one case covered in depth fitting the above criteria. Frankly, and not ment to reflect on you, listing 20 topics that are suggestive reminds me of fast talk manipulation and/or an infomercial. I want to see a conversation digging deep on one topic. I want depth of proof not breadth, because breadth by itself is not compelling only suggestive.
I see you repeating this in many places, but I have yet to see EY suggest the useful parts of philosophy should be ignored.
I see EY arguing philosophy is a field “whose poison a novice should avoid”. Note the that novices should avoid, not that well grounded rationalists should ignore. I have followed the conversations of EY’s and I do not see him saying what you assert. I see you repeatedly asserting he or LW in general is though. In theory it should not be hard to dissolve the problem if you can provide links to where you believe this assertions have been made.
I don’t understand.
Explanation of cognitive biases and how to battle against them on Less Wrong? “Useful.”
Explanation of cognitive biases and how to battle against them in a mainstream philosophy book? “Not useful.”
Dissolution of common (but easy) philosophical problem like free will to cognitive algorithm on Less Wrong? “Useful, impressive.”
Dissolution of common (but easy) philosophical problems in mainstream philosophy journals? “Not useful.”
Is this seriously what is being claimed? If it’s not what’s being claimed, then good—we may not disagree on anything.
Also: as I stated, several of the things I listed are already in use at Less Wrong, and have been employed in depth. Is this not compelling for now?
I’m planning in-depth explanations, but those take time. So far I’ve only done one of them: on SPRs.
As for my interpretation of Eliezer’s views on mainstream philosophy, here are some quotes:
One: “It seems to me that people can get along just fine knowing only what philosophy they pick up from reading AI books.” But maybe this doesn’t mean to avoid mainstream philosophy entirely. Maybe it just means that most people should avoid mainstream philosophy, which I agree with.
Two: “I expect [reading philosophy] to teach very bad habits of thought that will lead people to be unable to do real work.”
Three: “only things of that level [dissolution to algorithm] are useful philosophy. Other things are not philosophy or more like background intros.” Reflective equilibrium isn’t “of that level” of dissolution to cognitive algorithm, in any way that I can tell, and yet it plays a useful role in Eliezer’s CEV plan to save humanity. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment doesn’t say much about dissolution to cognitive algorithm, and yet its content reads like a series of Less Wrong blog posts on overcoming cognitive biases with “ameliorative psychology.” If somebody claims that those Less Wrong posts are useful but the Epistemology book isn’t, I think that’s a blatant double standard. And it seems that Eliezer in this quote is claiming just that, though again, I’m not clear what it means for something to be “of that level” of dissolution to algorithm.
And then, in his first comment on this post, Eliezer opened with: “I’m highly skeptical.” I took that to be a response to my claim that “rationalists need not ignore mainstream philosophy,” but maybe he was responding to some other claim in my original post.
But if I’ve been misinterpreting Eliezer this whole time, he hasn’t told me so. I’d sure appreciate that. That would be the simplest way to clear this up.
Here is one interpretation.
The standard sequences explanation of cognitive biases and how to battle against them on Less Wrong? “Useful.”
Yet another explanation of cognitive biases and how to battle against them in a mainstream philosophy book? “Not useful.”
Dissolution of difficult philosophical problem like free will to cognitive algorithm on Less Wrong? “Useful, impressive.”
Continuing disputation about difficult philosophical problems like free will in mainstream philosophy journals? “Not useful.”
Dissolution of common (but easy) philosophical problem arising from language misuse in mainstream philosophy journals? “Not useful.”
Explanation of how to dissolve common (but easy) philosophical problems arising from language misuse in LessWrong? “Useful”.
Good stuff of various kinds, surrounded by other good stuff on LessWrong? “Useful”.
Good stuff of various kinds, surrounded by error, confusion, and nonsense in mainstream philosophy journals? “Not useful.”
I’m not sure I agree with all of this, but it is pretty much what I hear Eliezer and others saying.
Yeah, if that’s what’s being claimed, that’s the double standard stuff I was talking about.
Of course there’s error, confusion, and nonsense in just about any large chunk of literature. Mainstream philosophy is particularly bad, but of course what I plan to do is pluck the good bits out and share just those things on Less Wrong.
I no longer remember your original post did you get that format from Perplexed? Or did he get it from you?
You state Perplexed example i a double standard here. Perplexed discribes what is happen LW as different from what happens in mainstream philosophy, which does not fit the standard definition of double standard. Double standard: a rule applied differently to essentially the same thing/idea/group. Perplexed statements imply that LW and mainstream philosophy are considerably different which does not fit the description of a double standard.
