This is the non-central fallacy at its best. Not as a defence, but seriously: who cares if you define yourself as a cultist or not? The important thing about a belief is the usual: how much reality does this belief allows you to grasp and manipulate?
If he finds he doesn’t want to be some things, and cultists are those things and also others, then it’s fine epistemology to also try not to be those other things in case they’re correlated.
This is the non-central fallacy at its best.
Not as a defence, but seriously: who cares if you define yourself as a cultist or not? The important thing about a belief is the usual: how much reality does this belief allows you to grasp and manipulate?
If he finds he doesn’t want to be some things, and cultists are those things and also others, then it’s fine epistemology to also try not to be those other things in case they’re correlated.
Well, they should be correlated in such a way that only excluding them allows to exclude the others, and I deem that situation improbable.