The value of the external world theory is that it explains why science works at all, not that it explains anything in particular.
No—the validity of inductive logic explains why science works at all. There’s no prior reason to expect inductive logic to be valid in an arbitrary external world.
Note the importance of “external”—if we omit external, then the word “world” just refers to the common factor of our experiences whatever that is, and we don’t actually disagree.
That is, anti-realism holds that nothing provably exists outside the mind. The argument comes down to “A world which is internal to our mind, and a world that is external to our mind, is not differentiable”. For what reason would you expect the internality or externality of the world to have a bearing on whether or not inductive logic applies?
Suppose the entire universe boils down to a mathematical equation; everything is one equation, maybe a fractal, which from a point of simplicity gives rise to complexity. What difference do we expect to encounter if that mathematical equation exists inside of our mind, as opposed to outside of it? If the universe is the expression of that equation, and the equation is compatible with induction, then we should expect induction to work without regard to whether the universe is internal or external to our mind.
That’s a very weak form of anti realism. If 0 and 1 aren’t probabilities, nothing is absolute proveable.
Sure. Is realism the claim that reality probably exists, or definitely exists, however?
What do “inside” and “outside” mean?
In a sense, it’s a statement of dependence. If our minds are inside the world, then if the world stops existing, so do our minds. If the world is inside our mind, then if our mind stops existing, then so does the world.
In another sense, it’s a statement of correspondence. If our minds are inside the world, then the map-territory distinction is ontologically important (note that the mind-territory distinction is itself an anti-realist position, as it argues that there is no direct correspondence between the world and the contents of our mind). If the world is inside our mind, then the map-territory distinction is indistinguishable from any other state of confusion.
. Is realism the claim that reality probably exists, or definitely exists, however?
There are multiple versions of both realism and anti realism. You can even make them overlap.
In another sense, it’s a statement of correspondence. If our minds are inside the world, then the map-territory distinction is ontologically important (note that the mind-territory distinction is itself an anti-realist position, as it argues that there is no direct correspondence between the world and the contents of our mind). If the world is inside our mind, then the map-territory distinction is indistinguishable from any other state of confusion
But you seem to favour a rather specific alternative involving fractals and stuff. Why wouldn’t that be empty? Isn’t evidence for realism, evidence against anti realism, and vice versa?
If making predictions really is the only game in town, then your alternative physics needs to make predictions. Can it?
Well, if my crackpot physics is right, it actually kind of reduces the probability I’d assign to the world I inhabit being “real”. Seriously, the ideas aren’t complicated, somebody else really should have noticed them by now.
But sure it makes predictions. There should be a repulsive force which can be detected when the distance between two objects is somewhere between the radius of the solar system and the radius of the smallest dwarf galaxy. I’d guess somewhere in the vicinity of 10^12 meters.
Also electrical field polarity should invert somewhere between 1 and 10^8 meters. That is, if you have an electrical field, and you measure it to be positive or negative, if you move some distance away, it should invert to be negative or positive.
Are these predictions helpful? Dunno.
Either way, however, it doesn’t really say anything about whether the world is internal or external.
No—the validity of inductive logic explains why science works at all. There’s no prior reason to expect inductive logic to be valid in an arbitrary external world.
There’s no reason to expect inductive logic to work in no world.
Note the importance of “external”—if we omit external, then the word “world” just refers to the common factor of our experiences whatever that is, and we don’t actually disagree.
That is, anti-realism holds that nothing provably exists outside the mind. The argument comes down to “A world which is internal to our mind, and a world that is external to our mind, is not differentiable”. For what reason would you expect the internality or externality of the world to have a bearing on whether or not inductive logic applies?
Suppose the entire universe boils down to a mathematical equation; everything is one equation, maybe a fractal, which from a point of simplicity gives rise to complexity. What difference do we expect to encounter if that mathematical equation exists inside of our mind, as opposed to outside of it? If the universe is the expression of that equation, and the equation is compatible with induction, then we should expect induction to work without regard to whether the universe is internal or external to our mind.
That’s a very weak form of anti realism. If 0 and 1 aren’t probabilities, nothing is absolute proveable.
What do “inside” and “outside” mean?
Sure. Is realism the claim that reality probably exists, or definitely exists, however?
In a sense, it’s a statement of dependence. If our minds are inside the world, then if the world stops existing, so do our minds. If the world is inside our mind, then if our mind stops existing, then so does the world.
In another sense, it’s a statement of correspondence. If our minds are inside the world, then the map-territory distinction is ontologically important (note that the mind-territory distinction is itself an anti-realist position, as it argues that there is no direct correspondence between the world and the contents of our mind). If the world is inside our mind, then the map-territory distinction is indistinguishable from any other state of confusion.
There are multiple versions of both realism and anti realism. You can even make them overlap.
Does any of that make an observable difference.
Not really, no. And that’s sort of the point; the claim that the world is external is basically an empty claim.
But you seem to favour a rather specific alternative involving fractals and stuff. Why wouldn’t that be empty? Isn’t evidence for realism, evidence against anti realism, and vice versa?
If making predictions really is the only game in town, then your alternative physics needs to make predictions. Can it?
Well, if my crackpot physics is right, it actually kind of reduces the probability I’d assign to the world I inhabit being “real”. Seriously, the ideas aren’t complicated, somebody else really should have noticed them by now.
But sure it makes predictions. There should be a repulsive force which can be detected when the distance between two objects is somewhere between the radius of the solar system and the radius of the smallest dwarf galaxy. I’d guess somewhere in the vicinity of 10^12 meters.
Also electrical field polarity should invert somewhere between 1 and 10^8 meters. That is, if you have an electrical field, and you measure it to be positive or negative, if you move some distance away, it should invert to be negative or positive.
Are these predictions helpful? Dunno.
Either way, however, it doesn’t really say anything about whether the world is internal or external.