As of yet I have not interpreted anything on LW as meaning the content of the quote above.
No it is not compelling. In science a theory which merely reproduces previous results is not compelling only suggestive. A new theory must have predictive power in areas the old one did not or be simpler(aka:more elegant) to be considered compelling. That is how you show the power of a new theory.
Your assertion was:
Your quote one does not seem to support your assertion by your own admission. My interpretation was most people should avoid mainstream philosophy, perhaps the vast majority and certainly novices. If possibly learn from a better source, since there is a vast amount from better sources and there is a vast amount of work to be done with those sources why focus on lesser sources?
This does not support your assertion either. It only claims the methods of mainstream philosophy are bad habits for people who want to get things done.
This one does not seem to a “daw arbitrary boundary” either so it does not support your assertion. Maybe a boundary but then EY then does on to describe the boundary so you have not supported your discriptor of arbitrary.
I think the difference more and less useful is defiantly being claimed. Having everything in one self consistant system has many advantages. Only one set of terminology to learn. It is easier to build groups when everyone is using or familiar with the same terminology.
Out of your three quotes I do not see any “arbitrary boundry” being drawn by EY. He is drawing a boundary, but in no way do I see it as arbitrary. This boundary and why it is draw is a point that you do not seem to understand EY’s reasoning on, otherwise you would do your best to describe the algorithm that EY used to draw the boundary and then show how it is wrong rather then just calling it arbitrary.
Really I would have thought you main assertion was:
You have not shown Quinean naturalism and the rest are a “centralized repository of reductionist-grade naturalistic cognitive philosophy” and you will have to do a proof with depth, which you have not provided but are working on, to show this. So his skepticism is warranted, justified, prudent and seems like a reasonable barrier to unproven ideas.
I think he has pointed it out. The three quotes above do not support your assertion or “arbitrary”. The difference is at a basic definition and methodological level.
And I just read your resolution as I was writing this post. Frankly It really seem like you jumped to conclusions on EY’s position and level of arbitrariness to a degree which caused inefficiency. My main curiosity is now why you think you jumped to conclusions and what you are going to do to prevent it from happening again.
Yeah, I just disagree with your comment from beginning to end.
Yeah, and my claim is that LW content and some useful content from mainstream philosophy is not relevantly different, hence to praise one and ignore the other is to apply a double standard. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, which reads like a sequence of LW posts, is a good example. So is much of the work I listed that dissolves traditional philosophical debates into the cognitive algorithms that produce the conflicting intuitions that philosophers use to go in circles for thousands of years.
This is a change of subject. I was talking about the usefulness of certain work in mainstream philosophy already used by Less Wrong, not proposing a new scientific theory. If your point applied, it would apply to the re-use of the ideas on Less Wrong, not to their origination in mainstream philosophy.
The strongest support for my interpretation of EY comes from quote #3, for reasons I explained in detail and you ignored. I suspect much of our confusion came from Eliezer’s assumption that I was saying everybody should go out and read Quinean philosophy, which of course I never claimed and in fact have specifically denied.
In any case, EY and I have come to common ground, so this is kinda irrelevant.
I’m fine with that. What counts as a ‘centralized repository’ is pretty fuzzy. Quinean naturalism counts as a ‘centralized repository’ in my meaning, but if Eliezer means something different by ‘centralized repository’, then we have a disagreement in words but not in fact on that point.
In the mind of EY, i assume, and some others there is a difference. If the difference is not relevant there would be a double standard. If there is a relevant difference no double standard exists. I did not see you point out what that difference was and why it was not relevant before calling it a double standard.
Not a change of subject at all. Just let you know what standards I use for judging something suggestive vs compelling and that I think EY might be using a similar standard. Just answering your question “Is this not compelling for now?”, a no with exposition. I was giving you the method by which I often judge how useful a work is and suggesting that EY may use a similar method. If so it would explain some of why you were not communicating well.
It is to be applied within the development of an individuals evolving beliefs. So someone holding LW beliefs then introduce to mainstream philosophy would use this standard before adopting mainstream philosophy’s beliefs.
I do not like the idea, I think it is unproductive, of having conversation with people who think they magically know what I pay attention to and what I do not. If you meant that I did not address your point please say so and how instead.
I did not ignore it. I did think it supported an argument that EY draws a boundary between mainstream philosophy and LW, but did not support the argument that he drew a arbitrary boundary.
My interpretation was that he skeptical with the grade of repository not the centralness of it.