Actually, make that “government” in the singular. … Nowadays, however, the U.S. government acts a single global authority that you have to contend with, and it has little tolerance for regimes that are outside of certain approved bounds.
If the seastead existed somewhere in the North Sea and the Dutch, German, Belgian and British governments approved its existence while the U.S. didn’t (because it feared realization of a libertarian utopia; no terrorist group on the seastead assumed), how likely do you think they would try to put it down by force? And how likely if it were in the Yellow Sea?
How large is the set of things that Western European governments would be OK with, but the U.S. government wouldn’t? It seems to me that their ideological consensus is strong enough that there is little if any practical difference.
When I speak of the U.S. global authority, I don’t mean just authority exercised through explicit military interventions and diplomatic pressures. I also mean the informal and indirect authority that stems from the fact that the modern-day global ideological consensus emanates from American institutions, which means that other countries also won’t be OK with anything that the U.S. government seriously objects to.
Moreover, the problem isn’t just the threat of armed intervention. Economic and even just PR pressures can be fatal by themselves. It’s enough that the respectable worldwide opinion—which is again driven primarily by what the respectable U.S. media and academic institutions say—starts viewing your seastead as undemocratic, exploitative, discriminatory, in violation of human rights, etc., calling for boycotts and sanctions, and so on. This could put enough pressure on respectable people to make them avoid having any business with you, which may well be enough to ruin you without a shot ever being fired.
As for the Yellow Sea, seeking some sort of Chinese protection might indeed be the only feasible course of action, given that China is insulated from the above mentioned influences to a larger degree than probably any other country. (Russia is another such example, but it would probably be even more risky and difficult to deal with.)
It seems to me that their ideological consensus is strong enough that there is little if any practical difference.
Agreed, but that’s somewhat different claim from saying that the U.S. government is the only important player who can prevent seasteads from functioning. Violation of important ideological taboos shared by European and U.S. societies would certainly result into some action against the seasteads, but what are these taboos isn’t decided by U.S. government’s whim. The basic ideological framework is already present in the Western society and the governments are bound to respect it, not the other way around. (I also disbelieve that running some version of libertarian utopian society with several dozens of people on board would classify as such inviolable taboo.)
seeking some sort of Chinese protection might indeed be the only feasible course of action, given that China is insulated from the above mentioned influences to a larger degree than probably any other country
There are certainly other possibilities. Not only Russia (which may be, on the other hand, more hostile to the concerned libertarian ideas and possible tax evasion than the U.S.), but also India, Brazil, Venezuela, perhaps France—strong anti-American sentiments exists in all those countries and any strong pressure from the U.S. government would likely result in a major diplomatic conflict.
The basic ideological framework is already present in the Western society and the governments are bound to respect it, not the other way around.
This isn’t really relevant for the main point, but in my opinion, this ideological consensus has been built, and is presently being maintained, overwhelmingly by American institutions (both governmental and those that are nominally not such). So it’s not at all inaccurate to see it as a projection of U.S. power, even though it nowadays rests on the status and prestige of American ideas and institutions far more than on the U.S. military supremacy. If tomorrow the U.S. disappeared from the global stage, I’m sure this consensus would quickly break down.
(I also disbelieve that running some version of libertarian utopian society with several dozens of people on board would classify as such inviolable taboo.)
Yes, but that’s far below any reasonable benchmark of success. Remember, the seasteading people want huge, hopefully world-changing impact. Achieving such a huge impact by radical experiments in government would involve some violation of taboos with certainty.
Not only Russia (which may be, on the other hand, more hostile to the concerned libertarian ideas and possible tax evasion than the U.S.), but also India, Brazil, Venezuela, perhaps France—strong anti-American sentiments exists in all those countries and any strong pressure from the U.S. government would likely result in a major diplomatic conflict.
On this list, India seems like the only potential candidate to achieve a decently independent status similar to Russia and China in the foreseeable future, though I’d say it’s still far from that. As for the other countries, I don’t think any of them could afford to protect openly a group of people at whom the U.S. government is really angry.
But more importantly, the anti-American sentiments held by the elites of these (and various other) countries are not based on rejecting the U.S.-led transnational ideological consensus (as, for example, the anti-Americanism of some radical nationalists or religious traditionalists would be). These sentiments are based on the perception that the U.S. itself fails to live up to the ideals of this ideological consensus. Therefore, an international campaign against the evil undemocratic human-rights-violating seasteaders would elicit enthusiasm from this whole crowd, and their anti-Americanism would find expression in accusations that the U.S. is supposedly tolerating and abetting them and failing to act against them with sufficient vigor, with its nefarious corporate and militaristic interests, and so on. Unlike the all-out anti-Americanism of various fringe elements, the respectable anti-Americanism of the intellectual and political elites always has this form.
