I’ve always seen it as, the sensation of free will comes from the ability to predict one’s own actions before they occur, in such a way as those predictions themselves seem to have causal efficacy to make themselves come true. Some predictions have that feeling—that they themselves are what’s making the thing being predicted happen (that the part of the brain doing the predicting is outputting that straight to the part handling the behavior, and this hand-off of information is perceived by other regions) - and others don’t.
The former always feel like volition, even when they are “long range” (plans for the future, for instance), but particularly when they are “short range” (like moving one’s arm, which has a very volition-ish feeling). It’s a bit like imperative, or better yet, performative statements (“I now pronounce you man and wife”) in language, which directly cause the thing they are describing.
When you feel as if you did not freely will something, it’s always either because you did not predict it, or because your prediction did not include the further prediction that it, itself, was what was causing the event, due to some kind of dissociation between the part of the brain doing the predicting, and the part acting. (When I dream at night, for instance, I rarely have any sense of free will, because part of the nature of dreaming is that predictive mechanisms are relaxed and various portions of the brain are heavily dissociated from one another.)
I’ve always seen it as, the sensation of free will comes from the ability to predict one’s own actions before they occur, in such a way as those predictions themselves seem to have causal efficacy to make themselves come true.
I thought about that too! The reason I didn’t include it as a contributor to the “free will” sensation was that for me, being able to predict my next action seems like it cuts against free will. If I’m sitting here predicting that I’ll take a drink of my coffee, and haven’t taken a drink yet, and that prediction proves correct, it feels like in the intervening time between making the prediction and taking the drink, I did not have free will to choose whether or not to take the drink! The predictive part of my brain is in control, not me.
By contrast, if I sit here considering whether or not to take a drink of my coffee, and don’t know whether I’ll choose to do so or not (before some time limit expires), that feels like free will. If I can’t predict my own actions, yet physically feel in control of my body when I do act, then that is what I seem to experience as free will.
But I wouldn’t be surprised if people’s “free will” sensation arises in different contexts for different people.
That’s why I included the causal bit. There’s a different sensation between “I can predict it (because something besides me will make it happen)” and “I can predict it (because I will make it happen)”. The latter feels like a plan, or an intention, with an energy of “the prediction itself is what’s doing the work” whereas the former feels like an expectation. And the capacity to make plans or intentions and see them through, is part of what people mean when they talk about free will, it seems like.
I’ve always seen it as, the sensation of free will comes from the ability to predict one’s own actions before they occur, in such a way as those predictions themselves seem to have causal efficacy to make themselves come true. Some predictions have that feeling—that they themselves are what’s making the thing being predicted happen (that the part of the brain doing the predicting is outputting that straight to the part handling the behavior, and this hand-off of information is perceived by other regions) - and others don’t.
The former always feel like volition, even when they are “long range” (plans for the future, for instance), but particularly when they are “short range” (like moving one’s arm, which has a very volition-ish feeling). It’s a bit like imperative, or better yet, performative statements (“I now pronounce you man and wife”) in language, which directly cause the thing they are describing.
When you feel as if you did not freely will something, it’s always either because you did not predict it, or because your prediction did not include the further prediction that it, itself, was what was causing the event, due to some kind of dissociation between the part of the brain doing the predicting, and the part acting. (When I dream at night, for instance, I rarely have any sense of free will, because part of the nature of dreaming is that predictive mechanisms are relaxed and various portions of the brain are heavily dissociated from one another.)
I thought about that too! The reason I didn’t include it as a contributor to the “free will” sensation was that for me, being able to predict my next action seems like it cuts against free will. If I’m sitting here predicting that I’ll take a drink of my coffee, and haven’t taken a drink yet, and that prediction proves correct, it feels like in the intervening time between making the prediction and taking the drink, I did not have free will to choose whether or not to take the drink! The predictive part of my brain is in control, not me.
By contrast, if I sit here considering whether or not to take a drink of my coffee, and don’t know whether I’ll choose to do so or not (before some time limit expires), that feels like free will. If I can’t predict my own actions, yet physically feel in control of my body when I do act, then that is what I seem to experience as free will.
But I wouldn’t be surprised if people’s “free will” sensation arises in different contexts for different people.
That’s why I included the causal bit. There’s a different sensation between “I can predict it (because something besides me will make it happen)” and “I can predict it (because I will make it happen)”. The latter feels like a plan, or an intention, with an energy of “the prediction itself is what’s doing the work” whereas the former feels like an expectation. And the capacity to make plans or intentions and see them through, is part of what people mean when they talk about free will, it seems like.