A brief manifesto regarding what is mysterious, what is not mysterious, and the nature of reality.
Some things that are mysterious:
The existence of anything at all is fundamentally mysterious. Trying to explain why there is something rather than nothing leads to odd and perhaps dubious concepts like a “necessary being”, and the alternative is just to say there is no explanation at all.
The existence of consciousness, with its manifest properties, is fundamentally mysterious if you suppose a world in the image of today’s mathematical physics. Just to be tedious and repeat a fact stated many times, but something as basic as experienced color is just not there, in a universe made of nothing but colorless particles. However, the strongly validated part of physics is the mathematical part. There is considerable room to rethink the nature of the entities which behave according to the equations, and I for one see an opening here to solve the problem of consciousness.
That we have “laws of physics” is semi-mysterious and possibly fundamentally mysterious. In a way it follows naturally from the premise that the world contains things which have different “natures” and that their behavior is determined by this nature. A physical law is then just a statement of how they behave. But these basic ontological terms—substance, property, nature—are all potentially mysterious in themselves. When you try to define basic ontological terms, it starts to sound like poetry, or like circular definition. So I think ontology—not ontology in the computer-science sense of sub-sub-categorization, but fundamental ontology, the nature of existence and that which exists—is an area we do not understand at all well, and its mysteries are probably continuous with the first two mysteries I mentioned above.
Some things that are not mysterious:
That life—in the sense of complex self-replicating entities—can develop in a world of atoms behaving according to physical law is not mysterious. If it needed any demonstration, the use of evolution made in computing proves that you can generate ingeniously adapted complexities through darwinian procedures. The combinatorial possibilities of organic chemistry and the nature of the physical environment on Earth can together plausibly be regarded as sufficient to explain the phenomenon of life, and in practice chemistry and genetics are showing us that the explanations can be found.
That a material system can exhibit properties of intelligence like problem-solving or goal-directed behavior, in a world of atoms behaving according to physical law, is also not mysterious. This is distinct from the problem of consciousness above. The nature of subjectivity is ontologically problematic—hard to characterize even in itself, let alone map onto the physical ontology—but if the question is just, how can a thing made of atoms solve problems or achieve goals, it is not mysterious. Computer science, pattern recognition, algorithms of all sorts show that it can be done.
So returning to your challenge to Liron’s worldview, I’d say life is not a problem, consciousness is, but there is nothing to show that consciousness is a challenge to the evolutionary explanation of life or the computational explanation of practical intelligence.
Finally, the nature of reality. It does in fact appear to be a logical possibility that atomistic materialism is radically wrong. For example, one might suppose a universe consisting of one or more fundamentally mind-like entities who are just hallucinating the whole affair, which act upon the material part of the universe ‘directly’ rather than in a way mediated by many elementary physical interactions, which are the product of a nonevolutionary process of creation, and so forth. However, when it comes to judging the plausibility of such scenarios from the evidence one has, they are basically on a par with the scenario out of The Matrix according to which I’m a body in a pod, or a brain in a vat, being fed images of a simulated world. All these scenarios require that a large part of mundane experience be regarded as false or as basically misleading. Again, it’s a logical possibility, but it is one that, if it is to be addressed rationally, has to be addressed on some other plane entirely than the one which one uses to make everyday decisions. If the world is not interpreted as a giant illusion, then the weight of everyday evidence already favors (in a broad sense) physics as the explanation of observable events, evolution as the explanation of life, and computation as the explanation of intelligence.
A brief manifesto regarding what is mysterious, what is not mysterious, and the nature of reality.
Some things that are mysterious:
The existence of anything at all is fundamentally mysterious. Trying to explain why there is something rather than nothing leads to odd and perhaps dubious concepts like a “necessary being”, and the alternative is just to say there is no explanation at all.
The existence of consciousness, with its manifest properties, is fundamentally mysterious if you suppose a world in the image of today’s mathematical physics. Just to be tedious and repeat a fact stated many times, but something as basic as experienced color is just not there, in a universe made of nothing but colorless particles. However, the strongly validated part of physics is the mathematical part. There is considerable room to rethink the nature of the entities which behave according to the equations, and I for one see an opening here to solve the problem of consciousness.
That we have “laws of physics” is semi-mysterious and possibly fundamentally mysterious. In a way it follows naturally from the premise that the world contains things which have different “natures” and that their behavior is determined by this nature. A physical law is then just a statement of how they behave. But these basic ontological terms—substance, property, nature—are all potentially mysterious in themselves. When you try to define basic ontological terms, it starts to sound like poetry, or like circular definition. So I think ontology—not ontology in the computer-science sense of sub-sub-categorization, but fundamental ontology, the nature of existence and that which exists—is an area we do not understand at all well, and its mysteries are probably continuous with the first two mysteries I mentioned above.
Some things that are not mysterious:
That life—in the sense of complex self-replicating entities—can develop in a world of atoms behaving according to physical law is not mysterious. If it needed any demonstration, the use of evolution made in computing proves that you can generate ingeniously adapted complexities through darwinian procedures. The combinatorial possibilities of organic chemistry and the nature of the physical environment on Earth can together plausibly be regarded as sufficient to explain the phenomenon of life, and in practice chemistry and genetics are showing us that the explanations can be found.
That a material system can exhibit properties of intelligence like problem-solving or goal-directed behavior, in a world of atoms behaving according to physical law, is also not mysterious. This is distinct from the problem of consciousness above. The nature of subjectivity is ontologically problematic—hard to characterize even in itself, let alone map onto the physical ontology—but if the question is just, how can a thing made of atoms solve problems or achieve goals, it is not mysterious. Computer science, pattern recognition, algorithms of all sorts show that it can be done.
So returning to your challenge to Liron’s worldview, I’d say life is not a problem, consciousness is, but there is nothing to show that consciousness is a challenge to the evolutionary explanation of life or the computational explanation of practical intelligence.
Finally, the nature of reality. It does in fact appear to be a logical possibility that atomistic materialism is radically wrong. For example, one might suppose a universe consisting of one or more fundamentally mind-like entities who are just hallucinating the whole affair, which act upon the material part of the universe ‘directly’ rather than in a way mediated by many elementary physical interactions, which are the product of a nonevolutionary process of creation, and so forth. However, when it comes to judging the plausibility of such scenarios from the evidence one has, they are basically on a par with the scenario out of The Matrix according to which I’m a body in a pod, or a brain in a vat, being fed images of a simulated world. All these scenarios require that a large part of mundane experience be regarded as false or as basically misleading. Again, it’s a logical possibility, but it is one that, if it is to be addressed rationally, has to be addressed on some other plane entirely than the one which one uses to make everyday decisions. If the world is not interpreted as a giant illusion, then the weight of everyday evidence already favors (in a broad sense) physics as the explanation of observable events, evolution as the explanation of life, and computation as the explanation of intelligence.