If tomorrow the U.S. disappeared from the global stage, I’m sure this consensus would quickly break down.
Besides “Universal adult franchise is the best, and only just, system of government” and micro-states rapidly becoming explicit protectorates of militarily powerful countries, what other changes would you expect to see if that happened?
Obviously there would be far more poltiical diversity, some of it for the worse, some of it for the better.
Consider Haiti, which is a US protectorate. The US has repeatedly removed regimes it disapproved of, such as the Duvaliers, and repeated installed regimes it approves of, such as Aristide, with the result that who ever is in charge does what the aid NGOs tell them. Observe that under the Duvaliers, there was electric lighting and human feces were buried rather than running down the streets.
That’s a tough and fascinating question, but I’m afraid this isn’t the right venue to pursue it, especially since it’s mostly unrelated to the topic of the original post.
But more importantly, the anti-American sentiments held by the elites of these (and various other) countries are not based on rejecting the U.S.-led transnational ideological consensus (as, for example, the anti-Americanism of some radical nationalists or religious traditionalists would be). These sentiments are based on the perception that the U.S. itself fails to live up to the ideals of this ideological consensus.
This seems not entirely true. The French and German governments opposed the Iraq war although there was no doubt that Saddam Hussein was a human-right-violating bloody tyrant. The public opinion was even more anti-American. The anti-American sentiments are verbally justified by assertions that the U.S. fails to live up to the consensual ideals, but the real reason of these sentiments has to do more with power balancing than with ideologies.
The anti-American sentiments are verbally justified by assertions that the U.S. fails to live up to the consensual ideals, but the real reason of these sentiments has to do more with power balancing than with ideologies
I guess we’ll have to agree to disagree about this. As far as I can tell, the 19th century-style thinking about balances of power in international politics is completely absent among today’s intellectual elites in Western countries. There is still of course a lot of such thinking among the common folk and in lower-class journalism and publishing, but practically none among the people whose opinion and influence really matters, and it really doesn’t describe the reality of what’s going on.
How large is the set of things that Western European governments would be OK with, but the U.S. government wouldn’t? It seems to me that their ideological consensus is strong enough that there is little if any practical difference.
There’s some divergence on drug laws and their enforcement.
How large is the set of things that Western European governments would be OK with, but the U.S. government wouldn’t?
Nothing significant: Western Europe is run by the state department, and less directly, by Harvard through the London School of Economics.
Eastern Europe, however, not so much. Estonia is “an economy in transition”—in transition to capitalism, instead of in transition to fascism.
Australia and New Zealand, though overall roughly equally socialized to the USA, tend to differ randomly from the US in what is regulated and socialized, and what is socialized tends to be socialized in a different way. Australia has a markedly more private school system, it has private transport infrastructure for resource extraction, and has much more private sewage than the USA.
Various Latin American countries are small enough and poor enough that they go for the revenues from regulatory arbitrage, for example Panama. Lee taking power in Singapore was a revolt against the neocolonialism of the London School of Economics, and thus against Harvard, and thus Singapore does no end of things that horrify the Harvard consensus, such as actually punishing criminals. They nonetheless try not to aggravate the US too much.
If the seastead existed somewhere in the North Sea and the Dutch, German, Belgian and British governments approved its existence while the U.S. didn’t (because it feared realization of a libertarian utopia; no terrorist group on the seastead assumed), how likely do you think they would try to put it down by force? And how likely if it were in the Yellow Sea?
How large is the set of things that Western European governments would be OK with, but the U.S. government wouldn’t? It seems to me that their ideological consensus is strong enough that there is little if any practical difference.
When I speak of the U.S. global authority, I don’t mean just authority exercised through explicit military interventions and diplomatic pressures. I also mean the informal and indirect authority that stems from the fact that the modern-day global ideological consensus emanates from American institutions, which means that other countries also won’t be OK with anything that the U.S. government seriously objects to.
Moreover, the problem isn’t just the threat of armed intervention. Economic and even just PR pressures can be fatal by themselves. It’s enough that the respectable worldwide opinion—which is again driven primarily by what the respectable U.S. media and academic institutions say—starts viewing your seastead as undemocratic, exploitative, discriminatory, in violation of human rights, etc., calling for boycotts and sanctions, and so on. This could put enough pressure on respectable people to make them avoid having any business with you, which may well be enough to ruin you without a shot ever being fired.
As for the Yellow Sea, seeking some sort of Chinese protection might indeed be the only feasible course of action, given that China is insulated from the above mentioned influences to a larger degree than probably any other country. (Russia is another such example, but it would probably be even more risky and difficult to deal with.)
