I think this is potentially an overly strong criteria for decision theories—we should probably restrict to something like the problems to a fair problem class, else we end up with no decision theory receiving any credence.
Good point, I should have mentioned that in my article. (Note that XOR Blackmail is definitely a fair problem (not that you are claiming otherwise)).
I also think “wrong answer” is doing a lot of work here.
I at least in part agree here. This is why I picked XOR Blackmail, because it has such an obvious right answer. That’s an intuition, but that’s also true for some of the points made in favor of The Evidentialist’s Wager to begin with.
Good point, I should have mentioned that in my article. (Note that XOR Blackmail is definitely a fair problem (not that you are claiming otherwise)).
I at least in part agree here. This is why I picked XOR Blackmail, because it has such an obvious right answer. That’s an intuition, but that’s also true for some of the points made in favor of The Evidentialist’s Wager to begin with.