“Time travel is too improbable to worry about preserving yous affected by it. Given that, it makes sense to want to protect the existence of the unmodified future self over the modified one.”
Those two sentences do not connect. They actually contradict.
Also, you’re doing moral epistemology backwards, in my view. You’re basically saying, “it would be really convenient if the content of morality was such that we could easily compute it using limited cognitive resources”. That’s an argumentum ad consequentum which is a logical fallacy.
You’re probably right about it contradicting. Though, about the moral-epistemology bit, I think there may be a sort of anthropic-bias type argument that creatures can only implement a morality that they can practically compute to begin with.
Your argument is that it is hard and impractical, not that it is impossible, and I think that only the latter type is a reasonable constraint on moral considerations, although even then I have some qualms about whether or not nihilism would be more justified, as opposed to arbitrary moral limits. I also don’t understand how anthropic arguments might come into play.
I think it summarizes to “time travel is too improbable and unpredictable to worry about [preserving the interests of yous affected by it]”.
Your argument makes no sense.
Those two sentences do not connect. They actually contradict.
Also, you’re doing moral epistemology backwards, in my view. You’re basically saying, “it would be really convenient if the content of morality was such that we could easily compute it using limited cognitive resources”. That’s an argumentum ad consequentum which is a logical fallacy.
You’re probably right about it contradicting. Though, about the moral-epistemology bit, I think there may be a sort of anthropic-bias type argument that creatures can only implement a morality that they can practically compute to begin with.
Your argument is that it is hard and impractical, not that it is impossible, and I think that only the latter type is a reasonable constraint on moral considerations, although even then I have some qualms about whether or not nihilism would be more justified, as opposed to arbitrary moral limits. I also don’t understand how anthropic arguments might come into play.