Agreed, but that’s somewhat different claim from saying that the U.S. government is the only important player who can prevent seasteads from functioning. Violation of important ideological taboos shared by European and U.S. societies would certainly result into some action against the seasteads, but what are these taboos isn’t decided by U.S. government’s whim. The basic ideological framework is already present in the Western society and the governments are bound to respect it, not the other way around. (I also disbelieve that running some version of libertarian utopian society with several dozens of people on board would classify as such inviolable taboo.)
There are certainly other possibilities. Not only Russia (which may be, on the other hand, more hostile to the concerned libertarian ideas and possible tax evasion than the U.S.), but also India, Brazil, Venezuela, perhaps France—strong anti-American sentiments exists in all those countries and any strong pressure from the U.S. government would likely result in a major diplomatic conflict.
This isn’t really relevant for the main point, but in my opinion, this ideological consensus has been built, and is presently being maintained, overwhelmingly by American institutions (both governmental and those that are nominally not such). So it’s not at all inaccurate to see it as a projection of U.S. power, even though it nowadays rests on the status and prestige of American ideas and institutions far more than on the U.S. military supremacy. If tomorrow the U.S. disappeared from the global stage, I’m sure this consensus would quickly break down.
Yes, but that’s far below any reasonable benchmark of success. Remember, the seasteading people want huge, hopefully world-changing impact. Achieving such a huge impact by radical experiments in government would involve some violation of taboos with certainty.
On this list, India seems like the only potential candidate to achieve a decently independent status similar to Russia and China in the foreseeable future, though I’d say it’s still far from that. As for the other countries, I don’t think any of them could afford to protect openly a group of people at whom the U.S. government is really angry.
But more importantly, the anti-American sentiments held by the elites of these (and various other) countries are not based on rejecting the U.S.-led transnational ideological consensus (as, for example, the anti-Americanism of some radical nationalists or religious traditionalists would be). These sentiments are based on the perception that the U.S. itself fails to live up to the ideals of this ideological consensus. Therefore, an international campaign against the evil undemocratic human-rights-violating seasteaders would elicit enthusiasm from this whole crowd, and their anti-Americanism would find expression in accusations that the U.S. is supposedly tolerating and abetting them and failing to act against them with sufficient vigor, with its nefarious corporate and militaristic interests, and so on. Unlike the all-out anti-Americanism of various fringe elements, the respectable anti-Americanism of the intellectual and political elites always has this form.
Besides “Universal adult franchise is the best, and only just, system of government” and micro-states rapidly becoming explicit protectorates of militarily powerful countries, what other changes would you expect to see if that happened?
Is that not enough?
Obviously there would be far more poltiical diversity, some of it for the worse, some of it for the better.
Consider Haiti, which is a US protectorate. The US has repeatedly removed regimes it disapproved of, such as the Duvaliers, and repeated installed regimes it approves of, such as Aristide, with the result that who ever is in charge does what the aid NGOs tell them. Observe that under the Duvaliers, there was electric lighting and human feces were buried rather than running down the streets.
That’s a tough and fascinating question, but I’m afraid this isn’t the right venue to pursue it, especially since it’s mostly unrelated to the topic of the original post.
This seems not entirely true. The French and German governments opposed the Iraq war although there was no doubt that Saddam Hussein was a human-right-violating bloody tyrant. The public opinion was even more anti-American. The anti-American sentiments are verbally justified by assertions that the U.S. fails to live up to the consensual ideals, but the real reason of these sentiments has to do more with power balancing than with ideologies.
The state department opposed the Iraq war, thus this is consistent with them being state department proxies or puppets—Mencius calls them muppets.
I guess we’ll have to agree to disagree about this. As far as I can tell, the 19th century-style thinking about balances of power in international politics is completely absent among today’s intellectual elites in Western countries. There is still of course a lot of such thinking among the common folk and in lower-class journalism and publishing, but practically none among the people whose opinion and influence really matters, and it really doesn’t describe the reality of what’s going on.
And you determined the Real Reason how?
Downvoted for politics.
Fair enough. Did you downvote the whole discussion or only my last reply?
There’s some divergence on drug laws and their enforcement.
Nothing significant: Western Europe is run by the state department, and less directly, by Harvard through the London School of Economics.
Eastern Europe, however, not so much. Estonia is “an economy in transition”—in transition to capitalism, instead of in transition to fascism.
Australia and New Zealand, though overall roughly equally socialized to the USA, tend to differ randomly from the US in what is regulated and socialized, and what is socialized tends to be socialized in a different way. Australia has a markedly more private school system, it has private transport infrastructure for resource extraction, and has much more private sewage than the USA.
Various Latin American countries are small enough and poor enough that they go for the revenues from regulatory arbitrage, for example Panama. Lee taking power in Singapore was a revolt against the neocolonialism of the London School of Economics, and thus against Harvard, and thus Singapore does no end of things that horrify the Harvard consensus, such as actually punishing criminals. They nonetheless try not to aggravate the US too much.