Actually, I somewhat agree, but being an agreeable sort of chap I’m willing to concede things arguendo when there’s no compelling reason to do otherwise :-), which is why I said “Yeah, credentials are a poor way of judging things” rather than hedging more.
More precisely: I think credentials very much can give you useful information, and I agree with you that argument does not perfectly screen off authority. On the other hand, I agree with prevailing LW culture (perhaps with you too) that credentials typically give you very imperfect information and that argument does somewhat screen off authority. And I suggest that how much credentials tell you may vary a great deal by discipline and by type of credentials. Example: the Pope has, by definition, excellent credentials of a certain kind. But I don’t consider him an authority on whether any sort of gods exist because I think the process that gave him the credentials he has isn’t sufficiently responsive to that question. (On the other hand, that process is highly responsive to what Catholic doctrine is and I would consider the Pope a very good authority on that topic even if he didn’t have the ability for control that doctrine as well as reporting it.)
It seems to me that e.g. physics has norms that tie its credentials pretty well (though not perfectly) to actual understanding and knowledge; that philosophy doesn’t do this so well; that theology does it worse; that homeopathy does it worse still. (This isn’t just about the moral or cognitive excellence of the disciplines in question; it’s also that it’s harder to tell whether someone’s any good or not in some fields than in others.)
I guess the way I would slice disciplines is like this:
(a) Makes empirical claims (credences change with evidence, or falsifiable, or [however you want to define this]), or has universally agreed rules for telling good from bad (mathematics, theoretical parts of fields, etc.)
(b) Does not make empirical claims, and has no universally agreed rules for telling good from bad.
Some philosophy is in (a) and some in (b). Most statistics is in (a), for example.
Re: (a), most folks would need a lot of study to evaluate claims, typically at the graduate level. So the best thing to do is get the lay of the land by asking experts. Experts may disagree, of course, which is valuable information.
Actually, I somewhat agree, but being an agreeable sort of chap I’m willing to concede things arguendo when there’s no compelling reason to do otherwise :-), which is why I said “Yeah, credentials are a poor way of judging things” rather than hedging more.
More precisely: I think credentials very much can give you useful information, and I agree with you that argument does not perfectly screen off authority. On the other hand, I agree with prevailing LW culture (perhaps with you too) that credentials typically give you very imperfect information and that argument does somewhat screen off authority. And I suggest that how much credentials tell you may vary a great deal by discipline and by type of credentials. Example: the Pope has, by definition, excellent credentials of a certain kind. But I don’t consider him an authority on whether any sort of gods exist because I think the process that gave him the credentials he has isn’t sufficiently responsive to that question. (On the other hand, that process is highly responsive to what Catholic doctrine is and I would consider the Pope a very good authority on that topic even if he didn’t have the ability for control that doctrine as well as reporting it.)
It seems to me that e.g. physics has norms that tie its credentials pretty well (though not perfectly) to actual understanding and knowledge; that philosophy doesn’t do this so well; that theology does it worse; that homeopathy does it worse still. (This isn’t just about the moral or cognitive excellence of the disciplines in question; it’s also that it’s harder to tell whether someone’s any good or not in some fields than in others.)
I guess the way I would slice disciplines is like this:
(a) Makes empirical claims (credences change with evidence, or falsifiable, or [however you want to define this]), or has universally agreed rules for telling good from bad (mathematics, theoretical parts of fields, etc.)
(b) Does not make empirical claims, and has no universally agreed rules for telling good from bad.
Some philosophy is in (a) and some in (b). Most statistics is in (a), for example.
Re: (a), most folks would need a lot of study to evaluate claims, typically at the graduate level. So the best thing to do is get the lay of the land by asking experts. Experts may disagree, of course, which is valuable information.
Re: (b), why are we talking about (b) at all?