There’s lots of people I think have valuable insights—cognitive scientists, AI researchers, statistical learning experts, mathematicians...
The question is whether high-grade academic philosophy belongs on the scholarship list, not whether scholarship is a virtue. The fact that they have managed to produce a minority school that agrees with Gary Drescher on the extremely basic question of whether there’s libertarian free will (no) and people are made of atoms (yes), does not entitle them to a position next to “Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach”.
Physicalism and the rejection of free will are both majority positions in Anglophone philosophy, actually, but I agree that agreement on those points doesn’t put someone on the shelf next to AIMA.
Physicalism and the rejection of free will are both majority positions in Anglophone philosophy
Regarding physicalism, I don’t entirely trust that survey.
Firstly, most of those who call themselves physicalists nevertheless think that qualia exist and are Deeply Mysterious, such that one cannot deduce a priori, from objective physical facts, that Alfred isn’t a zombie or that Alfred and Bob aren’t qualia-inverted with respect to each other.
Secondly, in very recent years − 90s into the new century—I think there’s been a rising tide of antimaterialism. Erstwhile physicalists such as Jaegwon Kim have defected. Anthologies are published with names like “The Waning of Materialism”.
As the survey itself tell us, only 16% accept or lean towards “zombies are inconceivable”.
This is all consistent with my experience in internet debates, where it seems that most upcoming or wannabe philosophers who have any confident opinions on the matter are antimaterialists.
Firstly, most of those who call themselves physicalists nevertheless think that qualia exist and are Deeply Mysterious, such that one cannot deduce a priori, from objective physical facts, that Alfred isn’t a zombie or that Alfred and Bob aren’t qualia-inverted with respect to each other.
[...]
only 16% accept or lean towards “zombies are inconceivable”.
Strictly speaking, I don’t think either of these requires abandonment of physicalism by even a small degree. To say that one can or cannot conceive something is not to directly say anything about reality itself (#). To say that one can or cannot deduce something is, again, not directly to say anything about reality itself (#except in the trivial sense that it says something about what one, i.e. a real person, can or cannot deduce, or can or cannot conceive). Even if you want to argue that it says something about reality itself, however indirectly, it’s not at all obvious that it says this particular thing (i.e. non-physicalism).
In particular, I am well aware of the severe limitations of deduction as a path to knowledge. Being so aware, I am not in the slightest surprised by, or troubled by, the inability to deduce that Alfred isn’t a zombie. I don’t see why I should be troubled. As for what I can conceive—well, I can conceive all sorts of things which have no obvious connection to reality. Why should examination of the limits of my imagination give me any sort of information about whether physicalism is true?
The key question for me is: is the hypothesis of physicalism tenable? I’m not asking for proof, deductive or otherwise. I am asking whether the hypothesis is consistent with the evidence and internally coherent. The fact that someone can conceive of zombies, and therefore conceive that the hypothesis is false, is no disproof of the hypothesis. And similarly, the fact that the hypothesis of physicalism cannot be deduced is no disproof either.
There’s lots of people I think have valuable insights—cognitive scientists, AI researchers, statistical learning experts, mathematicians...
The question is whether high-grade academic philosophy belongs on the scholarship list, not whether scholarship is a virtue. The fact that they have managed to produce a minority school that agrees with Gary Drescher on the extremely basic question of whether there’s libertarian free will (no) and people are made of atoms (yes), does not entitle them to a position next to “Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach”.
Physicalism and the rejection of free will are both majority positions in Anglophone philosophy, actually, but I agree that agreement on those points doesn’t put someone on the shelf next to AIMA.
Regarding physicalism, I don’t entirely trust that survey.
Firstly, most of those who call themselves physicalists nevertheless think that qualia exist and are Deeply Mysterious, such that one cannot deduce a priori, from objective physical facts, that Alfred isn’t a zombie or that Alfred and Bob aren’t qualia-inverted with respect to each other.
Secondly, in very recent years − 90s into the new century—I think there’s been a rising tide of antimaterialism. Erstwhile physicalists such as Jaegwon Kim have defected. Anthologies are published with names like “The Waning of Materialism”.
As the survey itself tell us, only 16% accept or lean towards “zombies are inconceivable”.
This is all consistent with my experience in internet debates, where it seems that most upcoming or wannabe philosophers who have any confident opinions on the matter are antimaterialists.
All good points. I take back the claim that physicalism is a majority position; that is under serious doubt.
How sad! :(
[...]
Strictly speaking, I don’t think either of these requires abandonment of physicalism by even a small degree. To say that one can or cannot conceive something is not to directly say anything about reality itself (#). To say that one can or cannot deduce something is, again, not directly to say anything about reality itself (#except in the trivial sense that it says something about what one, i.e. a real person, can or cannot deduce, or can or cannot conceive). Even if you want to argue that it says something about reality itself, however indirectly, it’s not at all obvious that it says this particular thing (i.e. non-physicalism).
In particular, I am well aware of the severe limitations of deduction as a path to knowledge. Being so aware, I am not in the slightest surprised by, or troubled by, the inability to deduce that Alfred isn’t a zombie. I don’t see why I should be troubled. As for what I can conceive—well, I can conceive all sorts of things which have no obvious connection to reality. Why should examination of the limits of my imagination give me any sort of information about whether physicalism is true?
The key question for me is: is the hypothesis of physicalism tenable? I’m not asking for proof, deductive or otherwise. I am asking whether the hypothesis is consistent with the evidence and internally coherent. The fact that someone can conceive of zombies, and therefore conceive that the hypothesis is false, is no disproof of the hypothesis. And similarly, the fact that the hypothesis of physicalism cannot be deduced is no disproof either.
I